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INTRODUCTION

Learned commentators have called the Religious Freedom Resto
ration Act of 1993 ("RFRA" or "the Act " )1 "perhaps the most uncon
stitutional statute in the history of the nation"2 and "the most egre
gious violation of the separation of powers doctrine in American
constitutional history."3 In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores,4
the Supreme Court struck down the Act in its applications to state and
local governments, declaring that "RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."5
The Act's applications to · federal law, however, survived Boerne,
which means that plaintiffs with religious freedom claims against the
federal government have a formidable legal tool at their disposal.
RFRA raises fundamental questions about the relationship between
legislative and judicial power. This Article aims to facilitate the opera
tion of RFRA's surviving federal law applications, which I will call
"Federal RFRA," by considering how this statute fits into the consti
tutional scheme of governmental power and how courts should pro
ceed in construing it.
RFRA offers a novel structural model for legislation. In the Act's
applications to federal law, Congress made a blanket precommitment
to protect religious liberty against federal encroachment, beyond what
the Supreme Court has held the Constitution to require. This form of
legislation may become increasingly important to the extent the Court
abjures enforcement of constitutional rights against the federal gov-

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
2. Lino A. Graglia, City of Boerne v. Flores: An Essay on the Invalidation of the Relig
ious Freedom Restoration Act, 68 MISS. L.J. 675, 675 (1998).
3. Eugene Gressman, RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper Errors, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 507, 538 (1999) [hereinafter Gressman, Comedy].
4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
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ernment.6 The Boerne Court's elimination of RFRA's state law appli
cations casts a clear spotlight on two inquiries the Court did not have
to make. First, did Congress exceed its constitutional role by legislat
ing a precominitment to enhance free exercise protection against fed
eral authority? Second, assuming Federal RFRA survives the first in
quiry, how can courts follow Congress's directive to administer a
statutory regime of mandatory religious accommodation without
countenancing violations of the Establishment Clause?
The answers to these questions have important implications for a
broad range of litigants, from federal prisoners whose opportunities
for religious exercise are constrained7 to members of minority relig
ious groups whose practices violate federal regulations8 to unlicensed
religious broadcasters9 and religion-motivated tax objectors.10 Analysis
of Federal RFRA can also aid in assessing the constitutionality of sub
sequent religious freedom legislation prompted by Boerne, notably the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.11 In addition,
constitutional analysis of Federal RFRA is significant because the
same Establishment Clause problems, and some variations on the
same separation of powers problems, will confront the RFRA-like
statutes many states are considering or have enacted in the wake of
Boeme.12

6. For a discussion of legislative attempts to fill gaps the courts leave in protecting
rights, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1
(1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Statutes).
7. See, e.g., McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 165 F.3d 32 (Table, Text in WESTLA W), Unpub
lished Disposition, No. 97-1701, 1998 WL 879503 (7th.Cir. 1998) (holding that prison officials
did not violate RFRA by punishing prisoner who refused to remove or cover religious pin
worn on outside of clothing).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-5492, 2000 WL 692647 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
22, 2000) (stating that, under RFRA, government's restriction on use of marijuana by
Rastafarian on supervised release from prison may be accomplished through less restrictive
means and without burdening exercise of religion).
9. See, e.g;, United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 1999 WL
718646 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31', 1999) (holding that seizure of unlicensed religious radio station's
equipment was notleast restrictive means of furthering compelling government interest, thus
violating RFRA).
10. See, e.g., Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (ruling that IRS penal
ties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of religious opposition to war did not
violate RFRA).
11. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
1 14 Stat. 803 (2000) . Federal and state statutory protections for religious exercise are legion.
See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 4-6 (2000) (discussing religious accommodation statutes) [hereinafter McConnell,
Singling Out).
12. See Symposium, Restoring Religious Freedom in the States, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
513 (1999); Mary Jean Dolan, The Constitutional Flaws in the New Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Why RFRAs Don't Work, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 153 (2000) (arguing that
Illinois RFRA violates federal and state Establishment Clauses and state separation of pow
ers principles); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Reiigious Exemptions, 46
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The few commentators who have paid more than passing attention
to the question of Federal RFRA's constitutionality have tended to
view both the separation of powers and Establishment Clause prob
lems as amenable to unambiguous resolution, either clearing Federal
RFRA of any constitutional deficiencies13 or condemning it across the
board.14 Meanwhile, federal courts that have applied RFRA to federal
law since Boerne have produced no consistent doctrine of accommo
dations under the Act.15 This Article examines whether and how
courts can apply Federal RFRA in a manner consistent with the Con
stitution. It contends that courts have no basis for invalidating the
Act's federal law applications; rather, courts should focus on the task
of construing Federal RFRA to avoid Establishment Clause problems.
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the genesis of Federal RFRA.
Part II explores the implications of the separation of powers for Fed
eral RFRA's enhancement of religious freedom at the expense of the
federal government. This Part first contends that Federal RFRA is
best understood as a legislative precommitment to protecting religious
exercise across the range of federal law, secured by the political inertia
RFRA requires Congress to overcome should it want to repeal the
Act or to exempt any given governmental function from the Act's pro
tection. That understanding compels the conclusion, detailed in the
remainder of Part II, that the Court has no business invalidating Fed
eral RFRA on any separation of powers ground. First, I will demon
strate that Congress's apparent lack of constitutional authority in ap
plying RFRA to federal law is irrelevant, because Federal RFRA UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999) (hereinafter Volokh, Common-Law Model] (discussing state
RFRAs in conjunction with Federal RFRA).
13. See Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20
ARK.-LITILE ROCK L.J. 715, 727-47 (1998) (hereinafter Berg, Constitutional Future];
Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 213 (1995)
(hereinafter Laycock, Ratchet] (suggesting that Congress has power to protect religious free
dom from federal encroachment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Re
ligious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995) (arguing that
Congress's power should not be questioned with respect to RFRA's ability to trump federal
laws); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 589, 677-78 (1996) (approving of concessions
that Federal RFRA is constitutional).
14. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 525-29; Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998) (herein
after Hamilton, Unconstitutional] (arguing that RFRA's federal applications violate separa
tion of powers and Establishment Clause); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 227 (1995) [hereinafter Marshall, Concerns] (suggesting RFRA violates establishment,
equal protection, and free speech principles); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No RFRAF Al
lowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake
of City of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1998) (concluding that Federal RFRA
violates Article V amendment provision).
15. See infra notes 266-271 and accompanying text (discussing judicial applications of
Federal RFRA).
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properly construed to prevent Establishment Clause violations - re
flects no exercise of power at all. Next, I will contend that a congres
sional precommitment to overprotecting rights in the federal sphere
neither usurps the judicial power to interpret the Constitution nor in
terferes with courts' function in deciding cases. Finally, I will explain
that the mechanism Congress chose to enforce RFRA's precommit
ment in particular cases - heightened judicial scrutiny of federal re
ligious accommodation claims - comports with the practical and con
stitutional determinants of judicial competence.
Properly focused judicial review of Federal RFRA entails two
carefully balanced tasks. First, courts must give Federal RFRA
meaningful effect. Second, they must determine whether and to what
extent RFRA violates the Establishment Clause. Part III of this Arti
cle contends that, although the Act on its face does not violate that
Clause, many of its conceivable applications do. I propose and evalu
ate two alternative approaches to statutory construction of Federal
RFRA that would allow application of the Act to its constitutionally
permissible extent. First, the Court could construe the Act to encom
pass nontheistic claims for conscientious exemptions from the opera
tion of federal laws. I favor this libertarian approach to construction of
Federal RFRA because it would give maximum effect to the will of
the political branches. An alternative would be for the Court simply to
assert the constitutional force of the Establishment Clause to constrain
the scope of RFRA's statutory expansion of rights. This approach
would dramatically reduce the Act's force, but I believe it would per
mit, at a minimum, accommodations to ensure equal treatment of
similarly situated believers in different religions and idiosyncratic ac
commodations that are not generally desirable.16
I.

FROM RFRA TO FEDERAL RFRA

The story of RFRA is the latest chapter in a longstanding debate
over the idea of mandatory religious accommodations by government
entities.17 In 1 990, the. Supreme Court in Employment Division v.
16. In addition to the constitutional problems, Federal RFRA raises the issue whether
the Court may invalidate some subset of a statute's applications, without striking any of its
substantive provisions, and then apply the statute in its valid applications. Courts to consider
the question have found RFRA's federal applications severable from the applications struck
down by Boerne. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Sutton v.
Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 833 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999); Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 43 (1998); see also Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for Constitutional
Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 689,
693-94 (1998) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Amendment]. But see Henderson v. Kennedy, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 14235 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2001) at **8-9 (identifying severability of RFRA's
federal applications as an open question).
.
17. A "religious accommodation" is an exemption from the effect of a neutral, generally
applicable law where such effect would interfere with the claimant's religious exercise. The
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Smith18 rejected a claim that the Free Exercise Clause precluded a
state from denying unemployment benefits to members of the Native
American Church who had lost their jobs due to their use of peyote in
a religious sacrament. The Court reached beyond the facts of the case
to hold broadly that the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle plain
tiffs who challenge applications of neutral laws on religious grounds to
have their claims examined under heightened constitutional scrutiny.
In so holding, the Court dramatically limited its earlier decisions in
Sherbert v. Verner19 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,20 which had applied strict
scrutiny to religious accommodation claims.21 Writing for the Court in
term "exemption" is often used interchangeably with "accommodation." A "mandatory"
accommodation or exemption is one that is not specified in the particular regulatory scheme
at issue but that a court holds to be required under a superior law. Mandatory accommoda
tion claims prior to Smith invoked the Free Exercise Clause; Congress designed RFRA as a
statutory directive of mandatory accommodation. In contrast, a "discretionary" or "permis
sive" accommodation or exemption is one the legislature chooses to provide as part of a
regulatory scheme. For a detailed parsing of the different varieties of religious accommoda
tion, see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 74954 (1992) [hereinafter Lupu, Trouble].
18. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding, in sustaining free exercise challenge to denial of
unemployment benefits where claimant had been fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath,
that any incidental burden on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a compelling
state interest). The Supreme Court followed Sherbert in three subsequent decisions that in
voked the Free Exercise Clause to reject states' denials of unemployment benefits. See
Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding unconstitutional
state's denial of unemployment compensation to claimant who lost job because of religion
motivated refusal to work on Sunday); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (holding unconstitutional state's denial of unemployment compensation
benefits to Seventh-Day Adventist terminated because religious beliefs forbade her from
working from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
719 (1981) (holding unconstitutional state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits
to Jehovah's Witness who terminated his munitions job because his personal religious beliefs
forbade participation in arms production).
20. 406 U.S 205, 214 (1972) (holding that a state may not "compel school attendance
beyond eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a
legitimate religious belief' absent a state interest of "sufficient magnitude" to overcome
right to free exercise of religion).
21. The Smith Court purported not to overrule Yoder or Sherbert but rather to distin
guish both precedents. The Court distinguished Yoder as involving a claim of "hybrid
rights," a free exercise claim combined with a due process claim of parents to direct their
children's education. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 & n.1. The Court extended the "hybrid
rights" umbrella to explain other successful free exercise challenges where the religious ex
ercise at issue had an expressive component. See id. (distinguishing, e.g., Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)). Justice Scalia, writing for the Smith majority, did not ex
plain how or why a free exercise claim became more potent when combined with an appeal
to another constitutional provision, or why the free exercise claim was not mere surplusage
under the "hybrid rights" analysis. The Court distinguished Sherbert and its progeny because
"a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility crite
ria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemploy
ment." Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Justice Scalia explained neither how this characteristic distin
guished unemployment compensation from most or all other administrative regimes nor why
Smith, which raised an unemployment benefits claim, did not fit within the distinction.
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Smith, Justice Scalia asserted that heightened scrutiny of religious ac
commodation claims would produce "a system in which each con
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social impor
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. "22 The
Smith decision was the subject of voluminous and intense academic
criticism. 23
The question of constitutionally mandated religious accommoda
tion had produced inconsistent results in a series of decisions between
Sherbert and Smith. As the Smith opinion acknowledged,24 the Court
in that period generally had accorded free exercise claimants less pro
tection than a strong reading of Sherbert and Yoder would have re
quired.25 In the majority of free exercise cases, the Court rejected
The Smith Court's distinction of Yoder and Sherbert has failed to persuade many com
mentators. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cr. REV. 1,
37-38 [hereinafter Laycock, Remnants] (accusing Smith Court, as to distinction of Yoder, of
preferring unenumerated to enumerated rights); id. at 48-51 (criticizing individualized con
sideration distinction of unemployment benefits cases); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exer
cise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121-24 (1990) [hereinaf
ter McConnell, Revisionism] (criticizing Smith Court's distinctions of Yoder and the
unemployment cases). But see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulner
ability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1245, 1289-90 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience] (echoing "indi
vidualized consideration" distinction of unemployment benefits cases).
22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
23. See John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause:
A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REV. 71 (1991); James D. Gordon III, Free Exer
cise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REY. 91 (1991); Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21 ;
Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That
Was Never Filed, 8 J. L. & RELIGION 99 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith
and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259; McConnell, Revision
ism, supra note 21; see also Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall:
The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REY. 925, 937 (1998) (assailing the
Smith approach to religious accommodations as "superficial and unconvincing" and urging
the Court to "try again"). But see Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1288-91
(defending rejection of strict scrutiny in Smith while criticizing Court's understanding of Re
ligion Clauses); Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Rhetoric of Religion, 20 ARK.
LITILE ROCK L.J. 619, 623-27 (1998) [hereinafter Hamilton, Rhetoric] (defending result and
standard in Smith); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) [hereinafter Marshall, Defense] (purporting "to defend
Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free exercise exemptions without defending
Smith itself').
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-84.
25. Commentators have emphasized the Court's retreat from strict scrutiny prior to
Smith as a factor that proves legislative action was needed to protect religious freedom,
demonstrates that strict scrutiny is unworkable in this setting, or simply complicates analysis
of RFRA. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 783 (1998)
[hereinafter Greenawalt, Religious Law]; Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restora
tion Act, 1993 BYU L. REY. 221, 231 [hereinafter Laycock, Act]; Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and
the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV.
171, 182-85 (1995) [hereinafter Lupu, Lawyer's Guide]; William P. Marshall, The Case
Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
357, 365-70 (1989-90) [hereinafter Marshall, Exemption]; Volokh, Common-Law Model, su
pra note 12, at 1495 (characterizing strict scrutiny under Sherbert as "a complex body of law,
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mandatory accommodation claims.26 Only a few decisions, factually
similar to Sherbert, reflected the solicitude for free exercise that had
characterized Sherbert and Yoder.27 The Court between Sherbert and
Smith also had decided a range of Establishment Clause cases that
presented accommodation claims - though usually not framed as
such - as to which it reached inconsistent results.28 These decisions
reveal considerable tension within and between free exercise doctrine,
which commands the government to safeguard religious liberty, and
Establishment Clause doctrine, which constrains the government to
avoid aggrandizing or coopting religion. "The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which
with not one but several tests"). But see Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the
Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious
Freedom from State and Local Infringement, 20 ARK.-LITILE RO CK L.J. 633, 636 n.13 (1998)
("(T]he Court continued to endorse a relatively demanding standard of review until its deci
sion in Smith . . . . "); McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1110 (calling pre-Smith strict
scrutiny "a Potemkin doctrine" in the Supreme Court but arguing that it influenced deci
sions of lower courts and federal and state political decisionmakers); see also Robert M.
O'Neil, Religious Freedom and Nondiscrimination: State RFRA Laws Versus Civil Rights, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 785, 787-91 (1999) (noting that the Court between Sherbert and Smith
'
generally weakened strict scrutiny of religious claims but intensified scrutiny in unemploy
ment compensation cases).
26. Prior to Smith the Court employed three distinct methodologies to rule against re
ligious claimants. See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1994) (hereinafter Berg,
Congress]; Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 178-185; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion
and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 215-16 (1992}. In some cases, the Court ap
plied a restrictive notion of what constitutes a "substantial burden" on religion. See Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (finding desecration of a
Native American burial site also used for "specific spiritual activities" not to constitute a
substantial burden); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (finding no substantial burden from
requirement that government maintain a social security number for religious claimant);
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (finding no substantial
burden on religious activity from imposition of Fair Labor Standards Act requirements on
religious employer). In other cases, the Court carved out exceptions to the application of
strict scrutiny. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (declining categorically
to apply strict scrutiny to prisoners' free exercise claims); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (deferring to military authorities in rejecting officer's free exercise claim). In a
handful of cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny but found the religious burden to Le the
least restrictive means for the government to accomplish a compelling interest. See Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that government's interest in en
forcing antidiscrimination laws outweighed burden placed on religious university by denial
of tax exemption due to university's ban on interracial dating); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982} (holding that government's interest in maintaining tax system outweighed
burden on Amish employer who believed religious duty to provide for elderly rendered
paying Social Security tax irreligious).
27. See supra note 19 (discussing unemployment benefit cases).
28. The decisions that most clearly drew the connection between accommodations and
the Establishment Clause were Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidat
ing exemption of religious publications from sales tax); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding exemption for religious employers from religious dis
crimination prohibitions), and Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (strik
ing down state statute giving sabbatarians right not to work on Sabbath}. The implications of
the Establishment Clause for RFRA are discussed infra Part III.
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are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other."29 Justice Scalia's major
ity opinion in Smith made no mention of the Establishment Clause,
addressing only the potential effects of strict scrutiny on the govern
ment's regulatory prerogatives.
In 1993, Congress passed RFRA in an unabashed effort to reverse
the Smith decision. The Act was supported by "one of the broadest
coalitions in recent political. history, including Christians, Jews,
Muslims, Sikhs, Humanists, and secular civil liberties organizations."30
It passed both Houses of Congress almost without opposition.31 RFRA
provides that "[g]ovemment shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion" unless the burden "is in furtherance of a compel
ling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of fur
thering" such interest.32 The text of the legislation includes "findings"
that expressly criticize Smith33 and declare that "the compelling inter
est test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior government interests."34 RFRA purported to "restore" the
Sherbert-Yoder test for accommodation claims;35 in fact, the Act's ex
press requirement of strict scrutiny for all free exercise challenges to
29. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); see also infra notes 284-288 and
accompanying text. Insightful discussions of the relationship between the two clauses iii.elude
Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PITI. L. REV. 673 (1980); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of ".Tests"
Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 323; Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State
and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive,
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) [hereinafter
Laycock, Neutrality]; Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: Th e Problem of Burde.ns on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989) [hereinafter Lupu, Burdens]; William P.
Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV.
545 (1983); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11; Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Para
dox Redux, 1992 SUP. Cr. REV ..123.
30. Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restora
tion Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 (1994); see also id. at 210 n.9 (listing all organizations that
formed coalition that sponsored RFRA); 139 CONG. REC. 26415 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993)

(statement of Sen. Bradley) ("It is a testament to the importance of RFRA that virtually
every religious group, spanning the entire spectrum, has voiced its support for this bill. It is a
rare thing when such a diverse coalition joins. in wholehearted agreement."). But see Graglia,
supra note 2, at 680 ("Few Americans were aware in 1993 that their religious freedom had
deteriorated and was in need of restoration.").
31. See 139 CONG. REC. 26416 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (reporting 97-3 Seil.ate vote in
favor of passage of RFRA); id. at 27239-41 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (reporting no objection
to unanimous consent request in the House).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-(l)(a), 2000bb-(l)(b)(2) (1994).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1994) (stating that "m [Smith] the Supreme Court vir
tually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion").
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (1994).
35. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb(b)(l) (1994).
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general laws probably accords religious exercise more protection than
it enjoyed before Smith, at least in theory.36 RFRA as enacted applied
both to the states, as an exercise of Congress's enforcement power un
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,37 and to the federal gov
ernment.
In 1997, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores38 declared
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments.39
The Boerne case involved a church's challenge to application of a local
government's zoning regulation; accordingly, the Court's opinion fo
cused exclusively on problems with Congress's reliance on Section 5 to
justify RFRA's applications to state and local governments.40 Justice
36. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (noting that RFRA "imposes
in every case a least restrictive means requirement - a requirement that was not used in the
pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify"); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Law
rence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores,
1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 79, 102-03 (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne] (arguing that
RFRA permitted more exemption claims than pre-Smith case law); Laycock & Thomas, su
pra note 30, at 224 (arguing, based on statement of purpose to restore Sherbert-Yoder stan
dard, that RFRA is "highly protective"); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 55 & n.245 (arguing
prior to enactment that RFRA "would provide far greater protection to religious freedom
claims than has ever been the case"); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious
Exemptions - a Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 598 (1999)
(hereinafter Volokh, Intermediate Questions] (arguing that federal and state RFRAs "fa
cially require strict scrutiny of all substantial burdens on religious practices, something the
pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence did not do"). Others have emphasized that
RFRA is unclear about what standard it meant to restore. See, e.g. , Christopher L. Eisgruber
& Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ls Unconstitutional, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451 (1994) (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutiona� ("By 're
storing' the Court's pre-Smith jurisprudence, RFRA did not enact any specific standard. In
stead, it endorsed a bevy of conflicting standards."). This uncertainty has left room for ar
gument about how broadly the Court should or might construe RFRA's scope. Compare
Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 26-28 (arguing that inconsistencies in pre Smith law require
courts to read RFRA as adopting a stronger version of strict scrutiny than courts practiced at
the time of Smith), with Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra, at 474-75 (suggesting
Court might construe RFRA to incorporate Smith understanding of Free Exercise Clause).
-

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (stating that
Congress has authority to enact RFRA pursuant to Section 5); S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 14
(1993) (same). No source of constitutional authority is cited in the text of RFRA itself.
38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. Congress subsequently amended RFRA to remove all references to the states, in
conformity with Boerne. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (2000).
40. Boerne is one in a line of decisions in which the Rehnquist Court has weakened the
power of the federal government. See e.g. , United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598 (2000)
(holding that Congress's powers under Commerce Clause and Section 5 did not extend to
providing civil remedies for victims of gender-based violent crimes under Violence Against
Women Act of 1994); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Tenth
Amendment bars Congress from "commandeering" state executive branch officers to en
force provisions of the Brady Act); Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity under enu
merated powers of Art. I, § 8); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that
congressional attempt to criminalize possession of firearms near schools exceeded congres
sional authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). See generally
Symposium, New Voices on the New Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). The
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Kennedy, writing for the Court, made clear that Congress under Sec
tion 5 had power only to remedy constitutional violations, not to de
fine constitutional rights the Court previously had declined to recog
nize:
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with
the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of
the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction on the States. Legislation which
alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be en
forcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is.41

Justice Kennedy found that Congress in RFRA had not merely en
forced a constitutional right but had altered the Court's interpretation
of the First Amendment as announced in Smith: "RFRA is so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu
tional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections."42 That substantive action encroached on
"[s]tates' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for
the health and welfare of their citizens"43 and thus exceeded
Congress's constitutional authority.44
fact that no Justice disputed the majority's Section 5 analysis in Boerne, while most of the
other cited decisions have come on sharply contested 5-4 votes, suggests some of the Justices
may have viewed Boerne more as a religious freedom case than a federalism case.

41. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court proceeded to hold that "[t]here must be a con
gruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end." Id. at 520. For elaboration of the Boerne "congruence and proportion
ality" standard, see Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 536 (2001) (finding application to
states of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (1994), not congruent and
proportional under Boerne); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding
application to states of Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U. S.C. § 621, not con
gruent and proportional under Boerne). The Boerne Court also defused the implication in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966), that Section 5 gave Congress substantive
authority to define constitutional rights, see Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-28, and it distinguished a
series of voting rights precedents that had approved broad congressional action pursuant to
Section 5. See id. at 530-33 (distinguishing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Morgan, 384 U.S. 641; and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
42. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
43. Id. at 534.
44. Boerne generated several separate opinions, although none disputed the Court's
reasoning on the Section 5 issue. Justice Stevens, who joined the majority opinion, added a
brief concurrence to state his view that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. See id. , at
536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor dissented, advancing historical arguments
to press her view that the Court had incorrectly decided Smith, although she expressed
agreement with the Boerne Court's Section 5 analysis. See id. at 549-64 (O'Connor, J., dis
senting). Justice Scalia responded with a partial concurrence that attacked Justice
O'Connor's historical evidence. See id. at 537-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice
Souter also dissented, maintaining that Smith had not been adequately briefed and that the
Court therefore lacked a sufficiently firm legal basis for deciding the issue presented in
Boerne. See id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Boerne Court nowhere expressly limited its holding to
RFRA's applications to state and local governments, and it referred
obliquely to the Act's federal applications.45 Near the close of his ma
jority opinion, Justice Kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial pre
rogative to interpret the Constitution in language that might be under
stood to implicate the Act's applications to federal as well as state law:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and
the proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
When the political branches of the Government act against the back
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it
must be understood that in later cases and controversies, the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles,
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. 46

In the next sentence, however, the opinion states that "RFRA was
designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us;
but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which
must control."47 The emphasis on the particular case before the Court
and especially on the provisions of RFRA "here invoked" implies an
awareness that only RFRA's state law applications were presented in
Boerne. Indeed, after a lengthy discussion of the history of the Four
teenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy situated the Court's judicial su
premacy concerns squarely in the context of the Fourteenth Amend
ment and state sovereignty:
The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in
maintaining the traditional separation of powers between Congress and
the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth
self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has
had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions.. . . As enacted, the
Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States
which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. The
power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in
the Judiciary. 48

45. See id. at 516 (quoting statutory language that applies RFRA to federal govern
ment); id. (singling out RFRA's applications to states as "the most far reaching and substan
tial of RFRA's provisions"); id. at 532 ("RFRA's restrictions apply to every agency and offi
cial of the Federal, State, and local Governments.").
46. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 536.
48. Id. at 523-24 (citation omitted); see also id. at 519 ("The design of the (Fourteenth]
Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states.");
id. at 529 ("If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amend-
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These passages indicate that Boerne did not strike down the Act's
federal law applications. The Court's subsequent actions49 and schol
arly commentary5° bear this reading out.
Several federal Courts of Appeals since Boerne have held that the
Supreme Court did not.invalidate RFRA as to federal law,51 and the
Eighth Circuit in In re Young52 has declared the Act constitutional as
ment's meaning . . . it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional
power.").
49. After deciding Boerne, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the Eighth Cir
cuit a case that implicated the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the Bankruptcy Code.
See In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). The Court's de
cision to remand Christians rather than summarily reverse it suggests that RFRA's federal
applications survived Boerne. See Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court
Was Right: Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 793, 808 n.77
(1998) [hereinafter Lupu, Reflections]. But see Marci A. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores:
A Landmark for Structural Analysis, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 699, 718 n.104 (1998) [here
inafter Hamilton, Landmark] (suggesting that remand of Christians indicated that the hold
ing of Boerne applied to RFRA's federal applications). The federal government itself has
vigorously asserted the continuing vitality of RFRA's applications to federal law. See Eric J.
Rothschild, Opinion & Commentary: Testing for Freedom, 149 N.J. L.J. 1064, 1068 (1997).
50. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959 &
n.169 (3d ed. 2000); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 745-46 (arguing that
Boerne's comments on separation of powers should be read in conjunction with the Court's
emphasis on federalism); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 WM .
& MARY L. REV. 665, 667-72 (1998) (arguing that separation of powers language in Boerne
is "a red herring," because holding on judicial supremacy grounds that Congress may not
alter constitutional protection of religious liberty would undeniline Boerne's federalism
holding that the states - equally subject to judicial supremacy - may do so); Greenawalt,
Amendment, supra note 16, at 691 ("Flores does not tell us whether Congress can qualify
past and future federal legislation by RFRA-like language."); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual
Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM . & MARY L. REV. 743, 745 (1998) [hereinafter
Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs]; Lupu, Reflections, supra note 49, at 808 & n.77; Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of Cify of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 153, 162 n.68 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions]; see also Robin-Vergeer,
supra note 13, at 677-79 (arguing pre-Boerne that RFRA presents federalism but not separa
tion of powers concerns); William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom
Restoration A ct Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DU K E L.J. 291, 294 n.12
(1996) (same); but see Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three
Abnormalities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 80 n.8 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, Normalized] ("Language
in [Boerne] suggests that the Court might view RFRA's limitations on federal government
action infirm on separation of powers grounds."); Steven D. Ginsburg & Natalie J. Carlos,

Zoning in Florida Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Acts: What City Officials Should
Watch Out for in Defending Their Ordinances Against Freedom of Religion Claims, 12 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 157, 160-62 (1999) (arguing that Boerne struck down RFRA's federal ap
plications as violating the separation of powers); Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 718
(arguing that "the vast majority of the Flores decision, as a matter of rhetoric and logic, ap
plies as persuasively to federal as to state law; Sniolla, supra note 23, at 925 n.3 (calling effect
of Boerne on RFRA's applications to federal law "unclear").
51. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 957-61 (10th Cir. 2001); Sutton v. Providence
St. Joseph Med. Center, 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999); Caldwell v. Caesar, No. 98-1857, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6914 (D.D.C. May 22, 2001) (holding RFRA valid as to District of
Columbia); see also Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald (Jn re Hodge), 220
B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998). One federal appellate court upheld RFRA against constitutional
challenges prior to Boerne. See EEOC v. Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 469-70 (D.C. Cir.
.
1996).
52. 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1996).
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applied to federal law. Young reaffirmed the Eighth Circuit's pre
Boerne decision53 that RFRA barred a bankruptcy trustee from recov
ering tithes debtors had made to their church, even though the tithes
met the criteria for avoidable transactions under the Bankruptcy
Code.54 As to the Act's constitutionality, the court first held that
Boerne had not decided RFRA's viability as applied to federal law.55
The court proceeded to reject the argument that RFRA violated the
separation of powers, holding that Congress in RFRA had properly
amended federal law pursuant to its Article I, section 8 powers.56
Finally, the court rejected a facial argument that RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause, holding that the Act had the requisite secular
purpose and effect to avoid invalidation under the Supreme Court's
Lemon57 test.58
Most federal courts confronted with RFRA claims simply have as
sumed the Act remains valid as to federal law.59 On the other hand,
53. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
5 4. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 857. Following the decision in Young, Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Code to exempt tithes up to fifteen percent of a debtor's gross in
come from being treated as avoidable transactions, unless the debtor actually intended to
defraud creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 48(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). See generally Julianne
Belaga, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Impact of RFRA 's Invalidation on Re
ligious Tithes in Bankruptcy, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 353-54 (1998) (describing how courts
have applied RFRA to permit debtors' tithes to their churches to supersede fraudulent con
veyance law).
55. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 858; see also Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-59; Sutton, 192
F.3d at 831-33.
56. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 859-61. Senior District Judge Bogue dissented in Young
based on his view that RFRA "attempts to impose upon the judiciary, a standard of review
for interpreting constitutional rights which it believes is a better standard than that crafted
by the Court itself." Id. at 864 (Bogue, J., dissenting). The majority did not analyze this ar
gument, an aspect of what I call the structural objection to RFRA, which I discuss infra Sec
tion 11.C. The majority also did not confront any argument that RFRA improperly counter
manded the Smith Court's judgment that courts lack institutional competence to apply strict
scrutiny. I consider such institutional competence-based objections to RFRA infra Section
11.D. For criticism of the Eighth Circuit's separation of powers analysis, see Michael K.
Sabers, Note, Well, It Depends on What Your Definition of "Unconstitutional" ls: The Eighth
Circuit's Misinterpretation of Flores in Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 44 S.D.
L. REV. 432 (1999).
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a description of the Lemon
test, see infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
58. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 861-63. The Eighth Circuit did not consider the possi
bility that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause as applied. I maintain that Young was
incorrectly decided because the result in that case violated the Establishment Clause. See
infra notes 386-388 and accompanying text; see also Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Ex
ercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne: Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105, 15355 (1998) (contending that the claim in Young clashed with the Establishment Clause);
Caitlin Garvey, Note, Through Amos-Colored Glass: The Eighth Circuit Fails to See the
RFRA 's Real Meaning in Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.
1998), 24 DAYTON L. REV. 491 (1999) (criticizing Eighth Circuit's Establishment Clause
analysis).
59. See generally cases cited infra notes 267-268.
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several federal courts have held or assumed, usually with little analy
sis, that RFRA is invalid as applied to the federal government.6()
II. RFRA, LEGISLATIVE PRECOMMITMENT, AND THE SEPARATION
OF P OWERS

Federal RFRA makes heightened protection for religious freedom
the default position in the application of all present and future federal
legislation. In creating this default, Congress did not draw on constitu
tional authority or affect the constitutional structure of government in
any way. Rather, Congress simply relinquished a measure of its own
authority to the people in order to advance religious freedom.61 The
discu�sion that follows will begin by explaining the precommitment
60. See La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 2000) (ex
pressing "doubt" that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal law); Carpa v. Smith, No.
CIV96-1 435, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 1 625 * 1 4 (D. Ariz. July 20, 1998) (dismissing claims
against federal employees on ground that Boerne invalidated RFRA); Waguespack v.
Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31, 36-37 (W.D. La. 1998) (holding that Boerne declared RFRA uncon
stitutional in its entirety); In re Andrade, 213 B.R. 765, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (holding
that Boerne declared RFRA unconstitutional in its entirety); In re Gates Comm. Chapel, 212
B.R. 220, 225-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); In re Saunders, 215 B.R. 800, 803-06
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (holding that application of RFRA in bankruptcy cases violates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses); Saleem v. Helman, No. 96-2502, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22572 *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 21, 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1 096 (1998); Monet v.
United States, No. 97-00281 DAE, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 5269 *5-*6 (D. Haw. Sept. 15,
1 997) (same); Patel v. United States, No. 97-1083, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 34067 *5 (lpth Cir.
Dec. 4, 1997) (dismissing federal prisoner's RFRA claim on ground that Boerne invalidated
RFRA); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. �upp. 591 , 595-600 (D. Md. 1996) (holding,
prior to Boerne, that RFRA violated separation of powers).
61. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 959 ("Congress certainly may choose to exer
cise less than all of its legislative power"); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 729
("[T)he application of RFRA to federal law does not expand congressional power, but
makes it possible for Congress to limit its own power, its own laws, so as not to infringe on
religious freedom . . . . "); Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?": The Sources and Limits of
Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters "Touching Religion," 29 IND. L.
· REV. 1, 91 (1995) ("As long as congressional action does not amount to a law 'respecting an
establishment of religion,' it is for Congress to define how solicitous of religious freedom the
executive branch shall be as it goes about the task of seeing that the laws 'be faithfully exe
cuted.' "); Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13, at 1 56 ("Congress can restrain the federal agen
cies if it wants, and that is what it has done [in RFRA).''); Loewy, supra note 58, at 153 n.215
("Separation of powers . . . does not preclude the Congress from voluntarily limiting the
reach of its own statutes."); see also William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 603 (1975) ("Congress can limit the
exercise of federal governmental power, creating individual rights that the courts have de
clared not to be compelled by the Constitution.").
The authority of which Congress relinquished a part subsumes the authority of instru
mentalities over which the Constitution gives Congress plenary power. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 17 (empowering Congress "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso
ever, over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United
States"); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (giving Congress "Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States"). These grants of plenary authority ensure that no constitutional issue akin to
the federalism concerns aired in Boerne arises from RFRA's application to the District of
Columbia or to the Territories.
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methodology of Federal RFRA. With that explanation in place, Fed
eral RFRA transcends the numerous separation of powers objections
that have been lodged against it. First, Congress did not need any
source of constitutional authority to restrain the effect of its own en
actments on religious freedom. Second, congressional precommitment
to heightened religious freedom does not force courts to accept or ap�
ply a congressional interpretation of the Constitution and thus does
not undercut judicial authority. Finally, the Court may not refuse to
effectuate Federal RFRA on the belief that the Act forces courts to
analyze cases in a manner outside the institutional competence of the
judiciary.
A. RFRA as a Legislative Precommitment to Protect Religious
Freedom
A "precommitment" is a binding constraint that forecloses the
possibility of future impulsive behavior.62 Jon Elster defines a decision
as a precommitment when its effect is to trigger an extrinsic causal
process that makes the undesired later behavior less likely than it
would be without the precommitment.63 The paradigm of a precom
mitment is the frequently recounted story of Ulysses' command to his
crew to bind him to the mast · of his ship to avoid being drawn over
board by the songs of the sirens.64 In the same way Ulysses predicted
he would need outside intervention to prevent him from succumbing
to the sirens, a governmental precommitment can entrench a long
term policy decision reached during a time of perceived rational delib
eration, in preparation for the future danger that short-term interests
might overwhelm the long-term goal.65
62. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: an Economic
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 123 (1993);
see also Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357 (1985)
(defining a system for setting up anticipatory self-commands).

63. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY 36-47 (1979). Professor Eisler lists five specific criteria for precommitment.

First, the precommitment must "bind oneself . . . to carry out a certain decision at time t1 in
order to increase the probability that one will carry out another decision at time t2." Second,
"[i]f the act at the earlier time has the effect of inducing a change in the set of options that
will be available at the later time, then this does not count as binding oneself if the new fea
sible set includes the old one." Third, "[t]he effect of carrying out the decision at t1 must be
to set up some causal process in the external world." Fourth, "[t]he resistance against carry
ing out the decision in t1 must be smaller than the resistance that would have opposed the
carrying out of the decision at t2 had the decision at tl not intervened." Finally, "[t]he act of
binding oneself must be an act of commission, not of omission." Id. at 39-46.
64. See id. at 36-37; see also Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 123; Jeremy
Waldron, Banking Constitutional Rights: Who Controls Withdrawals?, 52 ARK. L. REV. 533,
539-41 (1999).
65. For a discussion of the potential utility of precommitment strategies by candidates or
voters as means to enhance leverage in the electoral process, see Saul Levmore, Precom
mitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567 (1996).
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As a methodology for protecting high-priority societal values, pre
commitment has several advantages. First, by definition, precommit
ment increases the likelihood that a normative preference expressed at
t1 will be honored at t2. Second, precommitment reduces the unpre
dictability and instability of legal rules and regimes, because it gives
the people some assurance that the entrenched policy goal will survive
some measure of variation in other governing priorities.66 Third, pre
commitment decreases the costs of legislative decisionmaking by an
swering in one motion a question that might recur in a variety of socie
tal controversies.67 Of course, the precommitment methodology has
precisely countervailing disadvantages. First, again by definition, it in
creases "dead hand" control over future decisions, binding future gen
erations of governors and governed to an increasingly distant past.
Second, the importance of the entrenched policy goal may be difficult
to balance against unpredictable future priorities.68 Third, precom
mitment decreases the extent to which decisionmakers debate and
consider the consequences of the entrenched decision in the variety of
circumstances it will affect over time, many of which are unpredictable
at the time of precommitment.69
Jeremy Waldron has suggested a distinction between two varieties
of precommitment that helps place the advantages and disadvantages
of the methodology into perspective. In what may be called a strong
66. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 126. Even an unenforceable legislative
precommitment might provide this advantage through its persuasive force. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 48
ARK. L. REV. 215, 227 (1995) (suggesting general legislation that set rules for presidential
succession in contingencies for which Constitution does not provide would "serve as a pre
commitment and focal point" and that "deviation from this clear focal point will obviously
smack of changing the rules in the middle of the game - indeed, after the game has
ended").
67. Discussing constitutionalism as a limit on majoritarian decisionmaking, Cass
Sunstein observes that
the decision to take certain questions off the political agenda might be understood as a
means not of disabling but of protecting politics, by reducing the power of highly controver
sial questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness, chaos, stalemate, collective
action problems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities so serious and fundamental as to
endanger the governmental process itself.
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 642 (1991); see
also Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 126 ("[S]tabilizing governance rules encour

ages investment and avoids the deadweight losses that accrue from continual attempts to
manipulate the decision-making rules.").

68. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 504-07 (1997) (noting absence of readily available normative baseline to
indicate how much present interests should weigh against future interests); Waldron, supra
note 64, at 550-51 (describing constitutional precommitment as "the artificially sustained
ascendancy of one view in the polity over other views whilst the complex issues between
them remain unresolved").

69. This disadvantage gives rise to concerns about the due process of lawmaking. See
infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
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precommitment, the decisionmaker renders the constraint on its future
behavior inexorable. This form of precommitment provides the maxi
mum assurance of constraint while also assuring that the effects of t.he
precommitment will flow completely from the decisionmaker's
autonomous will.70 Strong precommitment, with its concentration of
control in the decisionmaker and its inexorable consequences, maxi
mizes both the advantages and the countervailing disadvantages. . of ·
precommitment. In contrast, what may be . called a third-party pre
commitment gives a trusted extrinsic actor responsibility for assuring
the behavioral constraint.71 A third-party precommitment provides a
less certain assurance of behavioral constraint, because the third party
may weaken the constraint, and the effects of the precommitment will
reflect inputs other than the original decisionmaker's autonomous
will.72 Professor Waldron characterizes the Constitution as this latter
variety of precommitment, because the Framers depended on courts
to interpret and effectuate the constraints they placed on the govern�
ment's behavior.73
Precommitment is most familiar as a constitutional methodology.74
Federal RFRA is a relatively l!nusual example of legislative precommitment. The Act precommits the federal government to a heightened
degree of solicitude for religious freedom by providing that courts in
religious freedom cases shall allow any present or future federal law or
rule to interfere with religious exercise only where the challenged fed
eral action satisfies strict scrutiny. In recent years, the closest parallel
to Federal RFRA's legislative methodology has been the federal Line
Item Veto Act.75 That statute, which precommitted the federal gov70. See Waldron, supra note 64, at 553 (discussing ELSTER, supra note 63, at 42).
71. Professor Waldron's example of this sort of precommitment is "the drinker giving
his car keys to a friend at the beginning of a party with strict instructions not to return them
when they are requested at midnight." Waldron, supra note 64, at 553.
72. See id. at 554-55.
73. Because the Constitution requires judicial application, Professor Waldron rejects the
precommitment model as an explanation for how constitutional judicial review can be con
sistent with democratic self-government, even by a "People" defined as retaining its identity
across generations. See id. at 555-59.
·

74. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 124-26; Samuel Freeman, Constitu
tipnal Democracy and the Legitimacy ofJudicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327, 353 (1990-91);
Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Su
permajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 655 (2000) (discussing benefits of constitutional
precommitment); Klarman, supra note 68, at 496-97 (discussing objections to constitutional
precommitment); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique
of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (dis
cussing precommitment and constitutional amendments); Levmore, supra note 65, at 593-9�
(discussing case law relating to constitutional precommitment politics); Nancy C. Staudt,
Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105 (1998) (discussing
idea of constitutional precommitment to balanced budget); Sunstein, supra note 67, at 639;
Waldron, supra note 64.
·

75. 2 U.S.C. § 691-691d (Supp. II 1996).

·
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emment to perceived fiscal prudence by authorizing the president to
cancel certain specified types of spending enactments subject to con
gressional disapproval, was struck down because it empowered the
president to encroach on the Article I legislative power.76 Legislative
precommitments such as Federal RFRA artd the line-item veto use
procedural approaches to effectuate substantive policy choices over a
range of cases.77
Closer analysis, however, reveals an important difference between
the ' line-item veto a:nd Federal RFRA. The line-item veto entrenched
a policy of cutting federal spending in appropriate cases by a single
precommitment to oversight of budgetary decisions, enforced by the
president. · Federal RFRA, in contrast, includes two distinct levels of
precommitment. At the first level, Federal RFRA binds Congress to
heightened judicial scrutiny of religious freedom claims against the
government in particular cases. This is a third-party precommitment
because it depends on a presumptively trustworthy third party courts - to effectuate the policy choice. At that first level, Federal
RFRA is · only marginally unusual. Every statute depends on some
combination of courts and executive officials for effectuation, inter
pretation, and enforcement.78 Federal RFRA's first-level precommit
ment is distinct from other statutes, and similar to the line-item veto,
only because it governs an unusually broad range of as-yet unspecified
drcumstances.79
At the second level, however, Federal RFRA binds Congress to
include heightened protection for religious freedom as a component of
all present and future legislation. Congress has denied itself the option
of legislating burdens on religious exercise unless it can overcome the
extrinsic political inertia imposed by RFRA (distinct from the intrinsic
76. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
77. See Saul Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 16 B.U. L. REV. 807, 828 (1996)
(identifying line-i�em veto and single-subject rule as legislative procedural precommitments);
see also David Currie, RFRA, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 637, 643 (1998) (comparing RFRA
and the Line Item Veto Act as instances where "Congress . . . has . . . succumbed to the
temptation to respond to perceived defects in the Constitution, or in the Courts understanding of it, by enacting simple legislation").
·

78. RFRA is hardly unique in "overprotecting" constitutionally inscribed rights, in
cluding the right to free exercise of religion, against federal encroachment. For example, af
ter the Court held in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), that the Free Exercise
Clause did not obligate the military to permit the wearing of religious headgear, Congress
imposed such an obligation by statute. See 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1987). Similarly, Congress re
sponded to Smith by amending the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to protect
Native Americans' sacramental use of peyote against federal and state discrimination. See 42
U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(l) (1994).
: 79. Federal RFRA's third-party precommitment feature, like the line-item veto, is for
mally subject to challenge on the ground that the legislative directive to the third party re
quires some unconstitutional action. In the case of Federal RFRA, however, the challenge is
unavailing. See infra Section III.D (discussing institutional competence objection to Federal
RFRA).
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political inertia that Congress must overcome whenever it seeks to
amend or pass a law). This is a strong precommitment because the en
trenched substantive policy choice is secured not by a congressional
instruction to courts or the Executive Branch but by the political iner
tia that affects Congress itself - the fact that Congress has to muster
exceptional political will to alter it.Bo Federal RFRA is distinctive in
placing this self-executing political constraint on the entire output of
the legislative process.Bi
Federal RFRA's strong precommitment to require heightened
protection for religious exercise makes it a distinctly potent statute.
The Act, however, does not exactly lash Ulysses to the mast. Congress
has two ways around Federal RFRA - repeal of the Act itself or ex
emption of a particular action from the Act's effects - either of which
it can achieve by a simple majority vote. Thus, Federal RFRA is far
easier to abrogate than a constitutional provision. The Act's strong
precommitment places the firmest constitutionally permissible limit on
legislative discretion by creating a default preference for protecting
religious freedom. However, the constitutional rule that Congress may
not bind future congresses,B2 and the attendant unavailability of a
stronger security mechanism akin to the Article V procedure for con
stitutional amendment, ensure that legislative discretion remains
broad. Although Federal RFRA's legislative methodology is novel,

80. See Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1481-82 (describing decrease
under RFRAs of legislative burden faced by ad vocates of any given religious accommoda
tion). The vastly more formidable constitutional analog is the amendment procedure, which
requires Congress and/or state legislatures to muster supermajority support. See U.S. CONST.
art. V.
81. The closest analogy to Federal RFRA's strong precommitment feature is public
property, such as federal parkland, public waterways, or the Social Security trust fund, that
the government holds in trust. The trust can be viewed as a politically secured promise or
precommitment to future generations that the government will maintain and protect the
property despite competing priorities that may arise in the future. See, e.g. , William G.
Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1996) (dis
cussing importance of preserving the financial trust funds for Social Security and Medicare);
Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colo
nial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REV . 623 (1998) (discussing definition of a public trust regarding
waterfront land).
82. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 66, at 227; John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J.
483, 505-06 (1995) (noting Blackstone's principle and Constitutional indications that one

legislature may not bind a future legislature). Some have argued that contract law may pro
vide exceptions to this rule. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Government Precommitment to Tax In
centive Subsidies: The Impact of United States v. Winstar Corp. on Retroactive Tax Legisla
tion, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1997) (discussing implications of Winstar case for legislative
precommitment through government contracts); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Oppor
tunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV.
1129, 1183 (1996) (suggesting use of contract law to force government to provide previously
promised tax subsidies).
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nothing about that methodology steps outside any boundary the
Constitution draws for Congress.83
The balance of this Part will proceed from this precommitment
analysis to explain why the various separation of powers objections to
Federal RFRA should be dismissed. The disadvantages of precom
mitment - dead hand control, the indeterminate importance of the
entrenched policy goal, and decreased debate about applications remain in the background. Nothing in the Constitution forbids legisla
tive precommitment on any of these grounds, and the relative ease
with which Congress can sidestep the strong precommitment in Fed
eral RFRA ameliorates all of them. The problems of the precommit
ment methodology, however, underscore the danger that a statute like
Federal RFRA might encroach on constitutionally protected rights in
particular circumstances. Strategies for dealing with that danger will
be the subject of Part III.
B.

No Power Required: Federal RFRA and the Enumerated Powers
Doctrine·

The most fundamental separation of powers objection to Federal
RFRA, advanced vigorously by both Eugene Gressman84 and Marci
Hamilton,85 is that no provision of the Constitution gives Congress
authority to enact RFRA and apply it to federal law.86 The enumer83. Laurence Tribe suggests Federal RFRA might violate the Constitution to the extent
it "add[s] to art. I's requirements for the enactment of legislation by a subsequent Congress."
1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 959 n.169. He concludes, however, that the only conse
quence of such a violation would be that any future federal statute whose plain meaning
connoted exemption from RFRA would have to be deemed to include such an exemption.
See id. Thus, the effect on Federal RFRA's strong precommitment feature would be mar
ginal. In a different vein, Ira Lupu suggests Federal RFRA's presumption in favor of height
ened statutory protection for religious freedom raises constitutional concerns because sub
sequent legislative adjustments to the reach of the statutory protection might favor
particular sects. See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Lib
erty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 584-86 (1999) [hereinafter Lupu, Codification]. That objec
tion proves too much. All statutes are subject to amendment, and any statutory scheme of
benefits carries a risk that subsequent amendments may allocate its benefits in violation of
constitutional nondiscrimination norms. Courts must deal with any such violations as they
arise. See infra Part III.
84. See Eugene Gressman, The Necessary and Proper Downfall of RFRA, 2 NEXUS 73,
81-84 (Fall 1997) [hereinafter Gressman, Downfall]; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3;
Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 119-38 (1996).
85. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into
the Henhouse Under Cover ofSection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
357 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton, Section 5]; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at
1 4-19; Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 718-22.
. 86. For additional statements of the enumerated powers objection to RFRA, see
Aurora R. Bearse, Note, RFRA: Is It Necessary? Is It Proper?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1045,
1 060-66 (1998) (questioning Congress's power to enact federal component of RFRA); J.
Jeffrey Patterson, Note, The Long Road Towards Restoration of Religious Freedom: Con-
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ated powers objection proceeds from the premise that RFRA has the
coercive effect of "enforc[ing] the Free Exercise Clause . . . when en
dangered by action of the federal govemment,"87 just as, prior to
Boerne, the Act enforced the incorporated Free Exercise Clause
against state and local governments. This premise, in tum, draws on
the Boerne Court's statement that RFRA "at every level of govern
ment" has the effect of "displacing laws and prohibiting official actions
of almost every description and regardless of subject matter. "88 The
enumerated powers critics posit that, if Congress is to impose its will
on the federal government through RFRA, it requires some source of
constitutional authority.
As Professor Hamilton points out, Congress could not have en
acted RFRA as to the federal government pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because that provision only authorizes legis
lation affecting the states.89 No other constitutional provision, includ
ing the First Amendment, gives Congress authority to enforce consti
tutional guarantees against the federal government in the manner that
Section 5 authorizes such enforcement against the states.90 The subject
matter of the Act does not fall within any of the congressional powers
enumerated in Article l.91 The enumerated powers critics also reject
the suggestion that Congress applied RFRA to the federal govern
ment pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, sec
tion 8.92 RFRA might be necessary and proper to effectuate either (1)
the religious freedom guarantee of the First Amendment or (2) all the
federal statutes passed pursuant to Congress's enumerated powers.
Professor Hamilton and Professor Gressman both dismiss the first
formulation on the view that Congress lacks power to enforce constigressional Options in Light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 87 KY. L.J. 253, 264-71 (1998-99)
(expressing doubt about possibility of using any Art. I, § 8 power to restore RFRA's applica
tions to state and local law). For responses to this objection, see Berg, Constitutional Future,
supra note 13, at 730-38 (arguing against enumerated powers critique); Lupu, Lawyer's
Guide, supra note 25, at 213 (dismissing enumerated powers critique); Ira C. Lupu, The Fail
ure ofRFRA, 20 ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 578 (1998) [hereinafter Lupu, Failure] (same);
Paulsen, supra note 13, at 253 (same).
87. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81.
88. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (quoted in Gressman, Downfall,
supra note 84, at 77; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 7).
89. See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 370-78; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra
note 14, at 15.
90. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 362-63; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note
14, at 14; see also Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The most substantial hint RFRA's legislative history

offers as to the constitutional grounding of the Act's federal applications relies on the Neces
sary and Proper Clause. See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (declaring congressional
authority to enact RFRA to provide statutory protection for a constitutional value pursuant
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause).

August 2001]

1925

RFRA and Federal Law

tutional rights against the federal government.93 As for the second
formulation, both maintain that Federal RFRA fails the standards
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Marylancf4 set for necessary
and proper legislation95 because the Act lacks a legitimate purpose and
does not actually pertain to any action taken by Congress pursuant to
one of its enumerated powers.96
The fundamental problem with the enumerated powers objection
lies in its premise that Congress needed to draw on any constitutional
authorization· at all in order to apply RFRA to the federal govern
ment. Federal RFRA's precommitment to minimize the federal gov
ernment's encroachments on religious freedom is simply a method of
enforcing voluntary self-restraint. If the population consists of three
groups
A, B, and C
and Congress passes a statute whose text
states that it applies to groups A and B, Congress has not exercised
power by exempting group C. The same result follows if Congress af
firmatively states that the statute shall not apply to group C. Nothing
about this analysis changes if courts that apply the statute necessarily
must ensure that the statute is not applied against members of group
C. Neither Professor Gressman nor Professor Hamilton can identify
any previous instance when a federal statute that merely withdrew
federal regulatory authority has been struck down, or even challenged,
for exceeding Congress's enumerated powers.97 RFRA, as applied to
'

-

·

-

93. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81 & n.52; Hamilton, Landmark, supra
note 49, at 720; Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 365; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra
note 14, at 14-15; see also Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1427-29.
·

94. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
95. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib
ited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 421.
96. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 81-84; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3,
at 519-25, 527-29; Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 133-34, 137-38; Hamilton, Land
mark, supra note 49, at 718-20; Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 18-19. But see
McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 162 n.68 (arguing that Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes RFRA's applications to federal law); Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at
677-78 & n.358 (same). Professor Gressman's articulation of the "necessary and proper" ar
gument suggests the objection is circular. As part of his argument that RFRA lacks any con
stitutional authorization, he asserts that RFRA lacks a constitutionally legitimate end, in
violation of the first McCulloch principle. His reason for concluding RFRA has no constitu
tionally legitimate end is that "[b]oth the language of RFRA and the expressed intent of its
framers loudly proclaim that the purposes of the statute are to restore the pre-Smith free
exercise jurisprudence and to create an expanded version of the Free Exercise Clause . . . . "
Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 82; see also Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at
133-34. Those purposes are not legitimate because they are "saturated . . . with separation of
powers problems." Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 82; see also Gressman &
Carmella, supra note 84, at 134-36. This boils down to an argument that RFRA lacks consti
tutional authorization because RFRA lacks const\tutional authorization.
97. Professor Gressman argues, by analogy to the Section 5 context, that "the Necessary
and Proper Clause, by its own terms and purposes, imposes limitations on Congress's
authority to regulate its own instrumentalities and on limiting the reach of its own stat-
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the federal government, disadvantages no one but the federal gov
ernment.98 Congress needed a proper source of constitutional author
ity to apply RFRA to the states, because that application precommit
ted not Congress itself but independent sovereigns to cede some
measure of power. When it ceded a measure of its own authority to
the People, Congress renounced power rather than exercising it.99
Defenders of RFRA's federal applications generally have argued
or presumed that Congress had power to apply RFRA to the federal
government commensurate with the various instances of Article I, sec
tion 8 authority it employed and will employ to enact all the affected
legislation in the first instance.H>0 On this view, Federal RFRA is a sort
utes . . . if, in so doing, Congress violates the separation of powers." Gressman, Comedy, su
pra note 3, at 534 n.103 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). My argument is

that, because Congress exercises no power when it does nothing more than "limit[] the reach
of its own statutes," it cannot possibly violate the separation of powers.

98. My conclusion that Federal RFRA need not partake of any constitutional grant of
power to Congress necessarily rests on the premise that the Act's federal applications do not
violate any other provision of the Constitution. If Federal RFRA encroached on judicial
authority in some other way, or if it abridged any rights-bearing provision of the Constitu
tion (i.e., the Establishment Clause), then the Act's federal law applications would represent
an exercise of constitutiorial power, just as the applications of RFRA struck down in Boerne
represented an exercise of power over state and local governments. I contend infra Part III
that the Court properly may construe Federal RFRA as avoiding Establishment Clause vio
lations.
99. Two provisions of RFRA might appear to require exercises of power. First, the Act
provides that "[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this sec
tion may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain ap
propriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. As to RFRA's state law appli
cations this provision certainly required constitutional authorization, because Congress
exposed states to a new cause of action just as it imposed new obligations on them. As to
RFRA's federal law applications, however, the provision is essentially surplusage. RFRA
simply withdraws federal regulatory authority in certain cases. Claiming a RFRA exemption
from regulation is no different from claiming exemption because a statute provides a dis
crete safe harbor or because a statute simply does not reach a given person or situation. Sec
ond, RFRA's stated application to federal law "unless such law explicitly excludes such ap
plication by reference to this (Act] ," 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b), might be characterized as
empowering Congress to regulate behavior if it chooses to abrogate RFRA's protection.
Such an abrogation would involve an exercise of power, but not any power created by
RFRA. Rather, any abrogation of RFRA in a future statute simply will define part of that
statute's coverage pursuant to whatever enumerated power authorizes the statute.
100. See In re Young, 141 F.3d at 860 (invoking Art. I, § 8 bankruptcy power to justify
application of RFRA in bankruptcy case); Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 73133; William G. Buss, Federalism, Separation ofPowers, and the Demise ofthe Religious Free
dom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391, 412-13 (1998); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties

with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1625 n.401 (1995) (suggesting that Necessary and Proper Clause, in
conjunction with Art. I, § 8 powers, authorizes Federal RFRA); Greenawalt, Amendment,
supra note 16, at 695 ("Congress does not need any independent constitutional base to ex
cuse people from conformity with ordinary federal standards"); Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs,
supra note 50, at 745 ("RFRA's application to federal law . . . is based on Congress's Article
I powers . . . ."); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 211 (describing Federal RFRA as
"both a rule of interpretation for future federal legislation and an exercise of general legisla
tive supervision over federal agencies"); Lupti, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 213 ("With
respect to [federal applications of RFRA], Congress presumably has affirmative power to
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of "super-amendment" to the entire U.S. Code, and the source of con
stitutional authority for Federal RFRA varies with each application of
the Act, tracking the sources of authority underlying each affected
statute. For Thomas Berg,
[Congress in RFRA] is respecting the limits placed on it by the First
Amendment, by amending its own laws to conform to its own conscien
tious understanding of what the free exercise of religion requires.
Congress has the power to amend its own laws in this way because it had
power to enact the laws in the first place.101

The "no power" explanation of Federal RFRA has rhetorical ad
vantages over the "super-amendment" explanation. First, it is truer to
the idea that the government has limited power over the sovereign
people than is any account that equates exemption from regulation
with an exercise of power. When Congress amends a duly enacted
statute to exempt some class of persons or situations from the statute's
reach, the enhanced freedom of the newly exempt class is not a prod
uct of congressional power. Rather, their freedom predated congres
sional power, and Congress simply has revoked a prior decision to
limit it in a manner authorized by the Constitution.102 Second, the "no
power" explanation deflates a key premise of the enumerated powers
objection: that a "wholesale" statute like RFRA differs in kind from
an amendment that restrains congressional authority in a single stat
ute.103 The "no power" explanation makes clear that Congress,
whether revoking a measure of its own authority in one statute or in
ten thousand, is not exercising power at all.104
Three objections advanced against the "super amendment" expla
nation of congressional power also might have relevance for the "no
power" explanation. First, the enumerated powers critics posit that
protect religious freedom; whatever power authorizes the underlying legislation will support
an accommodation of religious liberty as part of the legislative scheme."); Paulsen, supra
note 13, at 253 ("Congress possesses the same power to pass RFRA, a:s RFRA concerns fed
eral statutes, as it had to pass those other federal statutes in the first place."); Robin
Vergeer, supra note 13, at 677 n.358; see also Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1436-42 (suggesting
that Congress would have to rely on all its enumerated powers as authority for RFRA's fed
eral applications); Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 131 (same).
101. Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 731.

_

102. See U.S. CONST., amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.");

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 106 (1960) ("We are not . . . !} subject people begging or fighting for such limited
privileges and powers as may be grudgingly granted to us by a sovereign legislature. We are
the sovereign and the legislature is our agent.").
103. See infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text (discussing legislative process objec
tion to Federal RFRA).
104. For the same reason, the "no power" explanation obviates Professor Hamilton's
complaint that "RFRA poses a new phenomenon. . . . requiring even further expansion of the
enumerated powers' boundaries: a statute that reveals its enumerated powers basis only
upon application in each particular case." Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 366.
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RFRA does not amend substantive law at all, but rather impermissibly
imposes on courts a standard of review for constitutional free exercise
claims: "RFRA creates no new substantive religious rights, privileges
or entitlements. Nor does it add to or supplement any such rights. . . .
The statute confers the right to have one's free exercise claim adjudi
cated under a balancing approach."105 The problem with this objection
is that the distinction between an amendment to a law and the direc
tion of a judicial standard is very elusive. Virtually any statute that
creates legal rights can be characterized as implicitly or explicitly di
recting courts to enforce or apply a legal standard. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has construed even a statute that directed outcomes in
specific pending litigation as amending substantive law.106
Second, Professor Hamilton argues that Federal RFRA makes an
end run around the Article V procedure for amending the Constitu
tion.107 "As applied to federal law," she argues, RFRA "is a constitu
tional amendment. It permits Congress to act on First Amendment
freedoms without the constitutional restraints crafted by the Framers
in the enumerated powers requirement. "108 This notion that RFRA
amounts to a back-door constitutional amendment fails to take ac
count of how constitutional amendments differ from statutes. The de
fining characteristic of a constitutional amendment is that it alters the
supreme law of the land by changing the Constitution.109 As others
have noted, Federal RFRA is only a statute, and it occupies the same,
inferior position to the Constitution that every other federal statute
occupies.U° Federal RFRA resembles a constitutional provision only
105. Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 107-08; see also Dolan, supra note 12, at
166-67 (suggesting that legislatures may not "alter the judiciary's standard of review for a
previously existing constitutional claim"); Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 364
("RFRA is a bare standard of review yoked to no particular substantive policy arena within
which Congress is constitutionally empowered to act."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra
note 14, at 3-4. This assertion resembles the argument that RFRA violates the separation of
powers by directing outcomes in particular cases. See infra Section II.C.2.
106. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 437 (1992) (holding that
challenged statute compelled change� in the law because, in operation,. it merely m0dified
the existing law by adding two new provisions under which a claim could fail).
107. U.S. CONST. art. V.; see Hamilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 629 (characterizing
RFRA as "an amendment to the Constitution without. the involvement of the people, a
stealth amendment, if you will"); Hamilton, Landmark, supra note 49, at 721-22; Hamilton,
Section 5, supra note 85, at 386; Blatnik, supra note 14, at 1443-60.
108. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 386 (footnote omitted).
109. Thus, for example, pre-existing provisions of the Constitution must be read in light
of the amendment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (affirming congres
sional authority to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating pursu
ant to the later-enacted Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217,
222 (1934) (noting that the Eighteenth Amendment immediately became inoperative upon
ratification of Twenty-First Amendment).
·

110. See Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why .
They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415; 446-48 (1999) [hereinafter Berg, New Attacks]
(arguing that RFRAs create new statutory rights rather than directing outcomes of constitu-
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in that its methodology of precommitment to protect minority inter
ests is more characteristic of constitutions than of statutes.U1 Unlike in
the case of a constitutional provision, the Court may use its judicial re
view power to strike down Federal RFRA to whatever extent it finds
the Act to violate any substantive constitutional provision,112 and
Congress may revoke or amend the Act through legislation.113

y

tional cases); Erwin Chemerinsk , The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional
Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601 , 605-06 (1998) [hereinafter Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Expansion] ("the Court's inte_rpretive judgment that a particular right is not
constitutionally protected is in no way incompatible with a legislature's statutory recognition
and safeguarding of the liberty"); Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 243 ("RFRA creates
a statutory cause of action - nothing more."); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2543 (1998) (chara<;terizing RFRA "as a statute,
pure and simple . . . not as a constitutional imposition masquerading as a legislative enact
ment"); Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 614 (" [T]he First Amendment guarantee of free
exercise is enduring, while RFRA, a mere statute, is subject to repeal or amendment . . . . ");
Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 14, at 1474 ("state RFRAs, being state statutes,
can be modified by the legislatures that enacted them").
With respect to RFRA's applications to state law,' it is possible to argue that Congress
did effectively amend the Constitution, because it altered the authoritative understanding of
the First Amendment that bound the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532
(1997).
1 1 1 . For a discussion of the Constitution as a precommitment strategy, see Waldron,

supra note 64.

·

1 12. Professor Hamilton asserts that "[i]f RFRA is deemed constitutional as applied to
federal law, it would endow Congress with the authority to alter the constitutional balance
between church and state through nothing more than a majority vote." Hamilton, Unconsti
tutional, supra note 14, at 8. That statement ignores the Establishment Clause, which neces
sarily trumps any congressional enactment, including RFRA. See infra Section 111.D.1.. The
Boerne Co!lrt also expressed the concern that under RFRA " [s]hifting legislative majorities
could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detaile<;I amend

ment process contained in Article V." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. But the Court identified that
concern as a consequence " [i]f Congress could define its OWn powers by altering the Four
teenth Amendment's meaning." Id. (emphasis added). As to federal law, RFRA is simply one
vehicle, along with discretionary accommodations, see supra note 17, by which Congress may
alter the balance between religious freedom and governmental authority. Given that
Professor Hamilton believes RFRA violates the Establishment Clause, see Hamilton, Un
constitutional, supra note 14, at 8-14, she appears to believe courts cannot constrain RFRA
within Establishment Clause norms. I describe two methods by which ·courts can do so infra
Part III.
1 13. See Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 589 ("It is the relative imperviousness of
constitutional provisions to change by ordinary lawmaking mechanisms, rather than the sub
stantive content of such provisions, that makes them legally unique."); Rodney K. Smith,
Converting the Religious Equality Amendment Into a Statute with a Little "Conscience," 1996
BYU L. REV. 645, 685 ("If a court errs in interpreting a statute, the harm is far more negli
gible than an error in constitutional interpretation because it can easily be corrected through
conventional legal processes without having to resort to onerous amendment procedures.").
Professor Hamilton includes Congress's option to exempt any given federal law from
RFRA's coverage among "policy reasons" to hold the Act unconstitutional, on the ground
that Congress's reservation of a safety valve demonstrates its weak commitment to religious
liberty. See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 380; see a lso Hamilton, Unconstitutional,
supra note 14, at 7 n.33. Aside from the fact that Congress's retention of authority to alter its
precommitment to overprotect any right is a constitutional given, see supra note 82 and ac
companying text, the argument that the retention more than negates the precommitment
strains credulity. But even if Professor Hamilton's argument refutes the thesis that RFRA is
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Finally, Professor Hamilton asserts that RFRA's protection of re
ligious freedom across the entire range of federal law warps the legis
lative process.114 She would require Congress to act in discrete statu
tory increments; such that "money and power interests enter the
picture . . . [and] more publicity and more active factions with real in
centives to question the sincerity and necessity of Congress's foray
into religious liberty will likely arise."115 Whether or not discrete en
actments would be a preferable legislative approach, Professor
Hamilton does not and cannot point to any explicit constitutional re
quirement for the legislative process that Federal RFRA violates.116
Rather, her argument appeals to the idea that the Constitution re
quires some quantum of due process in legislative methodology. This
is a salutary goal, and a reasonable argument exists that Congress
should take more time and care when legislating with the breadth of
RFRA. But Professor Hamilton's insistence on individually contextu
alized deliberations about religious freedom exceeds even the most
vigorous calls for judicial enforcement of "due process of lawmaking."
One account of due process requirements for statutes urges judicial
enforcement of the explicit constitutional and statutory rules that gov
ern the legislative process.117 That account does not support the sort of
good for religious freedom, the fact that Congress may exempt legislation from RFRA un
dermines her assertion that RFRA operates in the manner of a constitutional amendment.

114. Professor Hamilton argues in part that, at least in the area of First Amendment
freedoms, Congress may overprotect rights on a statute-by-statute basis but may not do so
wholesale, because wholesale overprotection of rights entails a flawed legislative process.
See Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 386 ("If Congress is so devoted to religious liberty,
let it publicly pledge to abide by higher standards than the Court has set by rising to such
standards in every law it passes."); cf Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 735-36
("The arguments offered as to why RFRA does not fall within Congress's enumerated pow
ers all boil down to criticisms of the wisdom of Congress in choosing to legislate by a general
standard rather than case-by-case rules.").
115. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 382-83 (advocating judicial inquiry into "due
process of lawmaking defects"); see Hamilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 628 ("No govern
ment should be able to adjust the balance of power between church and state across the
board in one fell sweep. Such adjustments require ratification by the people."); Hamilton,
Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 17 ("To the extent that Congress has rubber stamped the
actions of particular interest groups without consideration of the polity's concerns, the courts
should read the enumerated powers requirement strictly."); see also Gressman, Downfall,
supra note 84, at 82 (dismissing "super-amendment" explanation for RFRA on the ground
that Congress failed to make specific findings that established the need to amend every fed
eral statue to protect religious exercise); cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing that
statutory adoption of "judge-made constitutional terminology" may "repress[] . . . debate
and careful consideration of alternatives").
·

116. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down statute that author
ized president to veto portions of appropriations bills because partial veto violated Art. I, § 7
requirements for enactment of legislation by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1986)
(striking down one-house legislative veto provision of Immigration and Nationality Act be
cause Art. I, § 7 requires bicameral passage and presentment to president for legislative ac
tion).
117. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 240-42
(1976); see also Waldron, supra note 64, at 535-36 (discussing constitutional constraints on
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subjective, politically charged judicial critique of the representative
quality of deliberation Professor Hamilton advocates. A second ac
count would require "a deliberate and broadly based political judg
ment" in situations where "governmental action trenches upon values
that may reasonably be regarded as fundamental."118 That approach
does not implicate Federal RFRA, which neither undermines specially
protected values or classes nor reflects any lack of legislative atten
tion.119 Professor Hamilton's approach would cut to the heart of
Congress's political discretion.12° Perhaps congressional precommit
ment to a high level of protection for religious liberty is a bad idea,121
but the Constitution nowhere prohibits such legislative self-restraint.122
Professor Hamilton's assertion that forbidding the sort of process that
led to RFRA would "encourage more searching and creative public
legislative process); cf Peter M. Shane, Back to the Future ofthe American State: Overruling
Buckley v. Valeo and Other Madisonian Steps, 57 U. PITI. L. REV. 443, 454-59 (1996) (advo
cating recognition that Constitution places procedural requirements on congressional delib
eration but suggesting that such requirements should not be judicially enforceable).
118. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1 188
(1977); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-49 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing for enhanced judicial review of legislative process where statute draws a suspect
classification).
119. Violation of the Establishment Clause would implicate a specially protected value;
that issue is discussed infra Section III.A. Legislative inattention was the subject of Justice
Stevens's objection in Fullilove. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (argu
ing that Congress, by giving only perfunctory consideration to the consequences of a racial
set-aside program, "failed to discharge its duty to govern impartially" as required by due
process).
120. Thomas Berg objects to Professor Hamilton's argument from legislative methodol
ogy on the more general ground that judicial pronouncements on the "wisdom" of congres
sional actions would encroach on the congressional power recognized in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at
737. This strikes me as the converse of Professor Gressman's circular error in arguing from
McCulloch that RFRA exceeds congressional authority. See supra note 96. Professor Berg
invokes the presumed legitimacy of RFRA's ends to discredit Professor Hamilton's attack
on the means by which Congress legislated the Act. But her argument, in McCulloch terms,
is that the end of "heightening protection for religious freedom in all federal statutes" is not
legitimate.
121. But cf Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. at 469-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (defending
legislative technique of altering effects of previously enacted statutes en masse on grounds of
practicality).
122. Professor Gressman, in a · related arguinent, would extend the Boerne Court's
holding under Section 5 that RFRA was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, un
constitutional behavior," City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997), to strike down
the Act's federal applications as well. See Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 526-27 & n.77.
No basis for this argument is apparent. As to RFRA's applications to state law, the Boerne
Court saw a need to protect the states from RFRA's "disproportionate" sweep. Boerne, 521
U.S. at 533-35. The federal applications, in contrast, present no problem of dueling sover
eigns. If Congress decides to protect an interest against federal regulatory authority, the
Court has no separation of powers basis for declaring that any degree of protection is too
much. For a description and refutation of a similar objection to Federal RFRA in the Estab
lishment Clause context, see infra notes 305-310 and accompanying text.
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debate"123 rings especially hollow given that her approach would place
courts in charge of the form and extent of legislative deliberation.
C. The Structural Objection: Confusing Federal RFRA 's
Constitution-Like Methodology with the Judiciary's Power to Interpret
and Apply the Constitution
Precommitments to protect rights are much more familiar in the
constitutional setting than in statutes.124 Federal RFRA's distinctive
use of a characteristically constitutional methodology to "overprotect"
a constitutional right may help to account for the structural objection
to Federal RFRA, which insists that, notwithstanding the federalism
problem addressed in Boerne, even the Act's federal applications
usurp the judiciary's constitutional power. The structural objectors
find fatal fault with Congress's unapologetic intent to overrule Smith125
and its decision to phrase RFRA in the constitutional nomenclature of
"substantial[] burden," "compelling governmental interest," and "least
restrictive means."126 These, writes Professor Gressman, are "terms
that clearly assert a congressional takeover of free exercise jurispru
dence."127 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager elaborate:
Congress was moved to enact RFRA by a reading of the Constitution
deeply antagonistic to the Court's reading in Smith. RFRA's mandate is
couched in exquisitely constitutional terms, and, like many constitutional
precepts, it sweeps across virtually the whole domain of state and federal
governmental activity. And RFRA insists that the Court return to the
compelling state interest test, which was specifically rejected by the
Court. In all, RFRA is a congressional attempt to subvert rather than to
supplement the constitutional judgment of the Supreme Court.128

The structural objection takes two distinct forms: that RFRA
usurps the Court's power to interpret the Constitution, and that
RFRA improperly tells courts how to decide religious freedom cases.

123. Hamilton, Section 5, supra note 85, at 382.
124. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying .text.
126. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-l (1994).
127. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 76; see also Neal Devins, How Not To Chal
lenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 654 (1998) (arguing that "RFRA's embrace
of strict scrutiny review effectively limited the judicial role to the application of the statutory
compelling justification test"). But see Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Supremacy and the Settle
ment Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 849, 858 ( 1998) ("Congress utilized judicial lan
guage because members of Congress share the widespread public belief that responsibility
for interpreting the Constitution is primarily judicial. [RFRA was] expressing an opinion
about which Court was right in interpreting the First Amendment, not claiming a fully inde
pendent legislative prerogative of interpretation.").
128. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 443.
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Usurping the Power to Interpret: The A rgument from Marbury v.
Madison

The more straightforward version of the structural objection holds
that Congress redefined the free exercise guarantee of the First
Amendment, thereby encroaching on the Court's interpretive pre
rogative under Marbury v. Madison.129 Several commentators have ar
gued that RFRA's constitutional rhetoric invades the judicial domain,
a contention independent of the federalism concerns that animated
Boerne.U0 According to Professor Devins:
F/ores's chief, if not only, complaint with RFRA was that the statute op

erated as a naked power grab, transferring from the Court to Congress
the power to define constitutional standards of review. In this way,
Boerne does little more than reaffirm the core holding of Marbury v.
Madison, that is, judicial review is necessary to ensure that the Constitu
tion not be "on a level with ordinary legislative acts . . . alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it. "131

The Act's quasi-judicial language strikes Professor Devins as espe
cially inappropriate in light of the excoriation of Smith in RFRA's
legislative history, which, he writes, "smelled, looked, and tasted like a
129. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to [s]ay what the law is."); sie also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 18
(1958) (declaring that Supreme Court is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti
tutiop" and that its interpretation of the Constitution is "the supreme [!Jaw of the [!]and").
130. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 78 (1995) (hereinafter
Conkle, Constitutional Significance] ("RFRA directly repudiates the Supreme Court's basic
constitutional reasoning. As such, it represents an unprecedented congressional challenge to
the Court's well-established role as the primary interpreter of the Constitution."); Devins,
supra note 127; Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 511-14; Gressman & Carmella, supra
note 84, at 120 ("Congress (in RFRA] has interfered with the 'province and duty' of the ju
diciary 'to say what the law is' in free exercise cases and controversies"); Hamilton, Land
mark, supra note 49, at 718 ("RFRA exhibits its structural weaknesses even when one looks
at its application to federal law. The law is a slap in the face of the Court, crossing separation
of powers boundaries in an unapologetic fashion."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note
14, at 3-7; Jonathan Mallamud, Religion, Federalism and Congressional Power: A Comment
on City of Boerne v. Flores, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 58 (1997) (concluding, in discussion of
RFRA's federal applications, that "Congress appears to have provided a basis on the face of
(RFRA] for a finding that Congress intended to change the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution"); Steven D. Smith, Mother, May We?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 506 (1999);
see also Currie, supra note 77, at 640 ("Congress cannot tell the Court what the Constitution
means."). Because some of these arguments were made prior to the Court's decision in
Boerne, the extent of their intended reach to RFRA's federal applications is not entirely
clear. See, e.g. , Devins, supra note 127 at 664 n.113 (expressing uncertainty about the status
of RFRA's federal applications after Boerne). The logic of the argument from Marbury,
however, encompasses the Act in all its applications, at least to the extent the argument em
phasizes the Act's appropriation of constitutional rhetoric. Cf Robin-Vergeer, supra note
13, at 678 (arguing that if RFRA is unconstitutional as "an impermissible repudiation of
Supreme Court constitutional doctrine, then it should not matter whether the statute is ap
plied to the federal government or the states").
131. Devins, supra note 127, at 646 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177).
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populist abrogation of the judicial function."132 He concludes that, be
cause "RFRA supporters invested no energy in casting their handi
work as anything but the de jure nullification of the Supreme Court's
voice in religious liberty decision making,"133 the Court "had no choice
but to view RFRA as a frontal assault on its authority."134 Professor
Hamilton concurs: "With RFRA, Congress has acted out of manifest
disrespect for the Supreme Court as an institution, and has done so in
the most unsubtle fashion imaginable."135
The argument from Marbury cannot and does not maintain that
Federal RFRA invades the judicial domain in the way ultra vires acts
of the political branches usually do, by altering substantive outcomes
the Constitution entrusts to another branch.136 Leaving Establishment
Clause concerns aside for the moment, the only power shift Federal
RFRA effects is Congress's blanket surrender in a class of controver
sies that might arise between the federal government and the peo
ple.137 Rather, the Marbury-based critique emphasizes legislative
rhetoric. Professor Devins explains that "[m]ore than anything, my
point is about the message that Congress sent the Court."138 The
Marbury-based objection posits that Federal RFRA's "outright repu
diation of the judicial function"139 undercuts the judiciary's "institu-

132. Id. at 655; see also id. at 652-54 (recounting "highly personal, highly incendiary
rhetoric [that] typified much of Congress's consideration of RFRA").
133. Id. at 650.
134. Id. at 654; see also Gardbaum, supra note 50, at 669 (suggesting that "RFRA's his
tory both inside and outside Congress and the sharp criticism of Smith in the legislative text"
led the Court to treat Boerne incorrectly as a case about judicial supremacy).
135. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 5.
136. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714· (1986) (striking down provision that allowed
Congress to remove executive branch official); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking
down statute that permitted Congress to overrule deportation decisions); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting President's attempt to resist subpoena based on his
own interpretation of constitutional executive privilege); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (rejecting President's nationalizing of steel mills). Defenders of
RFRA argued prior to Boerne that the Court should permit Congress to define the scope
within which free exercise rights should be protected. See, e.g. , Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Expansion, supra note 110, at 628-29 (rejecting Marbury critique of RFRA in context of
Act's application to states); Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 245-48. Rejection of that posi
tion, which would have accorded Congress significant power to affect substantive outcomes
of constitutional disputes, was the central thrust of Boerne. See supra notes 38-48 and ac
companying text. My contention here is distinct from, and narrower than, the position that
Congress and the Court should share responsibility for constitutional interpretations that
affect outcomes of constitutional disputes. For pre-Boerne consideration of that issue, see,
e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitu
tional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986); Cohen, supra note 61; Archibald Cox, The
Role of Congress In Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971).
137. See supra Section 11.B.
138. Devins, supra note 127, at 651.n.43.
139. Id. at 658.

August 2001]

RFRA and Federal Law

1935

tional integrity,''140 its command over an analytic lexicon and a body of
evolving doctrine. "For practical purposes,'' argues Professor
Gressman, "RFRA constitutes a congressional seizure and reforma
tion by Congress of the entire free exercise jurisprudence developed
by the Supreme Court."141 Congress has broken into the Court's
house, and even if nothing has been stolen, the Court must protect its
interests.
For Professor Berg, the Marbury critique of RFRA "is just another
way of asserting that Congress cannot protect religious freedom
through a general standard."142 That response misapprehends the ar
gument from Marbury. Professor Devins and Professor Gressman pre
sumably would concede that Congress is free to pass a law that con
strains federal authority with respect to a single statute. But they
would not countenance that law any more than they countenance
RFRA if, like RFRA, it spoke in constitutional terms, and especially if
it expressed open contempt for the Court's leading decision in the cor
responding constitutional area. The Marbury critics are concerned
with RFRA's constitutional rhetoric, not with its practical conse
quences.
The flaw in the Marbury-based critique lies in its presumption that
the congressional view of the Free Exercise Clause underlying RFRA
will have any force in the Act's applications to federal law. The Boerne
Court objected to RFRA's deployment of free exercise principles not
because Congress had "reinterpreted" the Free Exercise Clause in
some abstract sense, but because Congress had imposed a substantive
burden on the states.143 In its applications to federal law, the Act can
not possibly interfere with the Court's development of free exercise
doctrine, let alone "make the Court's interpretations of the Constitu
tion superfluous,''144 because Congress's view of what the First
Amendment should mean will have no consequences. Indeed, Federal
RFRA cannot even generate a justiciable challenge to the Court's
authoritative interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court's

1 40. Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 519.
1 41. Id. at 518; cf Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 460 n.79 (dis
tinguishing RFRA from Title VII on the ground that "Title VII offers the judiciary the op
portunity to develop a coherent j urisprudence consistent with its own understanding of con
stitutional justice").
142. Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 738; see also id. at 740-44.
1 43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997):
The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation
burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far
exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Oause
as interpreted in Smith. Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state
laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion.
144. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 8.
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power "to say what the law is" extends only to justiciable cases.145
Challenges to federal action under RFRA will give rise to disputes and
precedent about the mechanics of strict scrutiny under the Act, but
not claims about the meaning of the constitutional term "free exercise
of religion."146 RFRA challengers of federal action will not need to
dispute the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause: either
RFRA applies and overprotects the challenger or it does not. Like
wise, government defendants obviously will have no occasion to assert
the Act's broad conception of religious liberty against the Smith
Court's narrow account of governmental obligations under the Free
Exercise Clause.147
Federal RFRA employs the Constitution-like methodology of pre
commitment in order to protect rights ordinarily enforced by the
Constitution. Congress guaranteed Federal RFRA's precommitment
not by any appeal to constitutional authority but only with the weight
of political inertia. 148 Perhaps Congress fully intended for RFRA to
revise the constitutional understanding of free exercise. But the Act,
at least in its federal applications, neither had the capacity to change
the Constitution149 nor needed to do so in order to effectuate
145. See, e.g. , United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (stating that a federal court
may not evaluate the constitutionality of state or federal statutes unless and until "it is called
upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies"); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) ("The power of courts, and ultimately (the Supreme Court],
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of liti
gants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interfer
ence.").
146. Again, I defer discussion of the obvious caveat to this statement, the possibility that
overprotection in some circumstances may violate the Establishment Clause, until Part III.
147. Professor Gressman insists that RFRA's critical error is its invasion of Congress's
Article III power to decide cases or controversies:
In essence, Congress has created a statutory "case or controversy," replete with congres
sional standards of review, for use whenever a neutral law has allegedly burdened some re
ligious exercise. In that situation, RFRA becomes a congressional or statutory substitute for
a First Amendment "case or controversy" wherein the legislature - not the judiciary - sets
the review standards.

Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at 517; see also Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 73
(objecting to RFRA on the ground that "(n]ever before had Congress sought to dictate to
the judiciary how to inte.rpret some provision of the Constitution in the course of performing
the core judicial functi_on of resolving cases and controversies"); id. at 74. The problem with
this argument is that Congress's blanket precommitment in Federal RFRA to protect relig
ious freedom has nothing to do with the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution, and
thus Federal RFRA cannot generate any disputes about constitutional interpretation.
Professor Gressman is exactly right to state that "if Congress wants to dictate to the courts
how best to interpret the Constitution . . . it necessarily must cross over into the case-or
controversy realm of the judiciary." Id. at 77. RFRA, however, does not do so.
148. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
149. Cf 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, at 949 n.121 (arguing that Boerne Court could not have
struck down RFRA's application to the states had it found Congress's interpretation of the
First Amendment consistent with Court's prior holdings, even if Congress had intended to
deviate from those holdings); see also Buss, supra note 100, at 413 (noting that Congress's
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Congress's will.150 If Congress really had designs on the Court's inter
pretive authority, the only rebuke the Court needs is the echo of
RFRA's constitutional rhetoric in empty courtrooms. The delicate
construct of tripartite government is no place to punish futile attempts
to break the rules.
The Marbury-based critique of Federal RFRA also proves too
much. Its misplaced emphasis on protecting judicial authority from in
effectual congressional rhetoric threatens to undermine the proper
and important role Congress plays in interpreting the Constitution.
Scholars have argued persuasively that the working relationship be
tween the Court and the political branches is dialogic.151 On this view,
congressional engagement with the Court and the Constitution is es
sential to the health of the nation.152 lnterbranch dialogue, at least outintent to override Court's constitutional judgment has no bearing on constitutionality of
RFRA's federal applications).
150. Professor Hamilton argues that Congress.'s inattention · to the constitutional
authority for RFRA's federal applications should render those applications unconstitutional:
The record accords the courts nothing on which to peg a theory of constitutional power. This
procedural failure should doom RFRA. As a structural, constitutional principle, the courts
should not create arguments to justify such legislation after the fact, but rather should send
the law back to Congress so that it can engage in the deliberation necessary to make its laws

both apparently and actually constitutional.

Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 16-17; see also Hamilton, Landmark, supra
note 49, at 720 (RFRA's federal applications "should not be upheld, if for no other reason
than to send a message to Congress that when a law is unusual and the enumerated power
issue is opaque, Congress is constitutionally obligated to provide at least a modicum of ex
planation of what power it believed itself to be engaging."); id. at 706, 720. Such a rule may
have a place where the predicate for a source of constitutional power needed to animate a
statute requires joint legislative and judicial attention. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the
Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996) (advocating requirement of explicit congressional findings
to support exercise of commerce power); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
757, 761-71 (1996) (elaborating Frickey's notion as a "sense of the record" canon of constitu
tional interpretation). It is irrelevant to Federal RFRA, which required and used no consti
tutional power. See supra Section 11.B.
151. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); see also Carter, supra note 136,
at 851-62 (advocating interbranch dialogue in lieu of debates about substantive power under
Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Devins, supra note 127, at 648, 661; William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 27, 7695 (1994) (discussing role of institutional interests in division of labor between Court and
Congress).
152. Indeed, commentators have argued that, notwithstanding the separation of powers,
legislators have an obligation to evaluate the constitutionality of their actions. See 1 TRIBE,
supra note 50, § 3-4 at 262 ("Congress and the President must thus be recognized as having
the power and the duty to interpret the [Constitution] in a way that may command the re
spect of others."); Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Inter
pretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and
What Do They Do with Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 441 , 453-54 (1985) ("[I]f legal texts have meanings, then they speak to all participants
in the legal system, of whom judges are only one set and not necessarily the most impor
tant . . . . I think it absolutely vital that all public . officials, including citizens, confront the
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side the ramparts of federalism erected by Boerne, is essential in a
context as politically and emotionally charged as religious freedom.153
Such dialogue is especially important if one has a normative commit
ment to rights, 154 because for long stretches of its history the Court has
shown little interest in expanding rights.155 Professor Devins makes the
instructive observation that, in Boerne, both Congress and the Court
violated the principle of dialogue. Congress erred because " [r]ather
than encourage dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution's relig
ious liberty protection, RFRA sought to silence the Supreme
Court."156 The Boerne Court, however, "never acknowledged that dis
agreement with its rulings by lawmakers, government officials, and in
terest groups often plays a pivotal and salutary role in defining consti
tutional values."157 The subconstitutional character of RFRA's federal
applications, which obviates the first problem Professor Devins identi
fies, should deter the Court from repeating the second.

2.

Usurping the Power to Decide: The A rgument
from United States v. Klein

A second form of structural objection that encompasses Federal
RFRA posits that Congress employed an unconstitutionally heavy
question of what it might mean to take the Constitution seriously as a source of guidance.");
Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of
Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 485-501 (1987).
153. See, e.g. , Smith, supra note 1 13, at 650-57 (urging deliberative dialogue over relig
ion between Court and Congress in context of proposal for religious equality statute).
154. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expansion, supra note 110, at 617 ("the pro
tection of additional rights is inherently desirable under the Constitution"); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 151, at 77 (advocating more aggressive judicial review of congressional
enactments that limit personal rights).
155. RFRA's advocates and critics alike have made this point. Compare Berg, Congress,
supra note 26, at 28-29 & n.123 (citing scholarly commentary for the position "that legislative
action usually provides a firmer foundation for protection of civil liberties than do judicial
decisions"), and Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 257 (arguing that "part of the genius of sepa
ration of powers is that all three branches can protect liberty when motivated to do so"),
with Devins, supra note 127, at 660 ("Ever since Thomas Jefferson declared the Alien and
Sedition Act . . . a constitutional 'nullity' . . . the executive and legislative branches have lim
ited the effects of court rulings, more often than not by providing for greater individual
rights protection than the judiciary."). The concern, of course, is not a remote one. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 151, at 27 (describing 1990s as "a decade of downscaling in
American public law" characterized by "the Rehnquist Court's comparative reluctance to
expand, or in some cases even to protect, established constitutional rights of individuals");
Laycock, Act, supra note 25 at 257 (noting that in recent years "Congress has been more in
terested in protecting liberty than the Court has been").
156. Devins, supra note 127, at 647; see also id. at 658 ("RFRA's slash and burn ap
proach to dialogues between the Court and elected government promotes acrimony between
the branches and little else.").
157. Id. at 647; see also id. at 662 (criticizing Boerne for "formalistic rhetoric" that "�ug
gests an institutional compartmentalization that is overly parochial, ultimately shortsighted,
and factually inaccurate").
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hand to dictate federal courts' decisions in free exercise cases. This ar
gument, pressed by Professors Eisgruber and Sager158 and also raised
by Professor Gressman,159 maintains that RFRA's mandate of strict
scrutiny for religious freedom claims "insists that the Court adopt a
legal test that the Court has repudiated,"160 thereby "conscript[ing] . . .
the Court . . . to play a role in a charade - a charade in which the
Court is obliged to act as though its own judgment about a matter of
consequence is different than it actually is."161 Where the Marbury
objection focuses on the Court's interpretive authority, this second
version of the structural objection posits that Congress in RFRA inter
fered with courts' decisional authority. Professor Gressman charges
that "RFRA represents an unprecedented effort by Congress to exe
cute one of the core functions of the Court, the delicate function of in158. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1309-11; Eisgruber & Sager,
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 469-73; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
Protecting Without Favoring Religiously Motivated Conduct, 2 NEXUS 103, 107-08 (Fall
1997) (hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting]; Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra
note 36, at 135-36; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution,
86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2532-35 (1998). Professor Sager has expressly invoked Klein as a basis for
striking down the federal law applications of RFRA. See id. at 2533 (arguing that "Klein re
mains a good and sufficient reason to invalidate RFRA in (its] second, federal, life"). The
structural argument advanced by Professors Eisgruber and Sager is closely linked to their
objections to RFRA based on both what I label "substantive institutional competence" and
the Establishment Clause. See infra notes 245-246, 321-328 and accompanying text; cf
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 136 (arguing that RFRA violates Klein
because "Congress simply told the judiciary to do something it knew the judiciary had de
clared to be impossible"); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 472
(equating "charade" imposed by RFRA in violation of Klein with "a false endorsement of
religion as especially privileged by the Constitution"); see also Meltzer, supra note 1 10, at
2549 (posing question whether Sager's articulation of Klein-based objection to RFRA de
pends on an underlying appeal to the Establishment Clause); Sager, supra note 158, at 2533
(maintaining that "RFRA could violate Klein whether or not it violated the Establishment
Clause as well").
159. See Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 83-84 (arguing that Klein "supplies an
other precedential nail in RFRA's constitutional coffin"); Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3,
at 517 & n.36; Gressman & Cannella, supra note 84, at 134-37; see also Ira Bloom, Prisons,
Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial
Power, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1998) (favorably discussing Boerne at outset of article
that accuses Congress of frequently violating Klein); Mallamud, supra note 130, at 55-56
(suggesting that RFRA resembles the statute struck down in Klein); Van Alstyne, supra note
50, at 309-14 (discussing Klein in argument that RFRA exceeded congressional authority
under Section 5); cf J. Richard Broughton, Boerne Down the House: The Religious Liberty
Protection Act and the Separation of Powers, 2000 DET. C.L. REV. 317, 350 (arguing that
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999), violated separation
of powers by "requiring courts to prefer Congress's view of the Free Exercise Clause to the
view that the Supreme Court has already expressed in a final judgment on the matter and
one in which it expressly rejects the congressional view").
160. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 443.
161. Id. at 471 ; see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1310; Eisgruber
Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 108 (maintaining that RFRA violates separation of
powers because "to enforce RFRA, the Court had to behave as though it were applying a
constitutional test which was, in its judgment, unworkable") (emphasis added); Eisgruber &
Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 136.
&

1940

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:1903

terpreting the Constitution and applying that interpretation to specific
cases and controversies."162 The answer to the Marbury objection that Congress in RFRA did not invade the Court's interpretive do
main 163 - does not suffice to answer this second form of structural
objection, because Federal RFRA certainly will require courts to de
cide cases differently than they would have absent the statute. Rather,
the problem with this objection is that it condemns Congress for doing
exactly what Congress is supposed to do.
The second version of the structural objection invokes the Court's
repudiation, in the 1871 case of United States v. Klein,164 of a blatant
congressional attempt to countermand the Court's constitutional
judgment. Prior to Klein, the Supreme Court had held that a presiden
tial pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty for former Confederate
sympathizers who, pursuant to a federal statute, sought to recover
property the federal government had seized from them during the
Civil War.165 Congress, unhappy with the Court's holding, passed a
new statute that made a pardon a conclusive presumption of disloyalty
and that relieved the Court of Claims and Supreme Court of appellate
jurisdiction in any case where the granting of a pardon was proved.166
In Klein, the Court struck down the statute as contrary to the separa
tion of powers. The Court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the
Court found that Congress impermissibly had "prescribe[d] a rule in
conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction
[previously] conferred, because and only because its decision, in ac
cordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and fa
vorable to the suitor."167 Second, the statute "impair[ed] the effect of a
pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Execu
tive. "168
Reliance on Klein by RFRA's critics reflects a misapprehension of
that case. Granting the first Klein principle sufficient independent
force to undermine RFRA would lead to results the Klein Court can
not have intended. If Klein meant Congress may not change a rule of
decision previously applied by courts, then numerous federal statutes
would be invalid.169 If Klein meant Congress may not attempt to influ162. Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 74 (emphasis added).
163. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
164. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
165. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
166. Appropriation Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 235 (1870).
167. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147.
168. Id.
169. See Meltzer, supra note 110, at 2540-43, 2545-48 (discussing statutes that alter pre
viously announced judicial rules of decision and therefore would be threatened under broad
reading of first Klein principle). One interesting, as-yet unadjudicated instance of congres
sional alteration of a rule of decision is the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"),
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ence substantive outcomes by limiting the Court's appellate jurisdic
tion, then the principle of Ex Parte McCardle110 would be cast into
doubt. If Klein meant Congress may not tell courts how to decide
cases involving statutory rights, then legislative discretion to define the
substance of statutory rights would be severely compromised.171 The
Supreme Court, which in recent years has had two opportunities to
apply the first Klein principle, instead has gone out of its way to dis
tinguish the case.172 Likewise, the leading Federal Courts treatise sug
gests that Klein "hold[s] no more than that an unconstitutional inva
sion of the judicial function occurs when Congress purports . . . to bind
the Court to reach a result that is independently unconstitutional."173
The best understanding of the first Klein principle is that it merely
augments the second by expressly barring Congress from using its
power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction as a means toward a
substantive unconstitutional end, such as usurping executive power.174
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (Supp. IV 1998), which announces new substantive standards for courts
to apply in cases challenging prison conditions. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)
(leaving open question of standards' constitutionality); Bloom, supra note 159, at 406-14 (ar
guing that PLRA standards are unconstitutional .under Klein); see also infra notes 355-358
and accompanying text (discussing Miller Court's construction of PLRA' s automatic stay
provision).
170. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding pursuant to Exceptions Clause, Art. III, § 2,
cl. 2, that Congress has broad power to limit or withdraw the Supreme Court's appellate ju
risdiction).
171. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Soµrces, Alterna
tive Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2613 (1998) (rej ecting reading of Klein

as barring Congress from telling courts how to decide cases because " legislation often affects
- if not directs - the outcome of litigation"). Professor Sager acknowledges that reading
Klein to preclude Congress from altering a statutory right by telling courts how to decide
cases that implicate the right would "exalt form over substance." Sager, supra note 158, at
.
2526.
.

172. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (distin
guishing Klein on the ground that statute that retroactively altered limitations period "d[id]
set out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that sense change[d] the
law"); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (Thomas, J.) (declining
to consider whether Klein prohibited Congress from enacting statutes that direct decisions in
pending cases without amending any law, based on conclusion that statute settling pending
disputes over timber amended applicable law); cf Bloom, supra note 159, at 397-98 (criti
cizing Robertson and arguing that timber settlement violated Klein).
173. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 369-70 (4th ed. 1996); see also Meltzer, supra note 110, at 253839 (discussing narrow reading of Klein). In fact, Federal RFRA is more likely to violate the
second Klein principle than the first. The Act applies to any "official . . . of the United
States," 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994) (amended 1997), and it governs "all [f]ederal . . . law,
and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3
(1994) (amended 1997). That language appears to encompass executive orders, agreements,
and even treaties. If a claimant invoked Federal RFRA to gain relief from the effects of an
executive action that rested on a specific constitutional grant of authority to the president,
the reviewing court might appropriately invoke Klein to safeguard presidential authority.
174. Call this the "hybrid wrongs" explanation of the first Klein principle. See supra note
21 (discussing Smith Court's distinction of "hybrid rights" claims under Free Exercise
Clause).
·
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Aside from the hazards of a strong reading of the first Klein prin
ciple; the analogy between Klein and Federal RFRA is strained.
RFRA's heightened scrutiny standard does not impose anything close
to conclusive presumptions on litigation, as the modest success rate of
early RFRA claims confirms.175 The Act certainly does not direct out
comes in the federal government's favor;176 quite the contrary, its cen
tral purpose is to disadvantage the government in religious freedom
cases. RFRA does not direct outcomes in specific cases but merely
creates a statutory rule for application over an entire category of cases
involving an unpredictable range of parties and factual circum
stances.177 Finally, as discussed above, Federal RFRA announces no
constitutional standard, and thus it simply lacks the capacity to affect
the decision in any constitutional case.178 By setting a legal standard
and instructing courts to apply it, Federal RFRA does what countless
other statutes do. It is distinct only in that its rule applies across the
board to religious freedom claims against all applications of federal
law.119
None of the Court's major statements on the conflict between leg
islative and judicial power is squarely on point with Federal RFRA,
because all have involved situations in which Congress altered results
in pending or prior court cases.180 The most salient comparisons are to
175. See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
176. The Court emphasized this aspect of Klein when it. described the first Klein princi
ple in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 404 (1980) (stating that Congress in Klein
"prescribed a rule of decision in a case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner
that required the courts to decide a controversy in the [g]overnment's favor").
177. See supra note 1 10.
178. See supra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. A variation on the Klein objection

emphasizes the expressive character of judicial decisions: "The judiciary will not permit its
articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the ju
diciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact
disagrees." Sager, supra note 158, at 2529 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 2534-35 (arguing
that essence of first Klein principle is to prevent public spectacle of Congress's forcing judi
ciary to adjudicate based on standards with which judiciary disagrees); Eisgruber & Sager,
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 471 (arguing that RFRA violates Klein because any court
that applies RFRA "is being asked to assume the role of a false conscience"); Meltzer, supra
note 110, at 2540 (agreeing that first Klein principle means "Congress may not compel the
courts to speak a constitutional untruth" but advocating substantially narrower view of that
principle than Sager advances). This is the mirror image of the Marbury obj ection's empha
sis on constitutional language. There, the concern is with the impact of RFRA's constitu
tional rhetoric. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text. Here, the concern is with the
impact of the constitutional rhetoric RFRA elicits from courts. The answer is the same: Fed
eral RFRA is not a constitutional rule, and thus it has no impact on our understanding of
constitutional principles. See Meltzer, supra note 1 10, at 2543-49 (refuting Sager's rhetoric
focused version of Klein objection).

179. See supra Section II.B.
180. In addition to the cases discussed in text, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)
(rejecting separation of powers challenge to statutory provision that imposes automatic stay
of previously entered injunctive relief when inj unction is challenged under new statutory
standard); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995 ) (striking down on separation of
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United States v. Sioux Nation181 and Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co.182 In both of those cases Congress changed the law
in order to reverse the effects of prior court decisions. In each instance
the Court upheld Congress's action as a valid change to the underlying
law. The statutes in both cases posed greater threats to judicial
authority than Federal RFRA does, because they altered previously
settled outcomes in specific disputes. In addition, Sioux Nation en
tailed congressional waiver of "legal defenses based upon doctrines
central to the courts' structural independence."183 Both cases differ
from Klein primarily in that Congress's underlying policy goals did not
violate the Constitution. Sioux Nation and Wheeling Bridge establish
that Congress does not usurp judicial power simply by telling the
Court to adjudicate a claim or set of claims under a different rule than
th.e one the Court developed prior to receiving any congressional
guidance. Sioux Nation makes that conclusion especially clear for cir
cumstances in which Congress has acted. against the government's in
terest.184 The two decisions also strengthen the conclusion that any ar
gument that RFRA violates Klein must appeal to some independent
constitutional violation.185
Beyond the logical failings of the arguments from Marbury and
Klein, prudential considerations should compel the Court to respect
Congress's precommitment in Federal RFRA to protect religious
freedom. A judicial declaration that a statute intrudes on courts'
authority, especially in an area of acute political concern like religious
liberty, necessarily disturbs interbranch comity and restricts the vigor
ous give and take that characterizes robust government.186 Such a
powers grounds congressional effort to apply a new, more generous statute of limitations
retroactively to reopen final judgments of dismissal); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y,
503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding against separation of powers challenge federal statute that
prescribed outcomes in pending cases involving timber claims); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 409 (1792) (establishing principle that Congress may not authorize Executive Branch
officials to review judicial decisions).
181. 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (sustaining against separation of powers challenge a statute
that required Court of Claims to rehear Native American tribe's claim against the govern
ment without regard to res judicata or collateral estoppel defenses, even though that court
previously had rejected the claim).
182. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855) [hereinafter Wheeling Bridge II] (sustaining
against separation of powers challenge a statute that, in contravention of Court's prior order
that a bridge be altered or removed because it unlawfully interfered with navigation, de
clared bridge a "lawful structure[]" and thus authorized its reconstruction).
183. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230-32 (discussing congressional waiver in Sioux Nation of res
judicata and collateral estoppel defenses).
184. See supra text accompanying note 176.
185. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. As above, the discussion in this section
rests on the premise that Federal RFRA does not violate the Establishment Clause. I justify
that premise at length below. See infra Part III.
186. See supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
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declaration is a constitutional trump, analogous to Congress's constitu
tional authority to limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, 187 albeit less
potent. Prudence dictates that these trumps should be instruments of
last resort. The Court, for its part, should restrict action to protect its
own territory against otherwise valid congressional action to instances
where Congress invades the judicial domain in such a manner or to
such an extent that the Court can preserve the structural integrity of
government only by rejecting the congressional action.188 The invalida
tion of Federal RFRA urged by the structural critics would intensify
interbranch conflict, thus threatening just the sort of governmental
tumult these critics fear from RFRA itself, while also denying a legis
lative effort to expand rights.189.

187. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (defining appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court
subject to "such Exceptions, and 'under such Regulations as the Congress shall make"); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U:S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (dismissing appeal on authority of statute strip
ping Court of jurisdiction). For discussion of the proper scope of congressional power under
the Exceptions Clause, see, for example, Symposium, Congress and the Courts: Jurisdiction
and Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998); Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Juris
diction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate,
36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme
Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Exami
nation, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982).
188. See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits
on Congress' Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2506-10 (1998) (praising
Court's historic tendency to construe congressional efforts to limit courts' jurisdiction nar
rowly enough to preserve sufficient jurisdiction to satisfy apparent constitutional standards,
rather than addressing constitutional issues directly); Devins, supra note 127, at 661
("Balance-of-powers disputes, in particular, are best resolved through [a] process of give
and-take between the branches."); Friedman, supra note 150, at 771, 777-78 (suggesting
value of moderation in both legislative and judicial use of constitutional trumps); Meltzer,
supra note 110, at 2543 (contending that "the Court needs to have . . . a strong moral or po
litical justification for broadly curtailing the authority of legislative (and other) institu
tions"); cf Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing for a dialogic process between Congress
and Court to determine boundaries of federal judicial power).
189. Calls for judicial retaliation based on RFRA's legislative history are especially dis
turbing. Professors Gressman and Carmella, for example, argue that the Court should strike
down RFRA as an "incursion[] by Congress into the independent kingdom of the judiciary"
based in part on "repeated statements by RFRA's sponsors that [their] real purpose is to
overrule Smith." Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 122, 123 n.237; see also id. at 93
(stressing that "(m]embers of Congress . . . [called Smith] an infamous, disastrous, unfortu
nate, mischievous, dastardly, and ill-advised opinion that should and must be 'overruled' ")
(citation omitted); id. at 133; id. at 139 n.283; Gressman, Downfall, supra note 84, at 77-78
(basing argument that RFRA is unconstitutional on "[t]he entire legislative history of
RFRA, supplemented by the later statements of its ardent defenders"). For the Court to use
such second-hand evidence of motive where legislative purpose made a substantive constitu
tional difference would be problematic enough. Cf infra notes 311-313 and accompanying
text (discussing limits of appropriate judicial inquiry into legislative purpose under Estab
lishment Clause). To invoke legislative vitriol as. an independent basis for holding that
Congress exceeded its powers woulci provoke the political branches needlessly.
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The Institutional Competence Objection: RFRA and the .Court's
Power to Constrain Judicial Methodology

The final separation of powers objection to Federal RFRA, the in
stitutional competence objection, implicates not RFRA's legislative
methodology of precommitment but rather the Act's requirement that
courts apply the judicial methodology of strict scrutiny in religious
freedom challenges to neutral applications of federal law. The institu
tional competence critics emphasize that the Court in Employment
Division v. Smith190 categorically rejected the judicial inquires into re
ligious substance that are necessary for strict scrutiny.191 Having an
nounced that limit on judicial competence, these commentators main
tain, the Court had to reject Congress's attempt, through RFRA, to
force courts to make just that sort of inquiry. In questioning the
mechanism by which Congress sought to enforce Federal RFRA's
precommitment to safeguard religious freedom, the institutional com
petence challenge is the RFRA analog to the arguments that doomed
the federal line-item veto.192 Critics have articulated two variations on
the institutional competence objection: that RFRA encroaches on the
Court's fundamental power to assess which issues judges are capable
of deciding, and that RFRA runs afoul of a substantive judgment
about religious freedom implicit in the Smith account of judicial com
petence.

190. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
191. See Smith, 494 U.S at 887 (citations omitted):.
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that
a particular act is "central" to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious
practices is akin to the unacceptable "business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims." . . . Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility
of a religious claim.
The Smith Court's rejection of substantive inquiries into religious doctrine was not
novel. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988)
(stating that judicial determination of which lands are "central" to a religion "would require
[the Court] to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs.
We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents,
and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play."); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ("[The] guarantee of free exercise is not limited
to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. . . . [I]t is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire [who] more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation."); Ser
bian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976) (noting that, because j udi
cial resolution of controversies over religious doctrine and practice jeopardizes First
Amendment values, courts are bound to the decisions of church judicatories regarding such
controversies).
192. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's rejection of the
Line Item Veto Act provides no more than an analogy to Federal RFRA. That statute failed
because it gave the president excessive discretion in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. See
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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Pure institutional Competence

The first version of the institutional competence objection claims
that Smith authoritatively denied that courts have the capacity to de
termine whether a given religious practice is sufficiently "central" to a
plaintiff's religious belief that interference with that practice "substan
tially burden[s]" her exercise of that belief.193 According to Daniel
Conkle, "[t]he Court [in Smith] especially objected to the prospect of
balancing religious claims against competing state interests in a wide
variety of possible contexts, a task for which, according to the Court,
judges are not well-suited."194 Joanne Brant concludes that this judicial
rejection of free exercise balancing is "the only intelligible basis for
the Smith opinion"195 and maintains that "the Court's power to make
decisions based on this line of reasoning cannot be doubted" because
"[e]ach branch of government has the inherent power to determine its
own limitations."196 Thus, Congress's direction in RFRA of a standard
that requires such balancing violates the separation of powers.197
193. See Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591, 600 n.8 (D. Md. 1996);
Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and
Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 26667 (1994) (arguing that the difficulty of defining a "substantial[] burden" on religious exer
cise renders RFRA a dangerously manipulable statute).
194. Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 57 (citation omitted).
Professor Conkle expressly objects only to RFRA's state and local applications. See id. at 40.
But his arguments, articulated prior to Boerne, apply to the Act's federal applications as
well, insofar as he believes the Act countermands the Smith Court's authoritative assessment
of judicial competence or violates the Establishment Clause.
195; Brant, supra note 193, at 13; see also id. at 17 ("Smith is not a decision about
authority: jurisdictional, constitutional or otherwise. It is a decision grounded in the Court's
somewhat inchoate concerns about institutional limitations."); Berg, Congress, supra note
26, at 8-9 ("Smith's rule was based on 'judicial restraint' and institutional concerns related to
the separation of powers . . . balancing the relative importance of the religious claim against
the governmental interest gave too much discretion to unelected and unaccountable
judges"); Layock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 31-33 (characterizing and attacking Smith as a
rejection of balancing generally); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 59 (calling Smith "a deci
sion about institutional arrangements more than about substantive merits"); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 736 (1992) [hi<reinafter McConnell, Update] ("The principal argument
in Smith is that judges are institutionally incapable of engaging in the balance between re
ligious conscience and the interests of the government that free exercise accommodations
are said to require."). But see Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 663-71 (arguing that Smith
reflected both substantive and institutional concerns).
196. Brant, supra note 193, at 19.
197. Douglas Laycock and others have attempted to portray the institutional compe
tence strand of Smith as merely a statement that "the Court does not want final responsibil
ity for applying the compelling interest test to religious conduct." Laycock, Act, supra note
25, at 252 (emphasis added); see also Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 745
(summarily rejecting the "pure institutional competence" objection on the ground that the
Smith Court was merely practicing judicial restraint, not defining the limits of its compe
tence); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 253 n.11 (same); Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note
12, at 1491-92 (same). On this reading, RFRA presented no problem under Smith because
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An initial flaw in the pure institutional competence objection is
that RFRA does not necessarily require balancing.198 Rather, a claim
ant must meet the substantial burden threshold, and the government
must then show that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means
of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. Even assuming
RFRA will prompt a balancing analysis in many cases, the Court
should resist any inclination to strike down Federal RFRA based on
the pure institutional competence strand of Smith for two reasons.
First, Smith on this reading depends on an unprecedented and un
workable mandate for the Court to define judicial competence. Sec
ond, to whatever extent the Smith Court acted within its authority to
abjure judicial competence to perform the analysis required by
RFRA, it erred by presuming that strict scrutiny requires Courts to
determine the "centrality" of claimants' burdened religious prac
tices.199
"Congress, rather than the Court, will retain the ultimate responsibility for the continuation
and interpretation of [religious accommo9ations]." Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 253. On
Professor Brant's reading, however, Smith flatly denied courts' capacity to perform the
analysis mandated by RFRA. Even the availability of a legislative corrective does not elimi
nate that concern. A court might make matters worse by its incompetent attempt at analysis,
thereby tainting subsequent legislative deliberations, or any number of institutional con
straints might prevent Congress from correcting an errant judicial decision, thereby giving
the court the last word.
198. In a recent amendment to RFRA, Congress may have muted the pure institu
tional competence objection as to future cases. The Religious Land Use and Institutional
ized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to a system of religious belief." Pub. L. No.
106-274, § 8(7)(A), 114 Stat. 803, 807 (Sept. 22, 2000) . RLUIPA extends that definition to
RFRA, replacing RFRA's original language that defined "religious exercise" as "the exer
cise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." See id § 7(a)(3); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3, 2000bb-2(4) (2001). The amended definition seems likely to encourage the alternatives
to centrality analysis discussed infra notes 222-234 and accompanying text. See, e.g. ,
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960-61 (10th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that amended defini
tion of "religious exercise" relieved RFRA claimant from having to show that religious prac
tice at issue was mandatory).
199. Several commentators have dismissed the pure institutional competence critique by
arguing that the Smith Court could not have meant that courts cannot adjudicate religious
freedom claims under strict scrutiny, because the Smith Court itself allowed for such adjudi
cation in "hybrid rights" cases. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 & n.1 (1990);
see Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 744-45; Lupu, Codification, supra note 83,
at 589. That argument, however, presumes the Smith "hybrid rights" doctrine reflects a co
herent and principled distinction of Sherbert and Yoder that entails a true free exercise
analysis. In fact, the least problematic account of the "hybrid rights" exception is that its re
quirement of a second constitutional claim independently amenable to adjudication (e.g.,
free speech or due process) obviates the need to analyze the free exercise claim at all. See
supra note 21. The Smith Court's continued allowance for strict scrutiny in cases that involve
"system[s] of individualized exemption[]," Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, or burdens targeted at re
ligion, id. at 877-78, also has been noted. See Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at
744-45. Both of those categories, however, involve willful discrimination. See Eisgruber &
Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1287-88 (arguing that denials of religious exemptions in
unemployment benefit cases reflected failure of equal regard for religious beliefs); Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down ordinance on
ground of purposeful discrimination against a religious practice). Such discrimination creates
a presumption of invalidity that effectively obviates the need to invoke RFRA. The even
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The notion that the Supreme Court may limit categorically the
types of issues courts are capable of deciding is highly problematic.
The closest analogues in federal law are the abstention doctrines200 and
the requirement of a judicially manageable standard as a baseline for
distinguishing judicially cognizable matters from political questions.201
But those doctrines differ dramatically from the pure institutional
competence reading of Smith. Both abstention and the refusal to adju
dicate absent judicially manageable standards reflect judicial self
limitation and deference to the power of coordinate branches or dis
tinct sovereigns. The Court will declare an absence of judicially man
ageable standards where it is in danger of usurping legislative or
agency decisionmaking authority.202 Similarly, federal courts abstain
from decision to avoid usurping state courts' authority to construe the
meaning of state statutes.203 In contrast, reading Smith as an authorita
tive statement on judicial competence would allow the Court to abjure
decision - and in this case, to strike down a federal statute - based
not on deference to the power of a coordinate branch or distinct sovbroader argument that the pure institutional competence critique fails because courts apply
heightened scrutiny in other circumstances, see McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at
191-92, simply denies the premise that religion differs at all from other characteristics that
entail heightened scrutiny and thus fails to confront Smith on its own terms.
200. See R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (holding that federal courts
should abstain from deciding a constitutional issue pending a definitive ruling by a state
court on a matter of state law that could resolve the controversy); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 54-55 (1973) (holding that where challenged state statute is susceptible of construc
tion by state court that would avoid or modify necessity of reaching federal constitutional
question, the federal courts should abstain); see also Brant, supra note 193, at 25 (comparing
pure institutional competence reading of Smith to Pullman abstention doctrine).
201. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the lack of a judicially
manageable standard indicates that the Constitution has committed the issue to another
branch of government, making the controversy nonjusticiable); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1961) (holding that the lack of a judicially discoverable and manageable standard for re
solving a case indicates that resolution of the issue may be better handled by another branch
of government); cf Brant, supra note 193, at 22-25 (comparing the pure institutional compe
tence reading of Smith to the political question doctrine and the requirement of a judicially
manageable standard); Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 59 (considering Smith as a "political
question case, holding that judicially manageable standards for the resolution of Free Exer
cise exemption claims are lacking").
202. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-10 (holding challenge to state legislative apportionment
within judicial competence). Qualitative difficulties in managing constitutional standards are
common outside the political question setting. See Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 760;
McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 737.
203. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976) (stating in general that where a
state statute has not been construed by the state courts and is susceptible to a reading which
would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge, the district court
should abstain from passing on the constitutionality of the statute); Harris County Comm'rs
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1975) (concluding that where the uncertain status of a
local law stems from the unsettled relationship between the state constitution and a statute,
the district court should abstain from determining the constitutionality of the local law until
the state court can construe the state statute); see also Brant, supra note 193, at 25 (acknowl
edging that "[a)bstention is rooted in considerations of federalism and comity").
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ereign but on the Court's conclusion that a legal concept simply defied
application. For the Court to strike down RFRA as in excess of legis
lative power by reference to doctrines whose purpose is to rein in judi
cial power would be perverse.204
Professor Brant points to Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife205 as an
other analog to the idea of rejecting RFRA based on the Court's as
sessment that the judicial branch lacks competence to balance relig
ious claims against state interests.206 In Lujan the Court rejected
Congress's decision to allow citizen suits under the Endangered Spe
cies Act207 because Congress purportedly had authorized plaintiffs to
sue the government absent any "injury-in-fact," a requirement for
standing under Article III.208 Lujan, however, differs critically from
Professor Brant's reading of Smith, for the same reason the abstention
and political question doctrines do: it is a decision not about compe
tence but about authority. The Lujan Court held squarely that the
Constitution did not authorize courts to decide the kind of cases
Congress directed them to decide in the citizen suit provision. It did
not hold that courts had authority to decide such cases but lacked the
capacity to do so.209
Even aside from the dearth of precedent, the validity of sua sponte
judicial denials of institutional competence within the scheme of sepa
ration of powers is highly questionable. The Constitution gives
Congress broad power to control the Supreme Court's appellate juris204. Cf Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 33-36 (characterizing Smith decision as
"Ll]udicial activism in pursuit of judicial minimalism"); McConnell, Institutions, supra note
50, at 191 (suggesting, in context of criticizing Section 5 holding of Boerne, that Congress has
authority to supersede Supreme Court's declaration of institutional incompetence, because
Congress lacks the institutional limitations that inspire such a declaration); Resnik, supra
note 171, at 2614-15 (discussing phenomenon of Court's rejecting litigation authorized by
Congress).
205. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
206. See Brant, supra note 193, at 26-27.
207. 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (1994).
208. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-73. For an incisive critique of Lujan, see Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 163 (1992).
209. Professor Brant characterizes this critical difference as a mere distinction between
constitutional and prudential limits on judicial authority, and she suggests that the Lujan
Court collapsed that distinction. See Brant, supra note 193, at 27 n.96 (noting widely held
view that Lujan simply "constitutionalized" the prudential rule against standing to raise gen
eralized grievances, and suggesting a similar move could undermine RFRA). But even the
"prudential" rule against standing to raise generalized grievances deals with how much
power the judicial branch should exercise, not merely judicial competence to decide a par
ticular sort of case. See, e.g. , United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) ("[T]o
invoke judicial power the claimant must have a 'personal stake in the outcome,' or a 'par
ticular, concrete injury,' or 'a direct injury;' in short, something more than 'generalized
grievances.') (emphasis added; citations omitted). Moreover, the hypothesis that the Lujan
Court mustered a majority for the unprincipled act of "constitutionalizing" a nonconstitu
tional rule provides no reason to believe the Court can, let alone should, do so again.
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diction and the existence of lower federal courts.210 The political
branches, not the courts, define the particular boundaries within which
the constitutional judicial power operates. In that context, broad dec
larations of institutional incompetence by courts, particularly in areas
that Congress expressly has instructed federal courts to adjudicate,
seem at least undesirable and perhaps impermissible, absent a sub
stantive constitutional barrier - federalism or a guarantee of personal
freedom.211 "The judicial role is defined by the Constitution; the
Constitution is not defined by changing conceptions of the judicial
role."212
Allowing courts to opt out of particular controversies would give
them far too much opportunity to reach particular outcomes without
addressing the merits. Imagine that Congress passed a law permitting,
or requiring, the consideration of statistical evidence in evaluating
equal protection challenges to capital sentences.213 Could the Supreme
210. U.S. CONST. art.

I I I ; see supra

note 187.

211. Professor Sager has argued that the Court forswears full enforcement of various
constitutional provisions on "institutional" rather than "analytic" grounds. See Lawrence
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217-20 (1978). While Professor Sager characterizes such institutional
self-limitations as "based upon questions of propriety or capacity," id. at 1217 (emphasis
added), none of his examples mirrors the "pure institutional competence" account of Smith.
Professor Sager's underenforced constitutional norms reflect either judicial regard for coor
dinate branches or for state sovereignty, see id. at 1218 (discussing federal courts' refusal to
enforce equal protection norms against state tax and regulatory measures); uncertain distinc
tions between institutional and analytic/substantive limitations, see id. at 1220 & n.24 (dis
cussing substantive due process); or traditions of nonenforcement dating to the inception of
the norm at issue. See id. at 1219-20 & n.23 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause). Moreover, the increased vitality in the ensuing two decades of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, which Professor Sager included among his underenforced
norms, demonstrates that courts' reasons for declining to tackle a constitutional provision
may not run any deeper than the normative or intellectual commitments of the judiciary at a
particular time.
212. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 38-39; see also Berg, Constitutional Future,
supra note 13, at 744 ("Concerns for administrability may be one important factor in the
courts' choice between constitutional rules, but it hardly follows that such concerns author
ize the courts to refuse to follow or enforce a statute enacted by Congress."); McConnell,
Institutions, supra note 50, at 192 ("Although concern about the lack of judicially manage
able standards is reason for courts to avoid taking upon themselves an inappropriately intru
sive role, it is not a sufficient reason for refusing a responsibility vested in them by
Congress."). But see Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 Sur. CT. REV. 373, 374-75 (advancing "administrability" argument in favor of
restricting accommodation of religion).
213. Such legislation has been proposed. Title XVI of the Omnibus Crime Control Act
of 1991, the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, would have barred imposition of the death
penalty on the basis of the race of the defendant or victim; to prove the influence of race in a
particular case, the Act permitted the use of statistical evidence to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-242 (pt. I), at 153-59 (1991). Professor
Brant recognizes that such legislation would amount to congressional expansion of rights, see
Brant, supra note 193, at 34, but she denies that it could "threaten(] the Court's determina
tion of its institutional capabilities." Id. at 35. Under Professor Brant's view of the Court's
authority to determine its own institutional competence, however, the accuracy of her pre
dictive judgment would depend entirely on whether or not the Court chose to characterize
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Court affirm a capital sentence against a "statistical equal protection"
challenge by deciding that courts are not competent to consider that
sort of evidence, without addressing the merits of the petitioner's
equal protection argument? Similarly, would the Court be justified in
banning abortion, or in forbidding all restrictions on the right to re
productive choice, by positing that the distinction between fetus and
person was dispositive of the constitutional question and then declar
ing courts institutionally incompetent to draw the requisite line?214
Such declarations of institutional limits would have the uncomfortable
appearance of substantive decisions masquerading as judicial restraint.
Courts have a duty to make what they can of what Congress gives
them,215 and if their work does not satisfy Congress, it can amend the
statute.216
The ultimate problem with the view that the Smith Court authori
tatively proscribed judicial competence is that no principle would limit
such judicial authority. Professor Brant, attempting to identify a lim
iting principle, suggests two possibilities. First, she argues that " [t]he
Court cannot refuse to enforce an explicit provision of the Constitu
tion. "217 The major problem with this suggestion is that the Court itself
has authority to define what is or is not an "explicit" command of the
Constitution.218 Moreover, Professor Brant never suggests why the dis
tinction between explicit and implicit provisions, if it can be charted,
should make a difference in the Court's determination whether or not
it has the capacity to enforce a constituti?nal provision.219 In any
the legislation as threatening that authority - a characterization that seems perfectly rea
sonable.
214. In fact, abortion is a topic as to which the Court probably is institutionally incom
petent in some meaningful sense but has shown the fortitude to resolve a difficult constitu
tional dispute where no path of least resistance was available. In its watershed abortion
rights decisions, the Court has acknowledged the intractability of the question when life be
gins but has developed a constitutional jurisprudence based on its best understanding of that
issue. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, SOS U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13
(1973).
21S. Cf W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) ("Where a statu
tory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to contain that per
missible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously
and subsequently enacted law . . . . [I]t is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of
the corpus juris.") (citation omitted).
216. See Robin-Vergeer, supra note 13, at 623 ("If it turns out that RFRA is not easily
adlninistered, the answer is for Congress to amend or repeal it."); Slnith, supra note 113, at
684-8S (describing "definitional dialogue" in which Court and Congress may engage to ar
rive at correct interpretation of statutes); see also supra notes 1Sl-1S7 and accompanying
text (discussing dialogic approach to implementation of Federal RFRA).
217. Brant, supra note 193, at 3S (emphasis added); see also id. at 19 (suggesting that a
determination of institutional competence "amounting to abdication of an essential func
tion" would not be binding on coordinate branches).
218. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (196S).
219. As Professor Brant acknowledges, the Court in the past has refused to enforce ex
plicit constitutional provisions where it concluded that such provisions committed authority
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event, a strong argument exists that Smith represents the quintessen�
tial refusal to enforce an explicit provision of the Constitution: . the
Free Exercise Clause.220 Second, Professor Brant suggests · that
Congress may override prudential limits on judicial authority where
"their relationship to judicial competency is more attenuated than the
claim made in Smith."221 Here again, however, the Court would appear
to have the last word on how "attenuated" any prudential limit is from
its authority to determine judicial competence, and thus the posited
limiting principle disappears.
Even assuming the Court owns the sort of power to proscribe the
judicial role posited by the pure institutional competence critique of
RFRA, the Smith Court overstated the necessity of "centrality" analy
sis under strict scrutiny. Courts that apply RFRA have two well
established alternatives. First, courts can focus on the categorical de
termination whether a given claim .is "religious" within the meaning of
the Act.222 This . was the Court's approach in Thomas v. Review
Board,223 which distinguished between "religious" and "nonreligious"
conscientious claims224 but accorded great deference to the claimant's
account of his religious belief.225 Such an inquiry requires sufficient
deference to ensure that novel or nontraditional religious claims will
be fully recognized.226 Although defining what is religious is a delicate
to other branches. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224-26 (1962) (canvassing Guaranty
Clause cases challenging congressional acti?ns); Brant, supra note 193, at 24-25.
220. See, e.g. , Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 38-39; McConnell; Revisionism, su
pra note 21, at 1141-44; see also infra notes 249-255 and accompanying text. Professor Brant
rejects the notion that Smith abdicated the Court's duty to enforce the Free Exercise Clause:
"Smith did not find that enforcement of the. Free Exercise Clause was inconsistent with the
judicial role. The Court merely rejected the use of the compelling interest test and substi
tuted a neutrality standard. Enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause continues under this
new standard." Brant, supra note 193, at 28 (citation omitted). This account of Smith is cir
cular. The question is whether the Court's power to define the competence of the judiciary
extends to proscribing enforcement of "explicit" constitutional provisions. To reply that the
Smith Court did no such thing, because the Court continues to enforce a narrowed version of
the Free Exercise Clause, is no answer if, as Professor Brant posits, the Smith Court's basis
for narrowing the Free Exercise Clause was its narrow view of judicial competence.
221. Brant, supra note 193, at 36 (suggesting that Congress could overrule abstention
doctrines); see also Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13, at 169 (same).
222. The contours of this inquiry would depend on the meaning of the term "religion" in
RFRA, a matter whose resolution may be influenced by Establishment Clause concerns. See
infra Section III.C.
223. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
224. Id. at 713 ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion.").
225. See id. at 714 (stating that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consis
tent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection").
226. The Court has long acknowledged this dictate in the free exercise context, stating
that "it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one
group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment." Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 ( 1953) ; see also Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution of Issues About Relig-
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task;227 any complaint that attempting to do so entangles the court ex
cessively in religious substance228 proves too much. Courts must make
judgments about what is religious in order to enforce the Religion
Clauses at all.229 Analysis of whether a practice is religious at all re
stricts judicial subjectivity far more tightly than does centrality analy
sis, which asks whether a given practice has an especially important
religious pedigree. Second, courts can focus on the subjective validity
of a RFRA claim.230 In Mack v. O'Leary,231 for example, Chief Judge
ious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461, 463 (1998) (hereinafter Greenawalt, Judicial Reso
lution] (advocating "a broad approach to what counts as religious"). But see Jonathan C.
Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. REV. 589, 622-28
(2000) (criticizing deference under RFRA in defining "religion" where exemption at issue
causes harm to third parties).
227. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 682-87 (1999) (discussing problems with defining what is relig
ious); Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at 812-16 (describing complexities inherent
in determining religious character of bill of divorce und.er traditional Jewish law).
228. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 957-58 (expressing concerns that religiosity
may defy definition and that attempts to define what is religious discriminate against minor
ity religions); Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 359, 386-88 (arguing that attempts to
define religions entangle courts in matters of religious substance); Professor Greenawalt also
has noted the Establishment Clause problem with judicial declarations on "debatable issues
of religious law," as opposed to "straightforward determinations of religious requirements."
Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at 839.
229. See Tony anci Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 299 (1985)
(ncting that lower courts, in assessing religious group's claim that its regulated activity had
religious purpose, "were correct in scrutinizing the activities at issue by reference to objec
tively ascertainable facts concerning their nature and scope"); Greenawalt, Judicial Resolu
tion, supra note 226, at 463-65 (discussing types of cases that require judicial inquiries into
religiosity); Lipson, supra note 226, at 602 (criticizing courts' reluctance to define religion on
ground that "(i]t is difficult to see how courts can protect something if they cannot define
it"); Loewy, supra note 58, at 112-113 (maintaining that some measure of centrality analysis
is necessary for free exercise adjudication); Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause
Seriously, · 1986 BYU L. REV. 299, 325-31 (studying courts' tendency to avoid questioning
religious sincerity or defining religion, and proposing ways in which courts may do so in or
der to effectuate Free Exercise Clause); see also infra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
230. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 462-63 (discussing inquiry
into sincerity as a baseline for accommodation claims); Paulsen, supra note 13, at 277-78
(explaining that courts focused on the subjective sincerity of religious claimants' beliefs in
the wake of Sherbert v. Verner, and advocating such an approach to RFRA). Professor Lupu
and Professor Marshall object to inquiries into subjective validity, just as they object to "re
ligiosity" inquiries, on grounds of judicial entanglement with questions of religious sub
stance. See Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 954-57. Marshall, Defense, supra note 23, at 31011; Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 359, 386-88. Professor Marshall encapsulates the
concern: "[H]ow can one judge the sincerity of an individual's belief without judging the rea
sonableness of the belief?" Id. at 387; see also id. at 403. The answer is that every credibility
determination involves a determination of sincerity, and many of those determinations con
cern unreasonable beliefs. If a court can determine that a party before it is a sincere Nazi or
misogynist or millenarian, as any number of cases might require, then it must be able to de
termine whether a party before it sincerely holds a religious view, whether that view appears
reasonable to the finder of fact or not. The Supreme Court has established that a judicial
determination of an actor's subjective motivation need not entail any judgment about the
merits of the motivating thought or idea. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (up
holding against free speech challenge a statutory penalty enhancement for bias-motivated
crimes).
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Posner adopted what he termed a "generous" test for substantial bur
dens under RFRA, focused on the subjective importance of the bur
dened religious practice.232 Again, inquiry into the importance of a re
ligious practice to the claimant herself entails far less judicial meddling
in matters of religious substance than centrality analysis, which exam
ines the importance of the practice in the religion's doctrine generally.
Either of these two alternatives would avoid centrality analysis and
defuse the pure institutional competence concern.233 Once a court has
made such a prima facie inquiry, it can proceed to evaluate how se
verely the government's action impedes the claimant's practice.234
The extent to which either the religiosity or the subjective impor
tance approach would ease the prima facie showing required for a
RFRA claim means courts would need to exercise some control over
231. 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 801 (1997), on re
mand, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7239 (N.D. Ill. 1999). .
232. "[A] substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning of the
Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct,
inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central tenet of a person's re
ligious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs." Mack, 80
F.3d at 1179.
233. In addition, under heightened scrutiny "there are also easy cases - cases that can
be decided without any case-specific balancing whatsoever - and the principles constrain
judicial discretion. Indeed, in most free exercise cases no 'balancing' is required at all, be
cause the relevant factors are ones of kind rather than of degree." McConnell, Revisionism,
supra note 21, at 1145; see also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 757 (contending that prob
lems of judicial inquiry into centrality "are at the margin" because centrality of some relig
ious practices lies "beyond reasonable controversy"); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Estab
lishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 555, 602 (1991) [hereinafter Lupu, Reconstructing] (arguing that balancing is not al
ways necessary in free exercise cases because "OJudicial decisions must rest on norms that
transcend the immediate context in which they are applied.") (citation omitted); McConnell,
Update, supra note 195, at 735 (arguing that inquiries into religiosity and sincerity often are
unnecessary). Thus, even if the reasoning of Smith did· force courts to abjure all analysis of
the seriousness of religious freedom claims, many RFRA cases would remain amenable to
adjudication.
234. Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 240-41:
The Court should not say that minor burdens on constitutional rights require no justification.
Rather, it should say that minor burdens require justification proportionate to the burden that the state's interest must compellingly outweigh the burden on the constitutional
right. . . .

It is only common sense to recognize that a minor burden on a right may be justified by a
less compelling interest than a total prohibition on the same right.
To the extent such an analysis "require[s] both empirical guesswork and delicate compu
tations of tradeoffs," Brant, supra note 193, at 17, it is no more or less problematic under
RFRA than under any other scheme that employs strict scrutiny. Courts always have had to
contend with the question "what public purposes are sufficiently important that they justify
limiting rights of conscience." Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution 'Or Protec
tion of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique ofJustice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 826-27 (1998) (hereinafter McConnell,
Historical Arguments]; see id. at 822-32 (examining historical roots of religious accommoda
tion doctrine). Neither the Smith rule nor RFRA nor any other formulation of religious ac
commodation doctrine can obviate that question.
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the Act's reach on the back end, by sympathetically considering the
government's asserted "compelling interest."235 This imperative to
take serious account of the government's interest raises two concerns.
First, courts might fall into a pattern of overly credulous acceptance of
the government's asserted interests, a serious problem under pre
Smith jurisprudence.236 Although this problem could dilute the force of
RFRA, it is preferable to the alternatives of no protection on one side
and rule of law problems on the other. The scheme of RFRA compels
some measure of trust - backed up by legislative oversight - that
courts will implement the Act with sensitivity to the religious liberty
interests that prompted the Act as well as the genuine societal inter
ests that-sometimes trump them.237
Second, the Smith Court warned that the proven integrity of the
compelling interest standard, established in the free speech, equal pro
tection, and Dormant Commerce Clause contexts, would be under
mined by a more credulous jurisprudential approach to strict scrutiny
in religious freedom cases.238 As an initial matter, this concern seems
somewhat gratuitous, given that strict scrutiny still applies after Smith
in constitutional religious accommodation cases that involve either so
called "hybrid rights" or government actions other than generally ap
plicable laws.239 In any event, congressionally directed strict scrutiny
under RFRA need no more affect the meaning of constitutional strict
scrutiny generally than it affects the meaning of the Free Exercise

235. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 469 (discussing judicial
strategies for adjusting strict scrutiny in religious freedom cases if sincere motivation became
the only test for a substantial burden); Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 948 ("At the level of
claim definition, as well as in the application of the relevant standard of review, free exercise
adjudication provides seemingly legitimate ways for judges to say no.").
236. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; Idleman, supra note 193, at 274-80
(emphasizing manipulability of "compelling interest" standard as a reason to doubt RFRA
as a substantial guarantor of religious liberty); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with
Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 210 (2000) (hereinafter Marshall, Equality]
(suggesting, based on RFRA and pre-Smith free exercise·cases, that courts tend "to under
enforce religious exemption claims because of the difficult interpretive steps that religion
claims require") (citation omitted).
237. As Michael Paulsen has noted, the universal coverage of RFRA in the federal
sphere effectively precludes the government from arguing that uniform application of an
affected law is itself a compelling interest that justifies an exception to RFRA's directive to
accommodate religion. See Paulsen, supra note 13, at 270-74.
238. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990); see also Eisgruber &
Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 452 (arguing that use of strict scrutiny in RFRA
"will almost certainly have the effect of diluting that test in other contexts where the Court
has found the test normatively apt and workable in application"); Lupu, Statutes, supra note
6, at 66 (positing dilution concern); Sherry, supra note 29, at 149 n.103 (same); Volokh,
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1500-01 (same).
239. See McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 1 1 , at 3-4.
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Clause.240 Moreover, the Court has shown no tendency to allow its un
derstanding of strict scrutiny, including the soft version applied in re
ligious freedom cases between Sherbert and Smith,241 to bleed from
one context to another.

2.

Institutional Competence Based on a Substantive Determination
A bout Religious Liberty

Professor Conkle observes that "judicial decisions rejecting
heightened constitutional scrutiny typically involve a complex inter
play of substantive and institutional considerations."242 A variation on
the institutional competence objection reads Smith as an authoritative
constitutional judgment that the substantive content of the Religion
Clauses precludes courts from balancing religious claims against gov
ernment interests.243 This critique does not purport to prove the cor
rectness of the Court's substantive constitutional judgment; rather, it
invokes the Court's authority to make that judgment as a reason to
honor the Court's antecedent methodological judgment. From the
perspective of the substantive institutional competence critique, the
Smith Court's authoritative rejection of the methodology of strict scru
tiny as incompatible with the First Amendment compels invalidation
of RFRA.
Professors Eisgruber and Sager portray the Smith Court's holding
that strict scrutiny of religious exemption claims produced a "constitu
tional anomaly"244 as meaning that strict scrutiny "does not support
religious liberty at all, and that even if [RFRA] does not rise to the
level of an Establishment Clause violation, it works at cross-purposes
240. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text (explaining that RFRA can have
no effect on meaning of Free Exercise Clause).
241. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6,
at 64 (maintaining that strict scrutiny as applied in Sherbert and Yoder actually called for
"judicial evaluation of tradeoffs among the intrusion on liberty, the weight of the state's
ends, and the relative effectiveness of the intrusion, as compared with other means, for
reaching those ends").
242. Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 66.
243. See Brant, supra note 193, at 23 ("the [Smith] Court's institutional argument may
prove to have a foundation in the Establishment Clause"); Conkle, Constitutional Signifi
cance, supra note 130, at 64-65 ("the Court [in Smith] was concerned that religious equality
could not be adequately protected by the process of judicial balancing"); Hamilton, Uncon
stitutional, supra note 14, at 10-12; see also Greenawalt, Amendment, supra note 16, at 696
(noting that "the separation of powers objection to RFRA approaches the related objection
that a legislative directive to courts to apply an unmanageable standard for religious exercise
amounts to an establishment of religion"); Marshall, Equality, supra note 236, at 208-1 1
(generally discussing constitutional concerns arising from judicial determinations about mat
ters of religious substance). But see 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, § 5-16 at 951 n.121 (dismissing
idea that RFRA's conception of free exercise so clashes with Establishment Clause as to
render RFRA outside bounds of constitutional power).
244. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 (citation omitted).
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with the Court's understanding of religious liberty or other elements
of constitutional justice."245 Similarly, Eugene Gressman and Angela
Carmella, who reject the "pure" institutional competence critique of
RFRA,246 argue that the Smith Court's rejection of strict scrutiny in fa
vor of a categorical approach to free exercise was a methodological
decision whose "natural consequence" is a free exercise doctrine that
affords less protection to religious exercise against the effects of neu
tral, generally applicable laws.247 For Professors Gressman and
Carmella, Smith provides the last word on resolving conflicts between
religious liberty and government's regulatory prerogatives: "Smith re
jected the balancing approach for generally applicable, facially neutral
laws and with it the doctrinal formulation that the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause is dependent upon a judicial weighing of religious
claims and governmental interests."248
The substantive institutional competence objection turns on an
unnecessarily sweeping reading of Smith that would diminish protec
tion of religious freedom far more drastically than the Court appears
to . have intended. If Smith rejected judicial balancing of religious
claims against governmental interests not only · as a constitutional
mandate but also when called for by a statutory system, then the Court
irreparably skewed the proper institutional roles of Congress and the
judiciary in protecting religious freedom.249 In Smith, the Court appro
priated the congressional role of deciding how to deal with the broad
political issue of religious accommodation and held that the Religion
Clauses required Congress to decide whether particular accommoda
tions should be granted.25° Federal RFRA accedes to the Smith read
ing of the Religion Clauses but attempts a better allocation of institu
tional roles by announcing a general standard to govern
accommodations and enlisting the courts to strike proper balances in

245. Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra· note 36, at 98; see also Eisgruber & Sager,
Conscience, supra note 21, at 1302-04 (arguing tha t courts lack capacity to balance compet
ing interests in many cases that implicate core religious freedom principle of "equal re
gard"); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 459 {same).
246. See Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 73-75, 92 & n.116.
247. See id. at 75-92.
248. Id. at 86. Professor Gressman reiterates this argum<;mt in_ a post-Boerne article that
addresses RFRA's federal law applications.
·

249. See Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra note 226, at 471-72 (defending "trouble
some" judicial line-drawing in religious freedom cases as preferable to alternatives of nonen
forcement, underenforcement, and overenforcement); McConnell, Institutions, supra note
50, at 191-92 (arguing that legislatures should set general principles for religious accommo
dations and courts should adjudicate particular cases).
250. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (holding that accommodation of religious exercise is
properly left to the political process rather than to judges who would weigh the social impor
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs).
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particular cases.251 This arrangement is particularly appropriate in the
religious freedom setting. The Religion Clauses are designed to pro
tect minorities from majoritarian tyranny.252 A doctrine of religious
exemptions that transcends discrete legislative judgments can strongly
enhance that protection.253 If Smith bars Congress from harnessing the
courts' adjudicative function in this manner, then the Smith Court se
verely constrained the constitutional rights of religious minorities and

251. Some commentators have argued that, under RFRA's division of labor, courts
should grant exemptions more freely than they did under the pre-Smith Free Exercise
Clause because now they are effectuating the (amendable) political will rather than imposing
their own moral judgments. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 29; Volokh, Intermediate
Questions, supra note 36, at 617-18; Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1487-90.
That view understates the proper force of courts' constitutional judgments under both the
Free Exercise Clause (pre-Smith) and the Establishment Clause, see infra Section III.D.1.,
while also confusing courts' duty to effectuate the political will as expressed in statutes with
a license to legislate from the bench under statutory cover. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6,
at 25 ("A judge who perceives that a legislature has chosen her institutional path rather than
its own may erroneously interpret such an enactment as more of an affirmation of judicial
discretion than it is meant to be.").
252. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
("Indeed, it was 'historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave con
cern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.' ") (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 703 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943) (describing Bill of Rights as designed to remove certain interests "from the
vicissitudes of political controversy"); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative acts that discriminate
against "discrete and insular minorities"). I argue below that this deeply entrenched princi
ple of protecting minority religions makes accommodations that equalize the government's
treatment of similarly situated religious groups acceptable under the Establishment Clause.
See infra Section IIl.D.2.a.
253. "To move application of the [compelling interest) test from the courts to lawmak
ing bodies . . . would maximize the risks of underprotecting small or unpopular faiths and
overprotecting large, well-accepted faiths." Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 221; see
also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 777 ("[L)egislative politics most probably will favor
dominant religious traditions."); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 192 ("To insist
that legislatures deal with 'concrete cases' on an individual basis is an invitation to arbitrari
ness and favoritism.'') (footnote omitted); Sherry, supra note 29, at 152 (arguing that giving
legislature responsibility for deciding accommodation claims exacerbates bias against mi
nority religions already present in judicial determinations). But see Marshall, Equality, supra
note 236, at 210 (arguing that, under regime of aggressive judicial protection of religious
freedom, "minority belief systems will undoubtedly be the worse for wear"); Volokh, Com
mon-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1554 (arguing that "[legislative] exemption-by-exemption
decisions would neither violate constitutional equality guarantees nor be inherently unfair")
(footnotes omitted).
·
One response is that "RFRA is largely the majoritarian product of the demands and
pressures brought by a powerful religious coalition.'' Gressman, Comedy, supra note 3, at
518; see also Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 582-83 (maintaining that RFRA increases
danger of religious discrimination because its drafting reflects the interests of majority re
ligions). That argument has force to the extent RFRA raises concerns about competing
rights that may be undermined by RFRA's heightened protection of religious liberty. See
infra Part Ill. In the context of minority religions' quest for protection, however, it is difficult
to argue that judicial review under RFRA is worse than legislative fiat. See infra Section
III.D.2.a.
·
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permanently consigned what remains of those rights to majority will.254
That would be a strongly undesirable outcome.255 The better reading
of Smith is that it held strict scrutiny inappropriate for constitutional
adjudication under the Religion Clauses but not necessarily incom
patible with the substance of the First Amendment.
Aside from its unpalatable doctrinal consequences, the substantive
institutional competence reading of Smith would cause severe inter
pretive problems for courts in applying the Religion Clauses. The de
terminations about religious substance necessary for strict scrutiny of
accommodation claims differ only in degree from the most basic
judgments about what constitutes "religion" within the meaning of the
First Amendment.256 If courts could not make such judgments, then
they could not protect religious exercise even against the sort of inten
tional and discriminatory attacks that Smith acknowledged courts

254. This is the state of free exercise doctrine after Smith. Justice Scalia made clear that
the fate of minority religions under a weakened Free Exercise Clause did not trouble the
Court:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela
tive disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoid
able consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Commentators have condemned the" Smith Court's indifference to
minority interests. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1709, 1727 (2000) ("Smith poignantly illustrates . . . the reduction in the level of Supreme
Court protection for nonmainstream religions."); McConnell, Historical Arguments, supra
note 234, at 824 (arguing that "[w]hile the Smith interpretation of free exercise is adequate
to ward off religious persecution, it is not adequate to achieve a full liberty of conscience").
But see Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130 (arguing that Smith leaves
religious minorities with the same degree of legislative protection enjoyed by speech); Ham
ilton, Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 631 (asserting that minority religions, as "small, organized
groups," will "do better in the legislative process than disorganized minorities"); Volokh,
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1535 (asserting that "[m]ost religious groups in the
United States today do not lead particula rly discrete and insular lifestyles").
255. Professors Eisgruber and Sager argue that "legislatures may be better at . . . the
general task of accommodating religious interests." Ejsgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra
note 21, at 1304. They offer two salves for the danger of legislative bias. First, they argue that
bias is more of a danger "in small policy-making bodies that work in poorly lit corners of the
public square" than in "more cosmopolitan institutions" like Congress. Id. at 1305. Majori
ties are majorities, however, and they will exert the same pressure on large, "cosmopolitan"
institutions that they exert on local school boards. Moreover, even when representative
bodies have good intentions, they may be prone to careless or. ignorant disregard of minori
ties' preferences. See infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text. Second, Professors
Eisgruber and Sager maintain that "political institutions may react differently to an issue
once they see it as a matter of religious liberty," correctly noting that on several occasions
Congress has accommodated religious exercise where the Court would not. Eisgruber &
Saga, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1305-06. But this is, at best, a guarantee of a fair political
fight. By applying RFRA to federal law, Congress made a precommitment to give religious
exercise more than that, out of the belief that legislators might not always respect this impor
tant value in the heat of political battle.
256. See supra notes 222-229 and accompanying text (suggesting objective religiosity
inquiry for judicial assessment of prima facie claims under RFRA).
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could proscribe.257 Forbidding such judgments out of concern about
judicial encroachment on religion would amount to killing free exer
cise protection with kindness. By the same token, if courts could not
discern which practices are "religious," then they could not credibly
assess governmental actions under the Establishment Clause.258 They
could not, in effect, distinguish between a nativity scene and a red
nosed reindeer.259 Absolute judicial avoidance of inquiries into relig
ious substance, especially if it resulted in a weakened Establishment
Clause, would cross the line that divides appropriate respect for relig
ious autonomy from inappropriate solicitude for religious claims of
transcendence.260 As Professor Conkle has observed, "[t)he Court can
not entirely escape the definitional problem - that is, as long as the
Court finds any content in the religion clauses. "261
E.

Turning to the Real Challenge of Federal RFRA

The preceding discussion has established that the Court should re
spect and effectuate Congress's precommitment in Federal RFRA to
provide heightened protection for religious freedom. Despite the Act's
employment of a methodology usually associated with the Constitu
tion, its federal law applications neither exercise power without consti
tutional authority nor usurp the Court's authority to interpret or apply
the Constitution. Moreover, the mechanism Congress chose to carry
257. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 (stating that governmental prohibition of acts or ab
stentions when performed solely for religious reasons, or only because they display religious
belief, violates the Free Exercise Clause); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down local ordinance held to burden purposefully a
particular religion's practice of animal sacrifice).
258. "The majoritarianism reflected in Smith complements the majoritarianism implicit
in the permissive establishment cases: It is as if the Court wears blinders, so that it cannot
see an establishment of mainstream Christianity and cannot see free exercise violations of
anything else." Sullivan, supra note 26, at 216; cf. Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra
note 226, at 467 (noting similarity between inquiry into individual's subjective perception of
substantial burden on religious exercise and inquiry into subjective perception that govern
ment action "endorses or impermissibly aids a religion"). Professor Marshall, vigorously
objecting to judicial attempts to define religion, recognizes this Establishment Clause prob
lem but offers no answer to it. See Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 386 n.136.
259. Whether courts have proved capable of making such distinctions in the past is a fair
question. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding municipal display of creche
as part of "traditional" Christmas display); id. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority for holding creche " 'traditional' and therefore no different from Santa's house or
reindeer").
260. See Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 772 ("(I]t is easy to slip from a belief in the
'sovereignty of God' to the idea that the state lacks authority to question the bona fides of
religious claims.") (footnote omitted); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11, at 25
("merely because the civil magistrate is not a competent judge of a particular category of
truth does not mean that it enjoys any special constitutional status").
261. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path ofAmerican Religious Liberty: From the Original The
ology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 32 (2000) (hereinafter
Conkle, Religious Liberty].
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out its precommitment - strict judicial scrutiny of religious freedom
claims - does not force . upon the judiciary an analytic standard it
lacks competence to administer. The sort of legislative precommit
ment to prioritize rights manifest in Federal RFRA may be an impor
tant source of civil liberties in an era in which judicial expansion of
rights is criticized as an intrusion on the authority of the political
branches.262 Federal RFRA is the law, and the courts must effectuate
that law.
However, the methodology of precommitment, even in the service
of personal freedom, exacerbates a danger that is always present in
legislation. By making heightened solicitude for a given right effec
tively automatic, Congress foregoes case-by-case analysis of the dan
ger that such solicitude might violate other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.263 The separation of powers arguments lodged against
Federal RFRA threaten to distract judicial attention from the essen
tial task of safeguarding personal liberties.264 Any legislative solicitude
for religion, including RFRA's sweeping protection of religious free
dom beyond what the Constitution requires of the federal ·govern
ment, threatens to violate the Establishment Clause. This is the real
challenge Federal RFRA presents reviewing courts: to effectuate the
congressional will to protect religious freedom while preserving the
separation of church and state. The remainder of this Article explores
how courts can meet that challenge.

262. Critics of RFRA have expressed concern that the Act would impede rights by pre
venting enforcement of civil rights legislation in cases of religious motivated discrimination
based on race, gender, or sexual orientation. See generally O'Neil, supra note 25 (discussing
possible conflicts). Federal civil rights protections have several effective layers of protection
from Federal RFRA. First, note that this is not a constitutional problem. RFRA, a mere
statute, has nothing to say about constitutional nondiscrimination requirements. Second,
courts should, and presumably will, consider civil rights enforcement to be a "compelling
interest" that justifies encroachment on religious exercise in a broad range of cases. Third,
Congress retains the power to exempt existing or future civil rights protections from the ef
fect of Federal RFRA.
263. See supra Section II.A. The potential for a legislative precomrnitment to have im
permissible consequences should not be confused with the argument that the precommit
ment methodology's inattention to particular applications makes the methodology inher
ently suspect under some notion of due process of lawmaking. See supra notes 114-123 and
accompanying text.
264. Cf JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1980) (arguing that federal courts should forego review of federalism and separation of
powers questions in order to preserve institutional capital for individual rights cases).
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III. EFFECTUATING FEDERAL RFRA
RFRA has met with middling success in its aim of protecting re
ligious exercise.265 Many more federal RFRA claims have failed266 than
265. Ira Lupu's 1998 survey of reported pre-Boerne judicial and administrative decisions
found that, in the administrative arena, "there is absolutely no evidence that RFRA did any
thing to protect religion in decision making by the agencies of the United States." Lupu,
Failure, supra note 86, at 589; see id. at 588-97 (surveying pre-Boerne decisions and conclud
ing that RFRA was largely ineffective). In federal court cases, prisoners raising RFRA
claims had prevailed in only nine of eighty-four cases, while other RFRA claimants won in
nine of fifty cases. Id. at 591. Professor Lupu concludes: "If the goal of RFRA was to em
power religious believers and institutions, it accomplished far less than its backers hoped and
promised." Id. at 597; see also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Resto
ration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992) (contending that relig
ious freedom advocates have overstated the harm of Smith and the benefits of RFRA). But
see Berg, New Attacks, supra note 110, at 419-22 (defending RFRA's effectiveness);
Frederick Mark Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, 56 MONT. L. REV. 95, 95
(1995) [hereinafter Gedicks, Justice] (expressing skepticism about the likely effectiveness of
RFRA in protecting religious freedom but suggesting the Act would improve over pre-Smith
free exercise law in trial courts and administrative proceedings); Douglas Laycock, Religious
Freedom and International Human Rights in the United States Today, 12 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 951, 969 (1998) [hereinafter Laycock, International Human Rights] ("The experience in
the courts under [RFRA] was not good . . . but it was not terrible."). Professor Lupu's statis
tics do not seem to me to support his broad pronouncement that "a crisply codified doctrine
of free exercise exemptions cannot be made to work." Lupu, Failure, supra note 86, at 597.
Perhaps eighteen successes out of 134 cases is a disappointing result for RFRA's "backers,"
but it certainly represents meaningful "work" toward checking governmental encroachment
on religious freedom. What Professor Lupu's numbers establish is that federal courts are not
applying RFRA with anything like the vigor that Congress directed. My point here is that
the present posture of Federal RFRA provides a realistic opportunity for courts to do more
and better with the Act. Because I am not concerned here with the question whether RFRA
was the optimal means of ensuring religious freedom, I neither endorse nor dispute Profes
sor Lupu's preference for alternate means toward that end. See id. at 597-603.
266. A search for rejections on the merits of federal claims under RFRA turned up the
following decisions (thirteen appellate, eighteen trial-level): United States v. Oliver, No. 003526, 2001 U.S. App LEXIS 13284 (8th Cir. June 14, 2001) (prosecuting a Native American
for taking a bald eagle for religious purposes is not a violation of RFRA); Henderson v.
Kennedy, No. 00-5070, 2001 U.S. App LEXIS 14235 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2001) (ban on t-shirt
sales in public area did not substantially burden religious exercise of group that sold religion
therried t-shirts); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying federal employment tax laws to a church is not a violation of RFRA); Miller v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1 14 T.C. 511 (2000) (requiring Social Security numbers for
children is not a violation of RFRA); Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting RFRA defense against copyright
infringement claim); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (IRS's
revocation of church's tax-exempt status did not violate RFRA); Lipton v. Peters, No.
CIV.SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1 999 WL 33289705 (W.D. Tex. Oct 12, 1999) (affirming military's
finding that religious conscientious objector's claim was not based on a sincerely held belief);
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) (RFRA claim by
employee against hospital as private entity invalid); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215
(10th Cir. 1999) (RFRA claim invalid where defendant takes, possesses, and sells a protected
bird for commercial gain); Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1999) (IRS penal
ties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of religious opposition to war did not
violate RFRA); In re Grand Jury Empanelling of Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826 (3rd Cir.
1999) (enforcement of subpoenas to testify did not violate RFRA); Adams v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 170 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 1999) (government's failure to accommodate tax
payer's anti-military religious beliefs did not violate RFRA); Nichols v. United States, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 10992 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999) (rejecting RFRA defense against enforce-
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succeeded.267 The shortcomings do not appear inevitable from the face
of the statute.268 Rather, courts appear to have construed the statute
ment of IRS third-party summonses); McNair-Bey v. Bledsoe, 165 F.3d 32 (Table, Text in
WESTLAW), Unpublished Disposition, No. 97-1701, 1998 WL 879503 (7th Cir. 1998)
(prison officials did not violate RFRA by punishing prisoner who refused to remove or cover
religious pin worn on outside of clothing); Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(RFRA does not provide church with basis to challenge Parole Commission's decision to
deny parole to its pastor); FCC v. Girona, No. 3:99CV1262 AWT, 2000 WL 565496 (D.
Conn. 2000) (regulation prohibiting issuance of licenses for low-power broadcasters does not
violate RFRA); Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 180-81 (D.D.C.
2000) (policy statement declaring genetically altered foods presumptively nonharmful did
not impose substantial burden on RFRA claimants' religious exercise); United States v. Any
and All Radio Station Equip., 93 F.Supp.2d 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (statutory prohibition on
operating radio station without license did not violate RFRA); Jackson v. District of Colum
bia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2000) (Department of Corrections' grooming policy as ap
plied to federal prisoners did not violate RFRA); Marrero v. Apfel, 87 F. Supp. 2d 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denial of SSI benefits to non-disabled claimant, who asserted that his faith
prevented him from working, did not violate RFRA); In re Tzu Jung, No. 99-0420, 2000 WL
195066 (D.D.C. 2000) (no unconstitutional burden on free exercise of religion under RFRA
not to excuse failure to appear at trial); Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (regulation requiring that applicants for eagle parts under religious purposes exemp
tion of the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act be members of a federally recognized In
dian tribe did not violate RFRA as applied to Native American applicant not belonging to a
recognized tribe); Molotsky v. Henderson, No. CIV. A. 98-5519, 1999 WL 165683 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (no federal remedy available under RFRA to federal employee suing on employment
discrimination claim); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp.
2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (RFRA does not bar application of Age Discrimination in Employ
ment Act); In re Three Children, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D.N.J. 1998) (subpoena directing Or
thodox Jewish children to testify against their parent did not· violate children's rights under
RFRA); Packard v. United States, 7 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1998) (penalties levied on
religious tax protestor for nonpayment of taxes did not violate RFRA); Gunning v. Runyon,
3 F. Supp. 2d 1423 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (postal employee failed to establish prima facie case un
der RFRA based on decision of post office to cease playing Christian music station over its
public address system); Morehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0300-D,
1998 WL 320268, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (RFRA claim dismissed where defendant on super
vised release failed to set out details of his beliefs and burden on his free exercise of relig
ion); Steckler v. United States, 1998 WL 28235 (E.D. La. 1998) (RFRA claim for refusal to
use Social Security number for religious reasons improper because government used least
restrictive means of furthering its interest in tracking taxable income); Hartvig v. Tri-City
Baptist Temple of Milwaukie, Inc. (In re Gomes), 219 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) (recov
ery of debtors' tithes and offerings to church by Chapter 7 trustee did not violate RFRA).
267. A search for favorable adjudications of federal claims under RFRA turned up the
following decisions (2 appellate, 6 trial-level): Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-62
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had substantial likelihood of success in proving that
prison warden's denial of pastoral visit violated RFRA); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (Jn re Young), 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998) (RFRA prevents recovering bank
ruptcy debtors' religious tithes as avoidable transactions in bankruptcy proceedings);
Caldwell v. Caesar, No. 98-1847, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6914 (D.D.C. May 22, 2001) (deny
ing summary judgment on claim that RFRA is not violated when prisoners are required to
request religious diets at certain intervals); United States v. Ramon, 86 F. Supp. 2d 665
(W.D. Tex. 2000) (border patrol's use of religious symbols on vehicle as basis for stop on
suspicion of drug smuggling violated RFRA when no other factors were sufficient to support
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle); United States v. Valrey, No. CR96-549Z, 2000 WL
692647 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (under RFRA, government's restriction on use of marijuana by
Rastafarian on supervised release from prison may be accomplished through less restrictive
means and without burdening exercise of religion); United States v. Any and All Radio Sta
tion Transmission Equip., No. Civ.A. 99-2260, 1999 WL 718646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (seizure of
unlicensed religious radio station's equipment was not least restrictive means of furthering
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narrowly, in a pattern that replicates the Supreme Court's stingy ap
plication prior to Smith of the strid scrutiny mandated by Sherbert and
Yoder.269 Several causes might account for judges' narrow application
of RFRA.270 One likely cause, prior to Boerne, was the very breadth of
the Act. Any judge validating a claim under RFRA had to consider
the possibility that ruling in favor of a claimant might affect fifty state
governments and thousands of municipalities. Boerne greatly dimin
ished that source of anxiety. Now any judge who has to apply RFRA
can rest assured that only Congress - the body that enacted RFRA
and retains power to alter or repeal it - will be constrained by suc
cessful RFRA claims. But a second plausible source of judicial caution
in applying RFRA survives Boerne: the fear that ordering religious
exemptions might put the court, and the governmental entity at bar, in
compelling government interest, thus violating RFRA); United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d
33 (D.D.C. 1998) (Buddhist defendant met requirements for third-party standing to chal
lenge indictment on grounds that it infringed on right of temple and its monastics to free ex
ercise of religion in violation of RFRA); Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald
(Jn re Hodge), 220 B.R. 386 (D. Id. 1998) (RFRA provided defense to Chapter 7 trustee's
action to recover debtors' tithes to their church); see also Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353
(D.N.J. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss damages action against federal officials on ground
that availability of damages under RFRA remains undetermined).
268. One important textual impediment to RFRA's success that Professor Lupu empha
sizes is the Act's mechanical adoption from judicial precedents of the "substantial burden"
standard, which Professor Lupu ,characterizes as "poorly defined and subject to pro
government manipulation." Lupu, Failure, suprd note 86, at 594; see also Laycock, Interna
tional Human Rights, supra note 265, at 969 ("The most common reason for rejecting RFRA
claims was to find that there was no substantial burden on the religion."); Marshall, Exemp
. tion, supra note 25, at 394 ("doctrinal inconsistency is an inevitable product of the Sherbert
methodology"). But see Durham, supra note 227, at 697-711 (defending substantial burden
standard as necessary to define scope of RFRA); Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution, supra
note 226, at 469 (arguing that, absent substantial burden standard, courts would develop al
ternative means to constrain religious freedom protections).
269. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. Professor Lupu observes that, in ad
dition to continuing their past narrow construction of the "substantial burden" standard,
courts applying RFRA have tended to vindicate claims only where the burdened practice
was compelled by the claimant's religion, validate government actions that merely inhibited
religious practices rather than prohibiting them entirely, and give undue consideration to
government claims of expedience and practicality in determining whether the challenged
action was the least restrictive means of satisfying the posited compelling interest. Lupu,
Failure, supra note 86, at 594-97; see also Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes
in Private and Public Education, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 531, 572 (1999) [hereinafter Berg,
State RFRAs] (warning against undue judicial deference to governmental interests in appli
cation of RFRAs).
'
270. In addition to' the reasons discussed in the text, several other factors identified by
Professor Lupu may contribute to courts' reluctance to apply RFRA vigorously. First, courts
tend to disfavor any claim for exemption from generally applicable laws. Lupu, Failure, su
pra note 86, at 592. Religious exemption claims in particular present further problems:
judges, generally drawn from the "educated elite," may be skeptical of religion, and they
may have concerns about fraudulent claims. Id. at 593. Frederick Gedicks adds the thesis
that courts partake of a generalized societal commitment to egalitarianism that precludes
specifically religious exemptions. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The
Regrettable lndefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 ARK.-LIITLE ROCK L.J. 555, 568-72
(1998) [hereinafter Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation].
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the position of violating the Establishment Clause by favoring relig
ious over secular interests.271
This Part evaluates the implications of the Establishment Clause
for RFRA and suggests means by which courts can fulfill their dual
obligation to effectuate Federal RFRA's precommitment to protect
religious exercise while maintaining the separation of church and
state. The first section sets forth the Establishment Clause issues that
may bear on Federal RFRA. The second section considers and rejects
arguments that the Act on its face violates the Establishment Clause
but concludes that many applications of the Act will. This means that
courts must .develop a methodology for distinguishing permissible
from impermissible applications. The third section proposes a liber
tarian approach, under which the Court would interpret Federal
RFRA as mandating accommodation not only of theistic views but
also of strongly held conscientious beliefs that are not "religious" in
the conventional sense. The symbiosis of Smith and RFRA, by shifting
the source of mandatory accommodation claims from the Constitution
to a statute, provides a distinctly appropriate vehicle for this inclusive
approach to "religious" accommodation. The fourth section offers an
alternative, more restrictive approach, under which the Court simply
would recognize that, to the extent Federal RFRA embodies a level of
free exercise protection rejected as a constitutional matter in Smith,
claims under the statute must be subordinated to the Establishment
Clause. This section proceeds to describe some accommodations un
der the Act that should survive even under this restrictive approach to
statutory construction. Either of these approaches would give the Act
meaningful effect in the federal sphere, preserve the constitutional
separation of church and state, and facilitate a consistent jurispru
dence of mandatory accommodation at the federal level.
A. Federal RFRA and the Establishment Clause
The task of parsing the meaning and proper effect of the Estab
lishment Clause has proved notoriously difficult.272 The prevailing ap271. See Laycock, International Human Rights, supra note 265, at 969-70 (calling poor
success rate of RFRA claims "mostly a function of the secular view that religion should not
get any special treatment, and partly a function of the view that these are hard cases, and the
courts would rather not be bothered with them"); Lupu, Failure, supra note 86, at 593.
272. Numerous commentators on RFRA have discussed the analytic problems caused
by the Court's inconsistent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Do
State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts Violate the Establishment Clause or Separation of
Powers?, 32 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 645, 647 (1999) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Establishment
Clause] ("the Court has not been consistent in its approach or test for this constitutional
provision"); Teresa Stanton Collett, Heads, Secularists Win; Tails, Believers Lose - Return
ing Only Free Exercise to the Political Process, 20 ARK.-LIITLE ROCK L.J. 689, 694 & n.33
(1998) (expressing concern that, after Smith and Boerne, "efforts to obtain political accom
modations for religious believers will be substantially impeded by the current confusion in
the jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause"); Marshall, Concerns, supra note
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proach to Establishment Clause analysis emphasizes the purposes
and/or effects on religion of the governmental action at issue. In
Lemon v. Kurtzman,213 the Court set forth a three-part test for a gov
ernmental action to pass muster under the Establishment Clause: the
action must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must not ad
vance or inhibit religion, and it must not excessively entangle the gov
ernment with religious matters.274 The Lemon test has been frequently
criticized,275 but it remains one of the primary analytic lenses through
which the Court considers Establishment Clause claims.276 Other re
cent decisions have applied an "endorsement" test, articulated by
Justice O'Connor, which asks whether the purpose of a government
program is to advance or inhibit religion and whether the program
creates the impression that its purpose is to advance or inhibit relig
ion. 211
14, at 239 (noting absence of theoretical underpinnings for Supreme Court's often inconsis
tent Establishment Clause decisions). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994).
273. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
274. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
275. Commentators who oppose a strongly separationist approach under the Establish
ment Clause have been particularly .critical of Lemon, see, e.g. , Jesse H. Choper, Federal
Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY,
AND LAW 235, 237 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999) (calling Lemon
jurisprudence "a conceptual disaster area"), although separationists also find fault with the
test. See, e.g. , LEVY, supra note 272, at 158 ("Use of the Lemon test does not really aid the
Court in deciding establishment-clause cases."). The Court in some Establishment Clause
cases has declined to apply the Lemon test, see, e.g. , Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679
(1984) (expressing Court's "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area"), and most of the present Justices have criticized the test. See Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J ., concurring in judgment); County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur
ring in judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-14 (1985) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
276. The Court has applied or adapted Lemon in varied contexts in recent Terms. The
Lemon test played a pivotal role in the Court's decision in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), which upheld a facial challenge to a school district's
policy of allowing prayer before football games. The Santa Fe majority used the Lemon
"purpose" analysis to support facial invalidation of the policy. see id. at 314-17. On the same
day the Court handed down Santa Fe, the six justices who made up the majority in that case
(including three of Lemon's sometime critics) declined Justice Scalia's admonition to grant
certiorari in a case he saw as "an opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all." See
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251, 1253 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court applied a variation on the Lemon test that folded the third,
"entanglement" prong into the "effects" inquiry for the purpose of evaluating government
support for religious institutions. See id. at 233; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000) (plurality opinion) (purporting to apply Agostini test). The Court also applied Lemon
in Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395, a case about religious groups' access to public facilities.
277. See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Professor Greenawalt has noted that "courts need
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"Religious accommodation" generally refers to government action
that relieves religious believers from the effects of adverse govern
mental regulation.278 In practice, however, this sort of governmental
consideration for religious believers may closely resemble active gov
ernmental support for religion, just as a tax exemption may resemble a
subsidy. Thus, many Establishment Clause cases can also be under
stood as discretionary accommodation cases.279 Establishment Clause
challenges oppose governmental efforts to aid religious believers,
whether by allowing the display of religious symbols on public prop
erty,280 commingling religion with public education,281 or providing
benefits to religious institutions.282 Because the Court rarely equates
Establishment Clause claims with accommodation claims, the cases
have not clarified the extent to which the Establishment Clause reto think carefully about when endorsement terminology is closely similar to other inquiries
about aid and when the questions are genuinely different." Greenawalt, Religious Law, su
pra note 25, at 843; see also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987) (cri
tiquing endorsement test).
278. See supra note 17.
279. Conversely, many accommodation cases raise Estabiishment Clause issues, al
though Smith, in which the Court foreclosed most mandatory accommodations under the
Free Exercise Clause, ignored the Establishment Clause. See supra note 29 and accompany
ing text. In one line of mandatory accommodation cases that remains vital, those in which
the Court has required the state to grant religious groups equal access to nonscarce public
resources under the Free Speech Clause, the Court has considered and rejected Establish
ment Clause objections. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., No. 99-2036, slip op.
(U.S. June 11, 2001) (holding that allowirig religious group to conduct after-school meetings
in limited public forum does not violate Establishment Clause); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that public university's funding relig
ious student publication on equal basis with other student activities does not violate Estab
lishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (holding that giving religious group equal
access to public school facilities does not violate Establishment Clause); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that policy allowing student religious group equal access to
state university facilities comports with Establishment Clause).
280. See Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (upholding inclusion
of cross placed by Ku Klux Klan in area of state capitol grounds open to public displays);
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding government-sponsored display of me
norah); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (upholding inclusion of creche in municipal holiday display).
281. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down school district's policy that permit
ted sectarian prayers at school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (strik
ing down sectarian prayer at public school graduation ceremony); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down state statute providing for school prayer).
282. Compare Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (reversing Court's prior decision
that forbade public school district from sending public special education teachers to paro
chial schools) with Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down school district's
policy of providing special education teachers to parochial schools); see, e.g. , Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding use of federal funds to purchase instructional materi
als for parochial schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding inclusion of
sectarian agencies among recipients of federal grants for youth sex education); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tax benefit that accrued largely to parents of children
in parochial schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding extension of tax
exemption to churches).
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stricts discretionary accommodations. The few cases in which the
Court has made the doctrinal relationship explicit have reached incon
sistent results. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,283 the
Court held that exempting a religious employer from the Title VII
prohibition on religious discrimination in employment did not violate
the Establishment Clause. In contrast, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc. ,'lM the Court struck down a state's mandatory accommodation for
sabbatarian employees as an Establishment Clause violation; in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,285 the Court held that a special exemption for
religious publications from a state's sales and use tax violated the Es
tablishment Clause; and in Board of Education v. Grumet,286 the Court
struck down a school district that a state had created especially for a
religious group.287
Notwithstanding this doctrinal uncertainty, application of the
Lemon and end.orsement tests to RFRA raises obvious red flags. The
Act mandates accommodation in all cases where the government can
not demonstrate a compelling interest in the application of neutral
laws to religious conduct. Numerous situations exist in which no gov
ernmental interest would bar an accommodation that would advance a
religious belief or religion in general.288 Such applications of RFRA
would have the purpose and effect of advancing religion, in violation
283. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
284. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
285. 489 U.S. 1 (1989); see id. at 26-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the "ten
sion between mandated and prohibited religious exemptions is well recognized" and sug
gesting that Establishment Clause sometimes may prohibit what Free Exercise Clause re
quires).
286. 512 U.S. 687 (1994); see id. at 702-05 (discussing religious accommodations in con
text of Establishment Clause concerns).
287. In addition, the Court has limited the Title VII requirement that employers rea
sonably accommodate employees' religious practices to require only de minimis accommo
dations. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977). Professor Lupu suggests that the
result in Hardison was dictated by a concern about the statutory preference for religious be
lievers. See Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 593.
288. Several commentators also have suggested that special accommodations of relig
ious speech might discriminate against nonreligious expression, violating the Free Speech
Clause and perhaps the Equal Protection Clause as well. See Alan E. Brownstein, State
RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605 (1999); Marshall, Ex
emption, supra note 25 (making equal protection and free speech objections to mandatory
accommodations); McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11, at 40 ("Favoring religious speak
ers over similarly situated nonreligious speakers would violate the viewpoint-neutrality re
quirement of the Free Speech Clause." (footnote omitted)); Volokh, Intermediate Questions,
supra note 36, at 610-17 (considering argument that purely religious exemptions under fed
eral and state RFRAs may violate constitutional free speech protections); see also Eisgruber
& Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1271-72 (suggesting that purely religious exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause might violate the Equal Protection Clause). Any free
speech-based objection to applications of Federal RFRA seems to me subsumed in the Es
tablishment Clause objection: if an accommodation of religious speech is found to discrimi
nate against nonreligious speech, that accommodation improperly favors religion over non
religion.
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of the Lemon test, and give the appearance of gratuitous governmen
tal support for religion, failing the endorsement test.289 Thus, while
various commentators have defended purely religious accommoda
tions under RFRA290 on the ground that RFRA merely protects relig
ious exercise from government interference291 or that religion is some
how distinct from other priorities that might require
accommodation,292 several others, following lines of argument against
purely religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause,293
289. Cf Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S. Con
stitution, 18 CONN. L. REV. 739, 769 (1986) (noting, in constitutional context, that "[f]ree
exercise exemptions from general regulatory statutes are a form of constitutional tribute to
individual acts of faith").
290. Pre-RFRA defenses of purely religious exemptions include John H. Garvey, Free
Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779 (1986); Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]; Pepper, supra note 229; see
also Choper, supra note 254, at 1736 (arguing that purely religious accommodations do not
violate Establishment Clause "when no meaningful threat to individual religious freedom
can be said to exist"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 562-64 (endorsing a narrowly
defined class of mandatory accommodations under Free Exercise Clause).
i9l. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 25 ("In most cases the exemption works to
remove a burden on religion rather than creating incentives in its favor."); Chemerinsky,
Establishment Clause, supra note 272, at 655 ("permitting people to practice their religion
free from government involvement is a permissible and desirable effect"); Collett, supra
note 272, at 701-13 (arguing that substantial categories of religious accommodation comport
with the Establishment Clause under Lemon); Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra
note 130, at 77 n.187 (arguing that RFRA "does no more than protect religion from govern
mentally imposed burdens"). The obvious problem with this defense of purely religious ex
emptions is that it merely reframes the underlying tension between the establishment and
free exercise principles: a government action that a believer sees as accommodating religion
may fairly appear to a nonbeliever to advance religion. See supra notes 28-29 and accompa
nying text.
292. See Berg, State RFRAs, supra note 269, at 533-34 (arguing that religious interests
"tend to be deeply felt and constitutive of identity" and "offer a unique counter to the power
of the state"); Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expansion, supra note 110, at 632-34 (arguing
.that Court's past strict scrutiny of religious freedom claims proves such scrutiny does not
violate Establishment Clause and, in the alternative, that protecting free exercise can be a
compelling interest that justifies violating Establishment Clause); Durham, supra note 227,
at 667-70 (arguing that proper understanding of social contract compels accommodation of
religious believers); John H. Garvey, All Things Being Equal . . ., 1996 BYU L. REV. 587,
609 (arguing that religious believers deserve accommodation because "they are doing a good
thing and the government should not interfere with them"); Timothy L. Hall, Omnibus Pro
tections of Religious Liberty and the Establishment Clause, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 539, 543
(1999) (advocating "difference-regarding" view of religion as justification for religious ex
emptions); Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 6-24
[hereinafter McConnell, Accommodation] (arguing for "[t]he special status of religion"); see
also Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611
(1993) (arguing that unique political burdens on religion required by the Establishment
Clause justify unique accommodations under Free Exercise Clause).
293. Arguments against purely religious accommodations under the Free Exercise
Clause include Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21; Steven G. Gey, Why Is Relig
ion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment, 52 U. PIIT. L. REV. 75 (1990); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of
the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24
VILL. L. REV. 3 (1978-79); Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25; Sherry, supra note 29; Mark
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have maintained that the Act unconstitutionally privileges religious
interests at the expense of secular interests,294 or that the Act at least
creates the potential for applications that would violate the Establish
ment Clause.295
I will examine the constitutionality of RFRA based on a separa
tionist account of the Establishment Clause, which entails skepticism
about the constitutionality of exclusively religious exemptions.296 That
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J.
1691 (1988); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 591 (1991). See also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17 (op
posing purely religious discretionary accommodations but advocating mandatory accommo
dations under the Free Exercise Clause in some circumstances).
294. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 454 ("RFRA is . . . a
clear instance of the favoritism condemned by the Court's decisions in Thornton and Texas
Monthly."); Gedicks, Justice, supra note 265, at 99 ("Liberal neutrality seems to foreclose the
possibility of a religious exemption to generally applicable laws precisely because such ex
emptions distort private religious choice."); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 814; ldleman, supra note 193, at 285-302; Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14; see also Lupu,
Reflections, supra note 49, at 809 (noting that "[a]ccommodations of religion and religion
alone have not fared well in the Supreme Court" and calling RFRA's survival under current
Establishment Clause doctrine "a close question").
A distinct objection to RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds rests on the idea that
the Founders intended the Establishment Clause to prevent the federal government from
interfering with states' own establishments of religion by, inter alia, enforcing the Free Exer
cise Clause against the states. See Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA
Really Was Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2347 (1997); see also Graglia, supra note 2, at
680, 682-83 (asserting that RFRA violated the purpose of the Religion Clauses to protect
states from federal interference). This federalism-based concern applies only to RFRA's ap
plication to state and local law.
295. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 50, §§ 5-16 at 959 n.169 (suggesting some applications of
Federal RFRA might violate Establishment Clause); Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and
the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 527 (1999) (suggesting applications of state
RFRAs in employment setting might trigger serious Establishment Clause analysis because
workplace accommodations ·"seem to involve zero-sum games among employees"); Lupu,
Codification, supra note 83, at 591 ("The argument that some applications of RFRA may
violate the Establishment Clause by forcing religion-subsidizing transfers is a compelling one
in those circumstances where it fits the facts."); Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note
12, at 1492-94 (calling limitation of accommodations to religious claims "both morally and
(less certainly) constitutionally troublesome").
296. The view that the Establishment Clause requires a strict "wall of separation" be
tween religion and the public sphere has its contemporary roots in Everson v. Board of Edu
cation, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citation omitted). Two especially helpful expositions of
separationist principles are LEVY, supra note 272 (contending that separationism comports
with the Framers' intent and evaluating Establishment Clause jurisprudence from a separa
tionist perspective), and Sullivan, supra note 26, at 197-99, 202-14 (contending that the Es
tablishment Clause created a secular civil order to resolve disputes between religions in the
public sphere). The opposite approach to the Establishment Clause is nonpreferentialism,
which posits that the government need only avoid preferring one religion over another. See,
e.g. , Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (advocating
nonpreferentialism). Neutrality is a middle ground that bars the government from specially
burdening or benefiting religion. See, e.g. , Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)
(advocating "benevolent neutrality"). In general, separationists would bar government from
contact with religion; advocates of neutrality would bar government from endorsing religion;
and nonpreferentialists would bar government only from coercing religion. See Sullivan, su
pra note 26, at 202-03.
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account provides the strongest challenge to my thesis that courts can
construe RFRA in a manner that will obviate Establishment Clause
concerns, and it also reflects my own sense of how the Establishment
Clause should apply in this area. In my view, equitable treatment of
individuals, without regard to their religious convictions or lack
thereof, is a central Establishment Clause value.297 Therefore, a gov
ernmental preference extended only on grounds of religious belief is
impermissible unless it can be justified and understood without regard
to religion. One predictable response to this separationist position is
the assertion that religion is a uniquely important source of conscien
tious commitments and that, accordingly, an equality norm should
permit and may even require religious accommodations in various cir
cumstances.298 Thus, Michael McConnell, in advocating exclusively re
ligious accommodations, emphasizes that "[n]o other freedom is a
duty to a higher authority."299 That argument, aside from its dubious
account of equitable treatment,300 suggests a good reason not to privi297. "Most of the framers of [the Establishment Clause] very probably meant that gov
ernment should not promote, sponsor, or subsidize religion because it is best left to private
voluntary support for the sake of religion itself as well as for government, and above all for
the sake of the individual." LEVY, supra note 272, at 146.
298. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. Michael Perry offers a different re
sponse: he simply classifies the belief that "there is a God, who created us and who both
loves us and judges us" and the belief that "because God created us and loves us, we are all
sacred" as exceptions to the nonestablishment rule that government may not discriminate in
favor of religious beliefs. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de
Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 310 (2000).
299. McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 11, at 30. Professor McConnell also points out
that the government may promote, for example, environmentalism, whereas it may not pro
mote religion, and he argues that the government accordingly should lack the power to bur
den religious conduct to the same extent it may burden environmentalism. See id. at 10. The
argument is unduly linear, because equitable treatment of individuals has nothing to do with
any other restriction the Establishment Clause may impose on the government. Adherents
of nontheistic conscientious commitments who bear a heavier regulatory burden than their
religious counterparts receive no succor from the fact that the government is not barred
from cheering for their views. A narrower and more viable variation on Professor
McConnell's insight is Professor Gedicks's suggestion that permissive accommodations are
constitutional "only in the relatively narrow range of cases in which religion suffers from
special Establishment Clause or other unique disadvantages." Gedicks, Normalized, supra
note 50, at 98-99.
300. Commentators have persuasively refuted the claim that the special status of relig
ion should entitle religious believers to exemptions. See, e.g. , Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience,
supra note 21, at 1260-67; Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation, supra note 270, at 557-68; Marshall,
Exemption, supra note 25, at 382-85 (rejecting claims of special nature of religion as grounds
for religious accommodations generally); Sherry, supra note 29, at 137-42 (critiquing
McConnell's argument for special status of religious believers). Professor Durham's contrac
tarian argument demonstrates the problems with claims of this sort. Professor Durham
maintains that the state must honor religious believers' spiritual commitments because (a)
those commitments transcend the commitments of secular society in believers' minds and (b)
thus, believers never would have submitted to secular rule absent an understanding that the
state would accommodate their religious commitments. See Durham, supra note 227, at 66770. Premise (b) ignores the possibility that nonbelievers would have abstained from the so
cial contract had they known that their own commitments - moral, ethical, ideological, etc.
- would be subordinated categorically to the presumptively superior commitments of re-
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lege religion belief: religious belief has a unique capacity to promote
conflict and factionalism in society. We should understand the Consti
tution to constrain the government from using religion as a singular
basis for exempting individuals from the law precisely because religion
is a matter of uniquely intense conviction.301 I now tum to the question
whether and to what extent RFRA can be construed not to violate this
separationist conception of the Establishment Clause.
B.

Why RFRA on its Face Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause

Justice Stevens contended in his brief Boerne concurrence that
RFRA on its face violated the Establishment Clause.302 Several schol
ars have entertained the same idea.303 The Supreme Court generally
will invalidate a statute on its face only where the law has no constitu
tionally permissible applications.304 Thus, for example, the Supreme
Court rejected a facial challenge to a statute that included religious so
cial service providers in a program of grants to encourage family plan
ning counseling, emphasizing that the statute had a secular purpose
and effect, but remanded for consideration whether the statute as ap
plied violated the Establishment Clause.305 The Court in Santa Fe In
dependent School District v. Doe306 clarified the standard for Estab
lishment Clause challenges: a state action is subject to facial
ligious believers. Thus, the argument reduces to the presumption underlying premise (a):
that religious commitments are more important to their adherents than nonreligious com
mitments are to theirs. That presumption is both dubious on its face and antithetical to the
civil society the social contract is supposed to establish. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 126062 (rejecting privileging of religious priorities as inconsistent with liberal democracy).
301. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church
and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1997) (contending that religious conviction is inherently
incompatible with liberal norms of toleration); Steven G. Gey, When ls Religious Speech Not
"Free Speech"?, 2000 U. ILL L. REV. 379, 381-82 (arguing that reliance of religious speech
on a higher authority renders it fundamentally antidemocratic).
302. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997).
303. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 457-58 (arguing that
RFRA's use of constitutional language to overprotect religious freedom violates the en
dorsement test); Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 8-14 (agreeing with Justice
Stevens's Boerne concurrence and arguing that RFRA violates Establishment Clause under
settled jurisprudence); see also Idleman, supra note 193, at 285-96 (discussing arguments for
facial invalidity); Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 237-42 (same).
304. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a leg
islative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the chal
lenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.").
305. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); see also Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (emphasizing facial neutrality of statutory provision ex
empting religious employers from prohibition on religious discrimination in upholding appli
cation of the exemption to religious employer's nonreligious activity).
306. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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invalidation under the Establishment Clause if it lacks a secular pur
pose.307 In Santa Fe, five Justices who had not joined Justice Stevens's
Establishment Clause reasoning in Boerne concurred with his opinion
facially invalidating a high school's policy that orchestrated prayers at
football games, because the policy "specifie[d] only one, clearly pre
ferred message - that of [the school district's] traditional religious
'invocation.' "308
The most familiar argument for facial invalidation of RFRA bor
rows the Boerne Court's conclusion, critical to its invalidation of
RFRA's applications to state and local governments, that Congress
failed to demonstrate any real-world burden on religious exercise that
warranted protection from facially neutral laws.309 The Establishment
Clause variation posits that, absent any discernible burden, RFRA
fails the Lemon test because (1) Congress lacked a secular purpose for
RFRA and (2) the sole effect of the Act is to advance religion rather
than to protect it.310 As to purpose - the crucial inquiry under Santa
Fe - this argument improperly denies deference to congressional ex
planations for legislation. Even if Congress's failure to identify con
crete grounds for extending legislative protection to religious freedom
claims justified the Court in imposing its stringent "congruence and
proportionality" test to protect states against congressional power
grabs under Section 5,311 that failure provides no basis for tightening
scrutiny of congressional purposes under the Establishment Clause.312
As to effects, the argument that RFRA violates the Establishment
Clause because it lacks a discernible basis defeats itself. If no situa-

307. "Our Establishment Clause cases involving facial challenges . . . have not focused
solely on the possible applications of the statute, but rather have considered whether the
statute has an unconstitutional purpose." Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314. But see Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (noting practice in Establishment Clause decisions of dis
tinguishing between facial invalidity and invalidity of applications and suggesting that facial
challenge is inappropriate where government aid to religion may provide only secular bene
fits); see also Dolan, supra note 12, at 189-90 (arguing that RFRA may be invalid on its face
despite permissible applications).
308. 530 U.S. at 315.
309. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32.
310. See Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 9-10; Garvey, supra note 58, at
505-06; see also Chemerinsky, Establishment Clause, supra note 272, at 648 (identifying ar
gument that RFRA lacks secular purpose as central aspect of Establishment Clause objec
tion); Gedicks, Normalized, supra note 50, at 102-03 (noting that the Court has found insuf
ficient empirical justification for benign race and sex-based preferences and arguing that
permissive religious accommodations have less empirical justification than those prefer
ences); Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 237-38.
3 1 1. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
312. See Sullivan, supra note 26, at 197 n.9 (arguing that under Lemon courts should re
quire only a post hoc secular rationale and not proof that the legislation reflected a secular
motive).
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tions exist where RFRA is necessary, then RFRA, if faithfully applied,
will have no effect at all.313
The Court has made clear that at least some discretionary legisla
tive accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause,314 and
even some of RFRA's most ardent critics agree.315 Despite the ac
knowledgement in Santa Fe of a looser standard for facial invalidation
of statutes in Establishment Clause cases, the Court never has sug
gested that the possibility that many or most of a statute's applications
will violate the Establishment Clause warrants facial invalidation.316
Federal RFRA, as I demonstrate below, has potential applications
with permissible, secular effects, even if the Act is construed to pro
vide exclusively religious exemptions: to safeguard the religious
equality guaranteed by the Constitution317 and to accommodate idio
syncratic religious practices.318 Finally, the fact that RFRA explicitly
forswears any transgression of the Establishment Clause319 under
scores the Court's obligation to construe the statute not to violate the
Constitution if possible.320
313. For a discussion and refutation of the argument that RFRA in effect violates the
"entanglement" prong of Lemon because strict scrutiny requires courts to make substantive
inquiries into matters of religious doctrine, see supra Section II.D.2.
314. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) ("Values that are pro
tected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not
thereby banished from the political process."); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (upholding provision of Title VII that exempts religious employers
from prohibition against religious discrimination in hiring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 680 (1970) (upholding tax exemption for religious organizations).
315. See Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 134 ("Whatever the fate of
federal RFRA, nothing in Boerne should prevent either Congress or the states from enacting
more nuanced protections for religious commitments . . . . Nor would such laws encounter
Establishment Clause barriers."); Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 94-95 & n.121
(estimating that there are as many as 2000 statutory religious accommodations in state and
federal law, and calling legislative accommodations "common and legitimate"); Hamilton,
Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 2. But see Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 778-79 (op
posing discretionary accommodations and arguing that any legislative aid to religion must be
extended "to other institutions that are, on secular grounds, similarly situated"); Marshall,
Concerns, supra note 14, at 237 ("By holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
exemptions for religious claimants, [Smith] refutes the argument that religious claims are
constitutionally privileged" in legislative arena).
316. The question would be different if the Court found those applications of Federal
RFRA that violated the Establishment Clause inseverable from those that did not. As with
the question of the severability of RFRA's federal from its state applications, however, the
far more plausible conclusion is that Congress wanted, at a minimum, whatever statutory
protection for religious freedom the Court would uphold. See supra note 16.
317. See infra Section 111.D.2.a.
318. See infra Section III.D.2.b.
319. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (1994) ("Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed to affect,
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws re
specting the establishment of religion . . . . ").
320. Cf. Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 11-12 (calling provision in War Powers Resolu
tion of 1973 that forswore alteration of political branches' constitutional authority "gratui-
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Professors Eisgruber and Sager make a different sort of appeal to
nonestablishment principles in support of an argument that RFRA
should be facially invalidated. They maintain that the strict scrutiny
RFRA mandates for religious freedom claims is both "normatively
unjustified" and "wholly unworkable."321 First, they insist strict scru
tiny would elevate sectarian interests over not only improper, inequi
table government infringements on religious. practice but also legiti
mate, even essential government infringements on religious practice.322
Second, they suggest that courts' pre Smith inconsistencies in applying
the Sherbert-Yoder compelling interest standard, which they charac
terize as "strict only in theory and notoriously feeble in fact,"323 mark
that standard as ineffectual and counterproductive to religious free
dom.324 They argue, based on both grounds, that the judicial branch
may and must declare RFRA unconstitutional.
The first problem with Professors Eisgruber and Sager's argument
for facial invalidation is that it talks out of both sides of its mouth. The
fact that strict scrutiny seemed to underprotect religious freedom in
practice belies the danger of overprotection. The plausible hypothesis
-

tous" but acknowledging that it "represents . . . legislative acknowledgement of a conserva
tive rule of construction").
321. Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 451; see also Eisgruber &
Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 104 (arguing that Smith pronounced strict scrutiny of
religious freedom claims "both normatively unattractive and unworkable in practice"). This
argument is closely related to Professors Eisgruber and Sager's account of the "substantive
institutional competence" objection to Federal RFRA. See supra notes 244-245 and accom
panying text.
322. According to Professors Eisgruber and Sager, " [t)he compelling state interest test is
suitable only where it is appropriate to indulge in a broad and robust presumption of uncon
stitutionality . . . . " Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1306; see also id. at
1258-60, 1286-89; Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 106; Eisgruber & Sager,
After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130; Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 63 (calling strict scrutiny
as set forth in RFRA "an engine of destruction for virtually any policy made subject to it");
Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1502 (arguing that state RFRAs should
avoid strict scrutiny in favor of "explicitly delegat[ing] to courts common-law-making
authority so that they can generate different tests for different situations"). But see
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1136 (characterizing strict scrutiny of free exercise
claims as nothing more than "a way to determine whether government decisions that inter
fere with the religious exercise of religious minorities are in fact neutral").
323. Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting, supra note 158, at 104; see also Lupu, Statutes, supra
note 6 (arguing that pre-Smith "strict scrutiny" of free exercise claims actually involved a
nuanced balancing test).
324. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1307 ("Instead of evaluating
specific claims for exemption, Congress simply handed the problem back to the judiciary,
inviting it to continue on its erratic pre Smith course."); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional,
supra note 36, at 445-46 (" Sherbert's promise of the ruthless compelling state interest test
proved remarkably toothless."); Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 101
("RFRA's compelling state interest test could not be defended as a proven vehicle for vindi
cating Free Exercise Clause concerns. Its track record was - neither extensive nor impres
sive."); see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 65-66 (expressing concern that courts would
construe constitutional terminology in RFRA so restrictively as to prevent appreciable im
provement in protection for religious liberty).
-
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that the pre-Smith underprotection was a reaction to the undesirable
potential for overprotection325 provides an argument for refining the
standard, not for a constitutional quarantine. The overprotection con
cern, for its part, reflects an unnecessarily rigid account of strict scru
tiny under RFRA. Fealty to the Establishment Clause should provide
a compelling government interest that will defeat RFRA claims in ap
propriate cases. To the extent problems remain, courts may and
should adjust the strict scrutiny analysis to provide reasonable calibra
tion of the competing interests.326 Similarly, as to the underprotection
concern, Federal RFRA gives courts another chance, away from the
high-stakes game of constitutional doctrine, to develop an approach to
strict scrutiny that will better protect religious exercise in appropriate
cases.
Professors Eisgruber and Sager deride suggestions that courts
should attempt to refine strict scrutiny to fit the problem of religious
freedom as "at best fronts for more substantive but obscure intuitions
about how particular claims for religious exemptions ought to come
out."327 Fair enough. A statutory scheme that harnesses the analytic
skills of courts in an effort to refine and actualize such obscure intui
tions is an eminently reasonable method of making policy in an area
where obscure and competing intuitions inevitably define the political
discourse.328 More important, it is the method Congress chose. Even if
strict scrutiny proves as unworkable as Professors Eisgruber and Sager
predict, the constitutional constraint of the Establishment Clause, and
the ability of the courts and Congress to communicate about the Act
through the interplay of adjudication and legislative oversight, will
prevent its failure from transgressing constitutional boundaries.
325. See Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 447 ("The feeble quality
of the Court's pre-Smith jurisprudence was no accident. The compelling interest test cannot
bear the meaning in the area of religious exemptions that it has elsewhere."). But cf
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1144 (criticizing Smith Court for "eliminating the
doctrine of free exercise exemptions rather than . . . contributing to the development of a
more principled approach").
326. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing need to adjust strict scrutiny
inquiry in order to avoid excessive judicial inquiries into religious substance).
327. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1259; see also Eisgruber & Sager,
After Boerne, supra note 36, at 130 (asserting that "the compelling interest standard . . . is
too blunt and too invasive to serve as a sensible vehicle for identifying instances of disparate
impact or disparate treatment); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 474-75
(suggesting that Court could save RFRA by "dilut(ing] the 'compelling interest standard' "
to render it "duplicative of post-Smith constitutional protection for religious liberty" but
dismissing such a gambit as undesirable); cf Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at
1498 (rejecting possibility of judicial adjustment as a defense of strict scrutiny under RFRA
because that solution is "far from certain" and entails "set[ting) up a test that courts have to
ignore in order to reach the right results").
328. Cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 21-22 (noting that legislators may adopt consti
tutional language in order to address "difficulty in resolving the difficult policy questions
that surround the drafting task").
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Invalidating Federal RFRA on Professors Eisgruber and Sager's "un
workability" reasoning would grossly exceed the judicial function.
Although I reject arguments that RFRA is facially invalid under
the Establishment Clause, I believe a freewheeling regime of purely
religious exemptions would offend both Establishment Clause doc
trine and separationist principle. Douglas Laycock would construe
RFRA to create just such a broad-based regime of exemptions, con
tending that "[RFRA] can work only if it is as broad as the Free Exer
cise Clause."329 I agree with Professor Laycock's implicit assumption
that protecting religious believers from unwanted autopsies330 or per
mitting believers to attend church-affiliated schools331 raises no Estab
lishment Clause concern. These protections afford believers benefits
that others generally do not want, what I refer to below as "idiosyn
cratic accommodations."332 I disagree, however, that the state could
relieve a religious believer who drives of the otherwise universal obli
gation to carry a photographic license333 or permit members of a par
ticular church to practice polygamy.334 These protections would im
properly privilege religion, because they would inequitably relieve
believers of constraints from which many nonbelievers might also pre
fer to be free.335 RFRA is not the Free Exercise Clause, and courts
therefore must apply the Establishment Clause to draw the constitu
tional boundaries of Federal RFRA.336 At the same time, courts have
329. Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 221.
330. See id. at 226 (discussing Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990)).
331. See id. at 223-24 (discussing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
332. See infra Section IIl.D.2.b.
333. See id. at 229 (discussing Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affd
by an equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v" Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)).
334. See id. at 223-24 (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
335. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
336. Some have conceptualized the boundaries in economic terms. Professor Berg, for
instance, dismisses the Establishment Clause concern on the ground that "[a] great many
religious accommodations (im]pose only minimal costs on others, or only diffuse costs ab
sorbed by the whole of society." Berg, Constitutional Future, supra note 13, at 737; Lipson,
supra note 226 (emphasizing importance of third-party harms in determining validity of ac
commodations); Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1989) (discussing permissibility of ex
emptions in terms of "the prevention of negative externalities"); Pepper, supra note 229, at
332-35 (arguing for distinction under Establishment Clause between "private" and "public"
harms). But see Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1290-91 (questioning utility
of externality approach); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 608-10, 618-24
(discussing and critiquing externality approach).
I agree that the absence of externalized costs may be relevant in identifying permissible
accommodations. Cf infra Section IIl.D.2.b (discussing idiosyncratic accommodations).
However, permitting establishments on the ground that their costs were diffuse rather than
concentrated would write the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution. The costs of the
ultimate Establishment Clause violation - governmental creation of a national church would be diffused across society, but that fact would underscore the affront to the
Constitution, not ameliorate it. The Court has signaled the irrelevance of the concentration
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an obligation to construe a statute in a manner that renders it constitu
tional, where such an interpretation is possible.337 Federal courts that
apply RFRA can avoid Establishment Clause problems either by ex
pansively construing the statutory term "religion" or by simply re
stricting the scope of Federal RFRA's purely religious applications to
comport with the Establishment Clause.338
C. A Libertarian Approach to Interpretation: Broad Construction of
"Religion "
One approach to construction of Federal RFRA takes account of
the Establishment Clause at the root ofthe interpretive process, obvi
ating the need for Establishment Clause analysis of each distinct ap
plication. The approach is simple: to avoid Establishment Clause
problems, the meaning of "religion" in the text of RFRA should be
understood to encompass all deeply held conscientious beliefs,
whether or not the believers profess faith in a supreme being.339 Sev
eral commentators have suggested in passing that courts might extend
of establishment costs in two ways: by suspending for Establishment Clause claims the ordi
nary prudential standing rule against rai�ing "generalized grievances," see Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968), and by emphasizing the symbolic costs of actual or perceived
governmental endorsements of religion. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (dis
cussing endorsement test).
337. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see infra
notes 354-358 and accompanying text (discussing canon of constitutional doubt).
338. Courts might also attempt to avoid Establishment Clause concerns by construing
RFRA as returning the law to its pre-Smith state. See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Expan
sion, supra note 1 10, at 633-34; see also Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 25, at 221-25 (ad
vocating such a construction to avoid separation of powers concerns). That approach, how
ever, might fail both to effectuate RFRA in a meaningful way and to solve the
Establishment Clause problem. As to effectuating RFRA, the defects of the Sherbert-Smith
interregnum in protecting religious freedom are well documented. See supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text. As to the Establishment Clause, the Court prior to Smith held certain
endorsements mandatory as a matter of constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause.
Smith announced the effective demise of constitutionally compelled accommodations.
Congress cannot make a law that, like the Free Exercise Clause, stands on equal footing with
the Establishment Clause. Thus, the Court might construe RFRA as attempting to reinstate
the pre -Smith law and still hold thaf the Act violated the Establishment Clause because Es
tablishment Clause concerns trumped Congress's statutory initiative in a way that they could
not trump the Free Exercise Clause. But see Chemerinsky, Establishment Clause, supra note
272, at 653 (arguing that congressional power to interpret Constitution extends to expansion
of free exercise rights to pre-Smith boundaries, apparently without regard to Establishment
Clause).
339. Steven Smith has noted that treating nontheistic conscientious accommodation
claims like religious accommodation claims presumes religion is not meaningfully distinct
from nontheistic sources of conscientious commitment, and that such a presumption can
only be sustained by reference to some substantive principle. See Steven D. Smith, Blooming
Confusion: Madison 's Mixed Legacy, 75 IND. L.J. 61, 65-70 (2000). In my view, religion is
distinctive, but what makes it distinctive - its status as a uniquely potent and thus divisive
source of conviction - is what makes it a constitutionally suspect ground for special exemp
tions from the law. See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
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RFRA to cover nontheistic conscientious claims,340 but the problems
and possibilities such an approach would present for statutory con
struction remain unexamined.
The notion of broadly construing the statutory term "religion" de
rives from the Court's resolution of a similar problem in Welsh v.
United States.341 That Vietnam-era case required the Court to deter
mine who could qualify as a conscientious objector under section 6U)
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The statutory text
was blatantly sectarian, making the only acceptable basis for exemp
tion from military service "religious training and belief" and limiting
that category to "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human rela
tion, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo
sophical views or a merely personal moral code."342 When the Court
initially confronted the statute in United States v. Seeger,343 it avoided
the Establishment Clause issue by holding that any "sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption" fell within the statutory definition.344 Welsh, decided five
years later, went farther, essentially turning the statutory definition on
its head. The Court made clear that the Seeger umbrella encompassed
"beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that
nevertheless impose upon [the believer] a duty of conscience to refrain
from participating in any war at any time."345 The Court avoided the
340. See Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 77 n.187; Lupu, Reflec
tions, supra note 49, at 809 & n.83; Lupu, Codification, supra note 83, at 590-91; Perry, supra
note 298, at 315 n.67; Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 606; Volokh,
Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1493-94; see also Smolla, supra note 23, at 942 & n.82
(proposing an intermediate scrutiny standard �or religious accommodation claims that would
have the effect of putting theistic and nontheistic conscientious claims on the same footing).
But see Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 473 (recanting earlier sugges
tion that saving construction of RFRA might be viable, on ground that RFRA "sends signals
that are both difficult to ignore and impossible to reconcile with constitutional principle");
Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 232-235 (expressing skepticism about interpreting
RFRA to protect nontheistic conscientious practices); Smith, supra note 113, at 658-59 (ar
guing, in context of a proposed religious equality statute, that "since contemporary courts
appear disinclined to engage in dynamic statutory interpretation, it is doubtful that courts
would interpret 'religion' " to include nontheistic conscientious commitments (footnote
omitted)).
341. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
342. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964) (amended 1967). The Welsh Court noted that a 1967
amendment to the Act had deleted the reference to "a Supreme Being." Id. (1964 ed. Supp.
IV), cited in Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336 n.2.
343. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
344. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
345. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340; see also id. at 344 (concluding that statute "exempts from
military service all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or relig
ious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of
an instrument of war"). Justice Harlan, who had joined the Seeger majority, concurred only
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Robson's choice between countenancing a blatant preference for re
ligion and ending the possibility of exemption from the draft, distilling
from the words of the statute the essence of conscientious opposition
to violence.346
Some commentators, recognizing the Establishment Clause prob
lem raised by disparate treatment of different classes of conscientious
beliefs, have urged a constitutional system of accommodations that es
sentially adopts the Welsh principle.347 But understanding the term
"religion" in the text of the First Amendment - the source of manda
tory accommodation claims - to encompass nontheistic belief systems
would present a host of problems. First, such a reading obviously
would be difficult to justify textually or by reference to the Framers'

in the judgment in Welsh, rejecting "the liberties taken with the statute" by the Court but
agreeing that the statute should be applied expansively "as the touchstone for salvaging a
congressional policy of long standing that would otherwise have to be nullified" under the
Establishment Clause. See id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). For more detailed
discussion of the Court's approach to statutory construction in Welsh, see Eisgruber &
Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1294-95; Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 229-232.
346. The Court revisited the conscientious objector statute in Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 ( 1971), where it held that the statute's limitation to objectors who opposed all
wars, as opposed to people who believed that some wars could be just, neither interfered
with the free exercise rights of the latter group, see id. at 461-62, nor preferred some relig
ions over others in violation of the Establishment Clause, see id. at 448-60. Justice Douglas's
dissent portrayed the Court as preferring theistic over nontheistic conscientious claims. See
id. at 463-70 (Douglas, J. dissenting). The Court, however, was careful to emphasize that the
interpretive issues aodressed in Seeger and Welsh were "not relevant to the present issue,"
id. at 447, and it repeatedly used the ambivalent phrase "religion and conscience" or "con
science and religion" to describe the subject of the statute. See id. at 445, 455, 458, 459, 461.
The Court expressly held "that persons who object solely to participation in a particular war
are not within the purview of the exempting section, even though the latter objection may
have such roots in a claimant's conscience and personality that it is 'religious' in character."
Id. at 447. One of the two objectors in Gillette was Catholic, but the Court described the sec
ond as basing his claim on "a humanist approach to religion" and "fundamental principles of
conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation of human existence." Id.
at 439.
347. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27-28 ( 1989) (Blackmun, J., concur
ring) (suggesting that, where Establishment Clause forbids accommodation Free Exercise
Clause requires, court should require government to expand accommodation to similarly
situated nonbelievers); Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1282-1301 (pro
posing "equal regard" approach to constitutional accommodations); Laycock, Neutrality,
supra note 29, at 1002; Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at 778-79; Marshall, Equality, supra
note 236, at 205; see also Gedicks, Unfirm Foundation, supra note 270, at 571-72 (discussing
proposals for extending free exercise accommodations to secular conscientious beliefs). But
see Durham, supra note 227, at 685 ("It may be that worldviews should receive equal treat
ment whether they are religious or not. But this does not imply that all worldviews are nec
essarily religious." (footnote omitted)); Hall, supra note 292, at 545-48 (arguing that Court's
free exercise jurisprudence accords religious commitments protection not accorded to other
conscientious commitments based on special characteristics of religion); McConnell, Update,
supra note 195, at 717 (arguing that text of First Amendment requires preference for ac
commodation of religious over nonreligious norms); Sherry, supra note 29, at 149 n.103 (ar
guing that avoiding Establishment Clause problems by accommodating those similarly situ
ated to religious believers "would be highly impractical").
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intent.348 Second, if the Court construed the Free Exercise Clause to
protect "religion in the traditional sense, or any other conscientious
belief system," it would dramatically expand the class of beliefs enti
tled to immutable constitutional protection. The Court has resisted
expanding Free Exercise Clause protection beyond traditionally con
stituted religions.349 Third, the word "religion" in the First Amend
ment animates not only the Free Exercise Clause but also the Estab
lishment Clause. Reading the Establishment Clause to bar the federal
government from "establishing" any conscientious belief system could
inhibit the president and Congress from advocating and implementing
all manner of policies, from racial justice to free trade and beyond,
that may constitute deeply held commitments of conscience.350
. In contrast, Federal RFRA creates an unprecedented opportunity
to develop a broad-based system of accommodations under federal
law that incorporates the Welsh principle - if the Court is willing to
take a significant interpretive step. Because RFRA is only a statute,
interpreting the word "religion" in its text to encompass nontheistic
conscientious beliefs would not have the broad implications of trying
to impose that reading on the Constitution.351 Courts may consider
348. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 290, at 1488-500 (discussing Framers' consid
eration and rejection of broad constitutional protection for conscientious beliefs).
349. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (emphasizing distinction be
tween Amish religious beliefs and nonreligious, philosophical beliefs as grounds for exemp
tion from general laws); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (declining to
extend Free Exercise Clause to nonreligious conscientious objection). But see Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90, 495 n.11 (1961) (striking down state's requirement that of
ficeholders profess belief in God because requirement discriminated against nontheistic re
ligions).
350. "The culture of liberal democracy may well function as a belief system with sub
stantive content, rather than a neutral and transcendent arbiter among other belief systems."
Sullivan, supra note 26, at 199; see also Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the
Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 1047, 1082 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Continuity and Change] ("[G]eneral public
policy and the operation of public institutions must inevitably be based on the moral deci
sions of political bodies."); Lupu, Burdens, supra note 29, at 987 ("Government . . . transmits
messages about value, direction, and goals for its citizens."). The federal government fre
quently advocates policy initiatives in moral or conscientious terms. See, e.g. , Jack Germond
& Jules Witcover, . . . And a Moral Justification?, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Louisville, Ky.,
Jan. 6, 1991, at 3D (recounting President Bush I's professed moral justification for U.S. in
volvement in the Persian Gulf); Doyle McManus, Shultz Criticized For Opposing Aid to An
golan Rebels, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1985, at 16 (recounting House Republican Leader Robert
H. Michel's statement that U.S. support for Angolan Rebels was based not only on
geostrategy but moral necessity). See generally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983).
351. In light of RFRA's textual limitation to "religion," the Court might limit the scope
of Federal RFRA to those accommodations of conscience that would be constitutionally
permissible on purely religious grounds. That approach would mirror the view of some
commentators that religion should receive at least as much protection as any other sort of
conscientious claim. Cf Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 49-50 (suggesting constitu
tional "most-favored nation status" for religious liberty claims); McConnell, Accommoda
tion, supra note 292, at 14 ("Religion . . . is at least as protected and encouraged as any other
form of belief and association - in some ways more so."); Smith, supra note 113, at 674
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nontheistic conscientious claims and religious conscientious claims on
the same footing, extending heightened protection to both categories
as a matter not of constitutional mandate but of statutory right. Thus,
under this approach, the claim of a committed communist to relief
from a congressional ban on travel to Cuba would stand on compara
ble footing with the claim of a Sikh who wore a ceremonial dagger to
relief from a ban on carrying weapons into a federal building. The
Welsh principle could apply in the same manner to any statutory
scheme of permissive accommodation, but RFRA presents a distinc
tive vehicle for extending generalized protection of conscience over
the whole of federal law.
The most significant problem with following Welsh as an interpre
tive model for Federal RFRA is that the statute, as originally enacted,
defined the term "exercise of religion" to correspond with the mean
ing of that term in the First Amendment.352 Because of the problems
presented by reading the Free Exercise Clause to encompass nontheis
tic conscientious practices, and because the Court has declined to ex
pand the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause in that manner,
Congress's decision to lash the statute to the Constitution appears to
preclude a Welsh approach to RFRA.353 The canon of constitutional
doubt, however, dictates that the Court must, if possible, construe a
statutory provision in a manner that avoids serious constitutional
problems.354 The Court's recent decision in Miller v. French355 followed
(proposing religious equality statute under which " [n)either religion nor conscience could be
discriminated against on establishment grounds."); see also Lupu, Trouble, supra note 17, at
779 (suggesting that religion should not be excluded from generally available government
aid). But see Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1539-42 (objecting to approach
to accommodations whereby any exception to an application of a legal rule compels equiva
lent accommodation of religion). On the other hand, the Court might decide that Congress
drafted RFRA to extend the fullest constitutionally permissible protection to conscience.
Under that construction, the Establishment Clause might impose constraints on "religious"
claims within the meaning of the First Amendment that would not limit parallel nontheistic
claims.
352. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (1994) ("As used in this [Act) . . . the term 'exercise of
religion' means the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution.").
Congress in 2000 ameliorated this problem for future cases when it amended RFRA to de
fine "religious exercise" without reference to the First Amendment. See supra note 198.
RFRA now defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2001). The
new definition arguably bolsters the case for a Welsh-like reading of Federal RFRA, because
it decouples the "exercise of religion" from any "system of religious belief." The original
definition still matters in adjudicating claims for retroactive relief brought under RFRA
prior to the amendment. Cf Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (ap
plying amendment retroactively where primary relief sought was injunctive).
353. See Idleman, supra note 193, at 288 n.217 (arguing that such a reading would be
"thoroughly in derogation of clear statutory language and express constitutional intent");
Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 232-33.
354. "When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
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a strict line on this principle of construction. The Prison Litigation Re
form Act ("PLRA") imposes an automatic stay of the terms of exist
ing injunctive relief if prison officials of ' intervenors move to lift the
injunction under the new substantive standards announced by the
PLRA.356 In Miller, the Court declined to read into the automatic stay
provision an allowance for judges to suspend the automatic stay in
their equitable discretion, holding instead that Congress clearly had
intended for the automatic stay to be mandatory.357 The contrast be
tween the PLRA and Federal RFRA is illuminating. In both instances,
Congress would have wanted to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality.
In the PLRA context, however, the path of least constitutional resis
tance would have required Congress to contradict the policy of the
statute, which is to raise the hurdle prisoners must clear in order to
sustain injunctive relief. In contrast, reading Federal RFRA to en
compass nontheistic conscientious claims would be at worst irrelevant
to the policy of the statute. Congress in RFRA wanted to protect re
ligious exercise from governmental interference. Nothing in the text or
legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress affirmatively
wanted to privilege religious exercise to the exclusion of other consci
entious practices. The villain was government regulation, not secular
conscience. Thus, Miller suggests that application of the canon of con
stitutional doubt would be appropriate in construing Federal RFRA.358
avoided." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). The Court has been very assertive in imputing
meanings to statutes in order to satisfy the Ashwander directive. See, e.g. , Solid Waste
Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (refusing to accept agency's con
struction of Clean Water Act, which invoked the "outer limits" of Congress's Commerce
Clause power, without clear evidence of congressional intent, due to Court's "prudential de
sire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues"); United States v. X-Citement Video, 513
U.S. 64 (1994) (imputing scienter requirement as to age of minority to subsections of statute
prohibiting child pornography); see also Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988) (declining to construe subsection of National Labor Relations Act differently from
that of a materially identical statute in which avoidance of constitutional questions was
deemed reasonable).
355. 530 U.S. 327 (2000); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (declining to
construe reference to "substantial portion" of fetus in statute banning late-term abortions
narrowly to exclude constitutionally protected abortion procedure); DeBartolo Corp. v.
Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (holding appli
cation of canon of constitutional doubt inappropriate where "plainly contrary to the intent
of Congress"); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985) ("Statutes should be con
strued to avoid constitutional questions, but this interpretive canon is not a license for the
judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.").
356. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). The substantive provisions of the
PLRA set forth new, more stringent standards that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to win in
junctive relief against prisons or to sustain existing injunctive relief against a motion to ter
minate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
357. See Miller, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) .
358. Cf Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 73 (contending that legislative purpose should
play a relatively greater role, and plain meaning a relatively lesser role, in judicial construc
tion of statutes that borrow constitutional terminology, because "[s)tatutes that borrow Ian-
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Apart from the fundamental Establishment Clause issue, two fea
tures of RFRA provide affirmative reasons for the Court to adopt . a
Welsh construction of the Act. The first involves . another canon of
statutory construction: that the Court must, if possible, read a statute
to give effect to all its provisions.359 A strong reading of Congress's
statement that the term "exercise of religion" in RFRA means what
that term means in the Constitution would compromise RFRA by
equating the statute with the Free Exercise Clause as narrowly inter
preted in Smith.360 Thus, taking at face value Congress's equation of
the statutory and constitutional "religion" terms could render RFRA
incoherent or ineffectual.361 To avoid this conundrum, the Court might
fairly interpret the Act's definitional language as providing that . the
statutory term "exercise of religion" meant nothing less than the con
stitutional term, or that the statutory term should apply as broadly as
the broadest conception of constitutional free exercise the Court had
articulated prior to Smith.362 The Court might be reluctant to construe
RFRA's definitional language in this manner, because Congress knew
when it drafted the statute that the Smith Court had construed the
Free Exercise Clause narrowly. Congress, however, did not know con-

guage from judicial decisions, in which that language is both artful and contextually consti
tuted, simply cannot be understood as possessing meaning that is plain").
359. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 at 105 (Norman J. Singer ed.,
5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (footnotes omitted):
[T]he general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts
be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object, and if the language is sus
ceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest
object, it should receive the former construction.

See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31 (1948) ("[W]e must heed the . . . well-settled doc
trine of this Court to read a statute, assuming that it is susceptible of either of two opposed
interpretations, in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of
the legislative draftsmen.").
360. "[I]f [a statutory] definition is arbitrary, creates obvious incongruities in the statute,
defeats a major purpose of the legislation or is so discordant to common usage as to generate
confusion, it should not be used." SUTHERLAND § 47.07 at 152.
361. See Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 26 ("If courts . . . do no more than wipe Smith
itself off the books . . . then the statute will accomplish little."); cf. Eisgruber & Sager, Un
constitutional, supra note 36, at 474-75 (suggesting the Court could save RFRA from uncon
stitutionality by limiting its protection to post-Smith understanding of Free Exercise Clause);
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 132-33 (suggesting and rejecting same
narrowing construction); see also Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 25 ("A judge who perceives
that a legislature has chosen her institutional path rather than its own may erroneously in
terpret such an enactment as more of an affirmation of judicial discretion than it is meant to
be.").
362. In fact, the reason for Congress's adoption of the constitutional meaning of "exer
cise of religion" appears to have been nothing more than a desire to avoid the need for a
legislative determination whether protected religious exercise entailed religious compulsion
as opposed to mere religious motivation. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 30, at 230�31 &
n.125 (describing legislative history of RFRA's "exercise of religion" definition).
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elusively until Boerne that it lacked authority to expand the meaning
of constitutional protections when legislating under Section 5.363
Second, the context of RFRA's drafting and passage should inform
the Court's understanding of what Congress meant when it set out to
protect ''religion." Congress drafted, debated, and enacted RFRA in
1993, in response to a case that itself presented a claim the Framers
might not have accepted as "religious." The last two centuries have
brought developments in philosophy and the natural sciences that
have scattered Americans' spiritual and conscientious commitments
far beyond the range of traditional, theistic beliefs.364 Those develop
ments cast doubt on the need to limit the statutory term "religion" to
traditional, theistic belief systems. RFRA's broad support among
groups that frequently differ on questions of governmental solicitude
toward religion365 and its nearly universal . support in Congress366 are
consistent with a congressional purpose of spreading the statute's
benefits to the broadest possible set of deeply held conscientious
commitments.
Construing Federal RFRA to protect all adherents of conscien
tious belief systems from federal interference with their conscientious
exercise would bring significant benefits. First and foremost, the Act
would present no Establishment Clause problem, because it would dis
tribute benefits on an equitable basis that would have nothing to do
with the constitutionally problematic category of "religion." The po
litical will embodied in RFRA to protect freedom of conscience would
be fully effectuated in the federal sphere. In addition, the proposed
construction would dampen the Smith Court's concern about avoiding
judicial forays into questions of religious doctrine,367 a distinctly prob363. This argument would be simpler had Congress enacted an independent Federal
RFRA without applying the Act to the states through Section 5, and then defined the statu
tory term "free exercise of religion" to track the constitutional term. In that scenario, if my
arguments supra Part I are correct, Congress would have had no reason to doubt its power
to extend the concept of "free exercise of religion" as far as it wished in protecting conscien
tious beliefs against federal encroachment. Interpretation of the surviving federal applica
tions of RFRA, however, must take into account the entire Act as originally enacted.
364. See Conkle, Religious Liberty, supra note 261, at 29-32 (discussing the growing im
portance of nontheistic analogues to religion and suggesting that "the Court appears to be
lieve - perhaps with good reason - that the line between religion and nonreligion is in
creasingly thin in contemporary America"); Laycock, Continuity and Change, supra note
350, at 1079-81 (discussing ubiquity of theistic religions outside the Judeo-Christian tradi
tion, "so-called cults," New Age spirituality, and secular humanist attempts "to fill the func
tions of religion"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 592 (noting that ·�[n]onreligious
associations may perform many of the psychological, social, political, and economic func
tions commonly associated with religion").
365. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 31 and accompanying text; see also Laycock & Thomas, supra note
30,.at 244 ("The lopsided votes in both houses of Congress should send a strong message to
the judiciary that accommodating religious exercise is important.").
·

367. See supra Section Il.C.
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lematic enterprise under the First Amendment, because the RFRA
inquiry would focus on whether the claimant sincerely held any con
scientious belief that the challenged governmental practice substan
tially burdened.368
The major disadvantage of this broad construction, aside from the
interpretive complications discussed above, is that a Federal RFRA
construed to protect all manner of conscientious claims could shield
masses of people from the reach of generally applicable laws. Justice
Scalia's opinion in Smith emphasized the danger that strict scrutiny of
free exercise claims would yield "a system in which each conscience .is
a law unto itself."369 Professors Eisgruber and Sager have warned re
peatedly of the anarchic potential of a wide-ranging religious accom
modation doctrine.370 With regard to religion in particular, they ex
plain:
Religious belief need not be founded on reason, guided by reason, or
governed in any way by the reasonable. Accordingly, the demands that
religions place on the faithful, and the demands that the faithful can in
turn place on society in the name of unimpaired flourishing [of religion],
are potentially extravagant. 371

An interpretive approach that constrained RFRA within the Es
tablishment Clause, which I sketch below, would substantially allevi
ate this concern in a manner not possible under a constitutional doc
trine of mandatory exemptions.372 But my proposed broad
construction of the statutory term "religion" to extend Federal

368. "Conscience" is a difficult term to define, perhaps more difficult if less problematic
than "religion," and if the Act is construed in the manner I propose, courts will need to sort
out what sorts of claims Federal RFRA encompasses. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience,
supra note 21, at 1268-70 (discussing conceptual difficulties inherent in defining "con
science"); Smith, supra note 1 13, at 675-86 (same); cf supra notes 222-229 and accompanying
text (discussing possibility of determining whether a claim is "religious"). In the alternative,
courts could default to a deferential evaluation of the claimant's subjective conscientious
beliefs. Cf supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (proposing judicial inquiry into sub
jective sincerity of claimant's belief as an alternative to determining whether claim is objec
tively "religious" within meaning of RFRA). The Court's approach in the Vietnam-era con
scientious objector cases could provide additional guidance. See supra notes 341-346 and
accompanying text.
369. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 ( 1990).
370. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1256-57; Eisgruber & Sager,
Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 447-48.
371. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1256; see also Fish, supra note 301,
at 2255 ("All of liberalism's efforts to accommodate or tame illiberal forces fail, either by
underestimating and trivializing the illiberal impulse, or by mirroring it."). But see
McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1149-52 (suggesting that courts must subordinate
rule of law concerns to constitutional guarantee of religious freedom).
372. See infra Section IIl.D.1.
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RFRA's coverage to nontheistic conscientious claims would exacer
bate the problem.373
Fortunately, the very scope of a Federal RFRA construed to pro
tect all conscientious claims implies the means for its own limitation.
Courts should consider the potentially sweeping effects that accom
modating particular conscientious beliefs or practices would have over
a range of cases.374 This sort of analysis has led courts consistently to
deny free exercise claims for relief from the obligation to pay taxes.375
Even steadfast defenders of a strict scrutiny standard for purely relig
ious accommodation claims have acknowledged that consideration of
a given accommodation's potentially sweeping applications should in
form the compelling interest analysis to some extent.376 This approach
to the compelling interest requirement would not implicate the over
blown concern that applying strict scrutiny under a broadly construed
Federal RFRA would "water down" the standard in constitutional set-

373. "There is simply no government activity that could not compromise someone's
conscience." Loewy, supra note 58, at 107; see also Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra
note 21, at 1268-69 (pointing out that nontheistic conscientious commitments share many of
the features that cause accommodation of religious commitments to threaten the rule of
law); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 606-07 (suggesting that extending
exemptions under RFRA to encompass nontheistic claims might increase the volume of
claims sufficiently to undermine compelling governmental interests). But see Smith, supra
note 1 13, at 682-83 (noting "strong cultural currents that often cut against exercising one's
conscience").
374. See supra notes 325-328 and accompanying text.
375. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (though requirement to pay So
cial Security taxes burdened Amish employer's free exercise rights, requirement is never
theless constitutional). Courts applying RFRA have continued to deny accommodation
claims for relief from the obligation to pay taxes. See, e.g. , Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d
25 (2nd Cir. 1999) (IRS penalties and interest levied for taxes withheld on grounds of religious opposition to war did not violate RFRA).
·

376. See Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 13; at 148:
I agree that the number of potential claims is relevant to assessing the government's interest;

it matters if we know that many claims are likely. Because the government must give equal
treatment to similarly situated conscientious objectors, an exemption for one objector entails
an exemption for all others who hold the same belief. Arbitrarily exempting some and
prosecuting others similarly situated is not a less restrictive means of exempting some. So if
the government has a compelling interest in denying exemption to the whole group of simi
larly situated objectors, it also has a compelling interest in denying exemption to each one of
them.

See also id. at 149 (suggesting that government has compelling interest in denying accommo
dations in contexts, such as tax objections, where "self interest creates incentives to large
numbers of claims"); Berg, New Attacks, supra note 1 10, at 431-32; Marshall, Defense, supra
note 23, at 312. But see Durham, supra note 227, at 715 (arguing that government interest
must be assessed "by reference to the harm associated with exempting the religious claimant
alone and not by assessing the total damage if the exemption were somehow universalized or
turned into a precedent that somehow unraveled the entire governmental program").
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tings,377 because the compelling interest in maintaining the rule of law
is distinctive to the conditions such a statute would create.378
Despite the drawbacks of a Welsh-like construction of Federal
RFRA, the Court should follow this libertarian course. Doing so is, on
balance, the best way for the judicial branch to uphold the
Constitution while also effectuating the political will embodied in
RFRA to the greatest possible extent.
D. A Restrictive Approach to Interpretation: Subordinating RFRA
Accommodation Claims to the Establishment Clause
If the Court did not accept the broad interpretation of "religion"
advocated above, a second mechanism would be available to eliminate
the Establishment Clause problems raised by RFRA. The symbiosis of
Smith and RFRA replaces the federal government's political discre
tion not to accommodate religion with a firm constitutional limitation
grounded in the Establishment Clause. Reading Federal RFRA to
permit accommodation of religion within Establishment Clause
boundaries would secure the Establishment Clause against violation
under the Act while leaving a significant set of permissible applica�
tions.379

1.

Subordinating Federal RFRA to the Establishment Clause

Although RFRA's language reflects clear congressional will to
"overrule" Smith, the Act may be understood to work in conjunction
with Smith to form a regime that governs religious accommodation in
the federal sphere. RFRA states as a statutory matter that accommo
dation is required to the extent it is constitutionally permissible. Thus,
377. See supra notes 238-341 and accompanying text (refuting Smith Court's parallel
objection to broadly applying strict scrutiny under Free Exercise Clause).
378. A different potential objection to the broad construction of "religion" I propose is
that it would "water down" the potency of strict scrutiny in religious accommodation cases
by expanding the range of potential claimants and thus the threat accommodations pose to
the rule of law. This objection, of course, does not apply to constitutional religious freedom
claims, because whatever free exercise accommodation claims survived Smith (e.g., "hybrid
rights" claims) remain limited by narrow First Amendment meaning of "religion." See supra
notes 347-350 and accompanying text. As to religious accommodation claims under RFRA
itself, my contention is that the Establishment Clause would void many if not most purely
religious applications absent my proposed broad construction. Thus, there is nothing to wa
ter down.
379. Professor Lupu characterizes the Establishment Clause objection to Federal RFRA
as broader than the separation of powers objections, "because the Establishment Clause
ground would have consequences for·state legislation as well." Lupu, Reflections, supra note
49, at 810 n.84. Presumably Professor Lupu is referring to a facial Establishment Clause
attack on the Act. My suggestion that the Establishment Clause forbids some but not all
purely religious accommodations renders its consequences potentially narrower at .the fed
eral level (and perhaps in the aggregate) than the consequences of a separation of powers
problem.
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the task of courts that apply RFRA is simply to measure the scope of
the Act against the Establishment Clause.380 In the past, the jurispru
dence of religious accommodation has been complicated by the often
unstated imperative to balance free exercise against establishment
concems.381 Under Federal RFRA, the Supreme Court can administer
a meaningful regime of accommodations without having to choose be
tween competing constitutional provisions.382 It can limit its constitu
tional analysis to "monitor[ing] its religion clause jurisprudence to en
sure that the lines it has drawn pursuant to the Establishment Clause
result in an appropriate and pragmatic balance of power between
church and state. "383 The federal government likely will intensify the
Establishment Clause focus of RFRA cases by advancing its duty to

380. See Lupu, Statutes, supra note 6, at 60 & n.272 (stating that "[a]ll courts need do
with [discretionary accommodations] is measure them against the Establishment Clause" but
noting that such measurement "is no simple task"); Marshall, Defense, supra note 23, at 323
("Statutory exemptions raise the Establishment Clause issue of what the Constitution allows;
the free exercise exemption asks what the Constitution requires."); Smith, supra note 1 13, at
652-53 (noting that a religious equality statute would continue to be trumped by the First
Amendment); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 601 (suggesting that under
RFRAs the "constitutional norm of equal treatment without regard to religiosity trumps the
statutory preference for religious objectors over conscientious objectors").
381. See supra notes 283-287 and accompanying text; see also Lupu, Reconstructing, su
pra note 233, at 575-76 ("Free exercise rights trump Establishment Clause limits, but free
exercise 'values' do not . . . . By the same token, Establishment Clause 'values' do not trump
free exercise rights.").·
·

382. Enforcing Federal RFRA under a strong conception of the Establishment Clause
does not endanger the possibility that the Court might revisit Smith and expand the reach of
the Free Exercise Clause. Such freezing in place of Smith was a danger under RFRA as
originally enacted, because the Act converted almost all religious freedom claims from con
stitutional to statutory. See Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 75;
Gressman & Carmella, supra note 84, at 142; Hamilton, S�ction 5, supra note 85, at 382;
Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 254-56; see a.Isa ldleman, supra note 193, at 328-29; Lupu,
Codification, supra note 83, at 580-82 (discussing general danger that religious freedom leg
islation will cause "atrophy" in development of constitutional religious freedom norms). Af
ter Boerne, however, any free exercise claim against a state or local government could pro
vide a vehicle for overruling Smith.
383. Hamilton, Unconstitutional, supra note 14, at 12. Professor Hamilton emphasizes
the Court's duty to enforce the Establishment Clause in accommodation cases as a reason to
reject RFRA. See id. In my view, RFRA makes that duty far easier to perform than it was
under the Sherbert era's constitutional tension between the religion clauses. Indeed, Federal
RFRA may enhance the scope of judicial review of accommodations under the Establish
ment Clause. Professor McConnell noted prior to RFRA's enactment that "[legislative]
[a]ccommodation can be accomplished by inaction just as it can by action . . . . [L]egislatures
can simply refrain from passing laws that burden the exercise of religion by mainstream
groups, and there is nothing the Establishment Clause can do about this." McConnell, Revi
sionism, supra note 21, at 1132. Under Federal RFRA, Congress need not fear that any gen
erally applicable law will substantially burden religious practice; thus, it may enact some laws
that previously it would have foregone. The Court, however, may then have an opportunity
to weigh religious believers' claims for exemption from such laws against the Establishment
Clause. Until and unless Congress begins to consider the danger of judicial action, the net
result under RFRA should be a federal regulatory structure in which favoritism toward re
ligion plays a lesser role.
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avoid establishments as the compelling interest that justifies depar
tures from Federal RFRA's mandate.384
The Eighth Circuit's In re Young385 decision is an example of an
application of RFRA that should have been scrutinized and rejected
under the Establishment Clause. That court properly rejected a facial
challenge to Federal RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds386 but
declined to consider the possibility that applying RFRA to the case at
bar might offend the Establishment Clause. To award religious believ
ers a special exemption from bankruptcy law, a mechanism provided
by the federal government to sort out private rights under circum
stances of financial hardship, does not protect religious exercise. Re
ligious exercise, like any expression of conscience, is necessarily sub
ject to material constraints of the believer's own making.387 Rather, the
result in Young advanced religion by protecting a church's coffers, and
the court created a strong appearance of endorsement by validating a
purported congressional decision to favor churches' creditors.388
384. Cf Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ . . of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46 ( 1995) (rejecting
state's argument that Establishment Clause prevented it from funding religious publication
at public university); see Brownstein, supra note 288, at 611 (contending that government's
duty to avoid establishments should provide compelling interest to prevent RFRAs from
providing exemptions from content-neutral speech regulations); Chemerinsky, Establish
ment Clause, supra note 272, at 657-58. Professor Chemerinsky implies that the Establish
ment Clause is relevan t in RFRA cases only if the government invokes the clause as the
source of its compelling interest in denying a RFRA claim. See id. at 657 (contending that
"the Establishment Clause is not irrelevant under a state RFRA" because " [t]he government
should be regarded as having a compelling interest in not violating the Establishment
Clause"). Courts, however, have the prerogative and the duty to raise the Establishment
Clause sua sponte where appropriate, in order to prevent their own actions in enforcing
RFRA claims from establishing religion. Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 ( 1948) (holding
that judicial enforcement of private discrimination violates Equal Protection Clause).
385. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854 ( 1998).
For a description of the Young case, see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
386. See id. at 861-63.
387. In this sense Young differs significantly from cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 ( 1963). In Sherbert, the Court determined that the claimant, who lost her job because she
followed her religious tenet of refusing to work on Saturday, was not voluntarily unem
ployed. Her lack of employment was, in a sense, her own choice, but her religious convic
tions motivated that choice, and the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause pre
cluded the state from punishing her for adhering to those convictions. See id. at 409-10. In
contrast, the bankruptcy of the claimants in Young presumably had nothing to do with their
religious convictions: it was, instead, a consequence of nonreligious choices (and circum
stances), but one that happened to affect their ability to tithe to their church. In Sherbert, the
Court barred the government from penalizing a religious believer based on her religious ex
ercise. In Young, the court forced the government to grant religious believers a special re
prieve from the consequences of their nonconscientious actions.
388. The Eighth Circuit has not been alone in its errant application of RFRA in bank
ruptcy cases. See Magic Valley Evangelical Free Church v. Fitzgerald (Jn re Hodge), 220
B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998 ) (RFRA provided defense to Chapter 7 trustee's action to recover
tithing payments made by debtors to their church). But see Hartvig v. Tri-City Temple of
Milwaukie (Jn re Gomes), 219 B.R. 286 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) (recovery of debtors' tithes and
offerings to church by Chapter 7 trustee did not violate RFRA); cf Waguespack v.
Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31 (W.D. La. 1998 ) (holding that Boerne declared RFRA unconstitu-
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Subordinating RFRA to the Establishment Clause, like the alter
nate interpretive course of broadly construing the statutory term "re
ligion," would relieve courts of the need to balance and reconcile es
tablishment and free exercise principles. In addition, this more
restrictive approach would dramatically limit the breadth of Federal
RFRA's coverage, thereby alleviating rule of law concerns.389 On the
other hand, the Act under this construction would do less than under
the libertarian construction to effectuate Congress's intent to protect
religious exercise to the broadest possible extent. The restrictive con
struction, by keeping the focus of RFRA on "religion" as understood
in the Constitution, also would have the disadvantage of requiring
courts to engage with religious substance. In addition, Rodney Smith
has suggested - approvingly - that religious liberty statutes might
influence courts to soften their applications of the Establishment
Clause at the margin.390 The likelihood that courts would follow such
an approach to Federal RFRA is uncertain, but from a separationist
standpoint it is a danger that cannot be ignored.
RFRA's critics might see this analysis as an alternative route to
their conclusion that the Act, in all its applications, must fall before
the Establishment Clause.391 Certainly, under the formulation of the
Establishment Clause I am applying here,392 many conceivable ac
commodations will be barred in regulatory fields ranging from immi
gration to criminal law to taxation. Likewise, direct governmental sub
sidies of religious practice, whether demanded under RFRA or
volunteered, raise unacceptable establishment concerns on both sym
bolic and fiscal grounds.393 Significant accommodation, however, is
tional in its totality; thus, RFRA has no application as to claim that denial of debtors' tithing
infringes on their free exercise).

389. See supra notes 369-373 and accompanying text.
390. See Smith, supra note 113, at 653-54.
391. See, e.g., Marshall, Concerns, supra note 14, at 242 (suggesting that applications of
RFRA might present a categorical problem under the endorsement test for Establishment
Clause violations); cf ldleman, supra note 193, at 325-27 (lamenting possibility that interpre
tation of RFRA in light of the Establishment Clause might result in extremely narrow con
struction).
392. See supra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
393. Cf Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding that state finan
cial aid programs for nonpublic schools serving low-income families, ·and for parents of pu
pils of such schools, violate the Establishment Clause by subsidizing and advancing religious
activities of sectarian schools); see Sullivan, supra note 26, at 209-10 (explaining that forcing
the public to fund religious activities "will cause profound divisiveness and offense"). But see
Perry, supra note 298, at 322 (arguing that Establishment Clause permits direct aid to relig
ious entities if "the aid is provided on a religiously neutral basis" and "the aid program is not
a subterfuge for discriminating in favor of one or more religions in relation to one or more
other religions or to no religion"). Professors Eisgruber and Sager argue generally that
purely religious exemptions are indistinguishable from subsidies of religious institutions, and
thus they assail "the incongruity of calling for exemptions on the one hand while renouncing
subsidies on the other." Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 106. The equa
tion of exemptions with subsidies may be accurate in many circumstances, but it does not

1992

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 99:1903

permissible under the Establishment Clause, even if RFRA extends
only to "religious belief" as conventionally understood.

2.

Some Permissible Religious Accommodations Under Federal
RFRA

The question of what applications of Federal RFRA, as construed
in the restrictive manner just articulated, would be permissible under
the Establishment Clause implicates debates about what accommoda
tions the Court should understand the Free Exercise Clause to man
date and what accommodations legislatures may choose to make.394
This brief discussion aims not to resolve those debates, nor to diagram
the full set of accommodations that federal . courts might or should al
low under RFRA.395 I merely want to set forth two important catego
ries of mandatory statutory accommodations that I believe are permis
sible under a separationist conception of the Establishment Clause, in
order to demonstrate that a RFRA subordinated to the Establishment
Clause would still have meaningful impact. Both of these categories of
religious accommodations can be justified and understood without re
gard to religion - the first as a nondiscrimination principle, the sec
ond as a utilitarian principle.
a. Egalitarian accommodations
First, Federal RFRA can bolster the constitutional protection
against religious discrimination. The law of free exercise typically di
vides legal affronts to religious practice into two categories: (a) willful
state action that discriminates against a particular religion or against
religion in general, and (b) neutral state action that incidentally bur
dens religion. The Court in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City

describe the categories of purely religious accommodations defended below. See infra Sec
tion III.D.2.a. (discussing egalitarian accommodations); infra Section 111.D.2.b. (discussing
idiosyncratic accommodations). A straightforward equation of exemptions with sut.sidies
misses the emphasis that Establishment Clause doctrine properly places on the apparent
character of a government action, a factor manifest in the purpose inquiry under the Lemon
test and central to the endorsement test. See supra notes 273-277 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 290-295 and accompanying text.
395. Others have offered general theories of permissible legislative accommodation. See
Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 45-51 (suggesting interpretive theory to prevent establish
ments under RFRA, focused on avoiding accommodations that coerce or strongly encourage
religious participation and emphasizing accommodations' function of guaranteeing "auton
omy" for religious practices; McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 710-12 (suggesting ways
in which "government's authority to accommodate is broader than its obligation to accom
modate under pre-Smith law"); Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 600-08
(recognizing "the possibility tha.t some religion-only exemptions are constitutional and oth
ers aren't," and accordingly attempting to identify critical questions that need to be an
swered in order to sort out religious exemptions that may violate the Establishment Clause
from those that do not).

August 2001)

RFRA and Federal Law

1993

of Hialeah396 confirmed that the first category requires strict scrutiny,
while Smith held that the second does not. But a third sort of case does
not fit comfortably into either category: neutral state action that, over
a range of cases, disproportionately burdens some religions - typi
cally minority religions - while expressly or implicitly accommodat
ing others. Although courts generally lump such state actions with the
second, "incidental burdens" category, they raise a different, more se
rious problem. It is one thing if a neutral law - a building code, say happens to hamper a minority religion and not a majority religion in a
particular case. It is another thing if a law intended to be neutral, such
as a provision for worship opportunities in a federal prison, is designed
in a way that systematically discriminates against a particular religion.
Because of the nondiscrimination principle at the core of free exercise
doctrine, such discriminatory effects warrant close scrutiny,397 but the
Court in Lukumi extended constitutional protection only against will
ful discrimination.
Part of the problem is that the conventional antidiscrimination
norm that similarly situated persons must be treated similarly does not
always recognize discrimination whe.re similarities in situation are not
obvious.398 In the words of Professors Eisgruber arid Sager:
[T]he deep concerns of religious believers can differ sharply from each
other and from widely shared secular concerns; systems of religious be
lief can rest on radically distinct epistemologies and be inaccessible to the
reason and intuitions of nonbelievers; and religious believers may be
tempted to celebrate or reward their own faith, even . while filled with
396. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or
not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the com
mands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests
of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests."); see also
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (striking down provision in state's charitable solicita
tion statute that required only those religions that receive more than half their financial sup
port from members to register and report).
397. See McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at 706 ("[T)he logic of the Religion Clauses
requires that accommodations be extended to all comparable religious practices unless the
government has sufficient justification for differential treatment."); see also Lupu, Burdens,
supra note 29, at 982-87 (arguing that Equal Protection Clause must be invoked to prevent
religious discrimination). But see Volokh, Common-Law Model, supra note 12, at 1542-44
(arguing that democratic process properly may set policies that have differential effects on
different religions). I do not extend the egalitarian principle, as Professor McConnell does,
to encompass consideration of counterfactuals in which the majority must adhere to a base
line defined by a minority religious practice. See, e.g. , McConnell, Update, supra note 195, at
706 (arguing that government should accommodate religion-motivated desire not to make
social security contributions because it would make such an accommodation if the majority
shared that desire). My view is that courts under Federal RFRA may require the govern
ment to accommodate minority religions to the same extent majority religions are, in fact,
accommodated.
398. This insight has been richly developed in the literature on race-based and gender
based discrimination. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286-87 (1991).
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loving concern for the souls of nonbelievers. As a result, the interests of
religious believers may be invisible, or may appear as mere tastes or even
delusions, from the standpoint of outside observers.399

Strict scrutiny forces courts to examine seemingly dissimilar relig
ious practices in the same light. Some religious practices, of course, are
distinct in ways that will make a difference under strict scrutiny. For
example, a plausible argument exists that the federal government has
a compelling interest in preventing the abuse of peyote, which could
justify enforcing the ban on that drug even as to its religious uses, but
lacks a similarly compelling interest in preventing the abuse of wine.400
The requirement of showing a compelling interest, however, ensures
that similar religious practices will not be treated differently simply
because government decisionmakers and reviewing courts fail to no
tice their similarity.401 Far from creating any Establishment Clause
problem, using RFRA to root out unwitting government discrimina-

399. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1298-99; see also Laycock, Neu
trality, supra note 29, at 1015-16 ("The practice of a small faith may be forbidden just be
cause the legislature did not know about it and never considered its needs."); Lupu, Reflec
tions, supra note 49, at 800 (noting that "[e]lected politicians will rarely be insensitive to
mainstream religions, but they may readily overlook the interests of other religious tradi
tions"); Pepper, supra note 229, at 314 (observing that, although the religious majority is un
likely to disadvantage itself, it is likely to impose inadvertently on the interests of minority
religions); Sherry, supra note 29, at 145 ("Those who oppose exemptions for believers often
fail to see that neutral laws, rigidly applied, constitute a form of discrimination against be
lievers . . . "); Sullivan, supra note 26, at 2fJ7 ("[m]ajority practices are myopically seen by
their own practitioners as uncontroversial").
400. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in Smith on this basis, strongly dis
agreeing with the Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny but concluding that, under that test,
Oregon had a compelling interest in preventing abuse of peyote that justified a ban on the
drug even in the religious setting. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); cf id. at 913 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (analogizing Native American
Church's ritual use of peyote to Catholic Church's ritual use of wine, and noting lack of
compelling interest in preventing alcohol abuse that would justify banning wine in the relig
ious setting). But see McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 21, at 1 135 ("Evidence in the
Smith case showed that ingestion of peyote by members of the Native American Church is
not dangerous and does not lead to drug problems or substance abuse.").
401. See Laycock, Remnants, supra note 21, at 15 (arguing that courts, unlike legisla
tures, are bound "to treat like cases alike"); Lupu, Reconstructing, supra note 233, at 600-09
(developing reasons why courts are preferable to legislatures in defining religious accommo
dations); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 50, at 157 (explaining that strict scrutiny "re
quire[s] government officials to think seriously about the feasibility of accommodations and
[gives] aggrieved persons the right to a hearing on the accommodation issue from a more
disinterested governmental figure, a judge"). But see Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra
note 36, at 130 (asserting that strict scrutiny "is too blunt and too invasive to serve as a sen
sible vehicle for identifying instances of disparate impact or disparate treatment"); Sherry,
supra note 29, at 128 (arguing that Sherbert-era strong-Establishment, strong-Free Exercise
regime allowed Court "to pick and choose among religions" in accommodation decisions);
Tushnet, supra note 212, at 381-83 (contending that courts are likely to favor mainstream
religious claimants). The possibility that cultural disconnect may lead to underprotection of
minority religions absent strict scrutiny is exacerbated by the coincidence between religious
and racial minority status. See Laycock, Act, supra note 25, at 226-27 (discussing cases in
which courts denied accommodations to African-American and Hmong religious believers).
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tion against religion minimizes the extent to which the government af
fords any particular religion preferential treatment.402
Egalitarian themes are familiar in accounts of constitutional free
exercise protection.403 The most prominent example in recent scholar
ship is the "equal regard" formulation of Professors Eisgruber and
Sager, which "requires that the state treat the deep, religiously in
spired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as
that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally."404 That prin
ciple protects religious interests somewhat more broadly than my no
tion of egalitarian accommodations under RFRA, which would re
quire courts to accord minority religions only the same level of
accommodation accorded other religions, not necessarily the same
level of accommodation accorded any nonreligious interest. In addi
tion, Professors Eisgruber and Sager would impose a distinct "reason
ableness" requirement for judicial validation of secular claims.405 The
differences in appropriate equality principles under the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA reflect the understanding that the Act is subordi
nate to the Establishment Clause.
b. Idiosyncratic accommodations
Second, Federal RFRA may appropriately be applied in "idiosyn
cratic" cases, where granting a religious believer's request for accom
modation would neither deny adherents of other religions, or of no
religion, any benefit that they want and have a factual basis for claim402. Professor Marshall objects to equality justifications for generalized religious ac
commodations on the theory that two wrongs don't make a right: if an accommodation vio
lates the Establishment Clause, expanding its scope to benefit minority religions would ex
pand the violation. See Marshall, Exemption, supra note 25, at 379-80. Courts certainly
should address substantive establishment concerns in RFRA cases where they arise. It seems
unlikely, however, that discrimination in accommodations stops at the elusive line where
accommodations begin to satisfy the Establishment Clause. To the extent Federal RFRA
leads courts to conclude that accommodations violate the Establishment Clause, fairness will
be enhanced because all religions will be subjected to the same establishment bar.
403. A particularly rich examination of equality and antidiscrimination themes in free
exercise jurisprudence is scattered throughout Symposium, Religious Liberty at the Dawn of
a New Millennium, 75 IND. L.J. 1 (2000) . See Conkle, Religious Liberty, supra note 261, at 524 (discussing ascendance in religion clause jurisprudence of ideas of denominational equal
ity and formal neutrality); Gedicks, Normalized, supra note 50 (assessing free exercise juris
prudence in light of equal protection jurisprudence); Marshall, Equality, supra note 236
(analyzing and advocating equality principle as basis for religion clause jurisprudence); cf
Smith, supra note 339, at 62-70 (criticizing prominence of equality rhetoric in religious free
dom scholarship and jurisprudence).
404. Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1285; see also id. at 1277-82 (con
tending that equal regard principle explains pre-Smith cases in which Court granted free ex
ercise exemptions); Eisgruber & Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 449-50 (same);
Eisgruber & Sager, After Boerne, supra note 36, at 104-05 (arguing that Smith and Boerne
decisions are best understood as adopting an equal regard approach); cf McConnell, Sin
gling Out, supra note 11, at 32-38 (criticizing equal regard theory).
405. See Eisgruber & Sager, Conscience, supra note 21, at 1291-97.
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ing, nor impose substantial costs on nonbeneficiaries. As discussed
above, most of the objections to purely religious accommodations em
phasize the problem of favoring religion over nonreligion.406 Providing
a religious accommodation is less problematic when few nonbelievers
want it, because the religious benefit does not entail distribution of
scarce resources based on religion.407 A variation on the idiosyncratic
accommodation is a benefit that believers in other religions or nonbe
lievers might want but lack any factual (as opposed to doctrinal or
spiritual) predicate for claiming. Both sorts of idiosyncratic accommo
dations avoid the problem of favoring religious interests.408 The idea of
idiosyncratic accommodation resembles the notion of measuring per
missible accommodations based on the absence of externalized
costs,409 but it takes account of the sometimes invisible cost of unmet
desire on the part of nonrecipients. Even if a believer's accommoda
tion costs a nonbeliever nothing, separationist values are threatened if
the nonbeliever values and has a factual basis for claiming the accom
modation.
Goldman v. Weinberger410 demonstrates the viability of idiosyn
cratic accommodations. In that case, an Orthodox Jewish Air Force
doctor sought the right to wear a yarmulke with his uniform, in con
travention of a military restriction that forbade the wearing of head
gear indoors. The Court rejected the free exercise claim, deferring al
most completely to the military's assertion that the requested

406. See supra notes 293-295 and accompanying text.
407. Loewy, supra note 58, at 115; see also Greenawalt, Religious Law, supra note 25, at
840 ("In determining whether a religion is impermissibly assisted, a court should ask whether
other groups have similar needs that are unmet."). Arnold Loewy notes another advantage
of accommodations not sought by nonbelievers: "the general undesirability of the benefit
sought is some evidence of, though certainly not a perfect proxy for, sincerity." Loewy, supra
note 58, at 115; see also Berg, Congress, supra note 26, at 43 (arguing that accommodation
requests that "coincide[] strongly with secular self-interest" will be more likely to "encour
age many other claims, including false ones that may be difficult to identify"). Thus, idiosyn
cratic accommodations avoid not only the Establishment Clause concern with religious ac
commodations but also the rule of law concern of Smith.
408. By contending that courts may apply RFRA to require idiosyncratic accommoda
tions, I do not mean to suggest that they must grant accommodations in all instances, such as
voluntary human sacrifice, where the government asserts paternalistic concerns for the lives
or safety of consenting believers. See Volokh, Intermediate Questions, supra note 36, at 62430 (discussing paternalistic justifications for nonaccommodation). Certainly such concerns
may amount to compelling government interests. My point is simply that idiosyncratic ac
commodations generally should not violate the Establishment Clause.
409. See supra note 336. Other close analogues to the idiosyncratic accommodation idea
include Professors Eisgruber and Sager's suggestion that accommodations might not violate
the Establishment Clause where the challenged government policy is "irrational," Eisgruber
& Sager, Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 455 n.66, and cases in which a religious believer
seeks equal access to a nonfinite state resource, which the Court has analyzed under the
nondiscrimination norm of the Free Speech Clause. See cases cited supra note 279.
410. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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accommodation would undermine order and discipline.411 Strict scru
tiny of the claim in Goldman would have compelled the Court to
strike what was a close balance even under rationality review in favor
of the claimant. Accommodation would have given him what he
wanted while denying nothing to devotees of other conscientious be
liefs, theistic or otherwise. Most people who did not share Goldman's
religious beliefs would not care one way or another about accommo
dating his preference. Others might have wanted the same accommo
dation but lacked a basis for claiming it because their preferred relig
ious headgear or attire would have presented bona fide concerns
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.412 Requiring the government to
make a strong showing before interfering with a religious practice that
matters to the claimant but not to everyone else comports with Estab
lishment Clause values.
.

CONCLU S ION

In the federal sphere, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act con
strains only federal power, reflecting a congressional precommitment
to heightened protection for religious exercise. That precommitment
required no exercise of constitutional power and has nothing to do
with the Court's prerogatives to interpret and apply constitutional
principles. The courts' proper role in applying a legislative precom
mitment to "overprotect" rights is to prevent violations of the rights
secured by the Constitution. Federal RFRA presents a serious danger
of Establishment Clause violations, but ".Ourts can defuse that danger
through careful construction and application of the Act. The Supreme
Court can, and should, construe the Act as applying to all deeply held
conscientious beliefs, thereby maximizing the Act's effectiveness while
411. Id. at 507-10. Congress subsequently overruled Goldman, passing a statute that al
lowed military personnel to wear "neat and conservative" attire compelled by their religious
beliefs. 10 U.S.C. § 774(b)(2) (1994).
412. Justice Stevens, concurring in Goldman, argued that allowing Goldman to wear a
yarmulke presented a danger that the military might in the future confront a claim by a Sikh
to wear a turban or a Rastafarian to wear dreadlocks. In Justice Stevens's view, " (t]he Air
Force has no business drawing distinctions between such persons when it is enforcing com
mands of universal application." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring). A yar
mulke, however, differs from dreadlocks or a turban in that it does not protrude from the
head. The military might well establish a compelling interest in barring protruding headgear.
Federal RFRA, by requiring strict scrutiny, would alleviate what appears to be Justice
Stevens's driving concern - that such distinctions would reflect discriminatory premises
rather than actual differences. See supra Section 111.D.2.a. Moreover, Justice Stevens's
premise - that any regime of accommodation will lead to discrimination - discounts the
possibility, later made manifest in Smith, that a regime of ostensible nonaccommodation
could result in discriminatory preferences for majority religions. See supra notes 252-255 and
accompanying text; cf Conkle, Constitutional Significance, supra note 130, at 77 n.187
("RFRA's generalized scheme of accommodations might actually mitigate one Establish
ment Clause concern, the risk of selective accommodations that discriminate among similar
religious claims").
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eliminating any favoritism it shows religious commitments over non
theistic commitments of conscience. Alternatively, courts simply can
subordinate all accommodation claims, which now have a strictly
statutory basis, to the Establishment Clause, and mandate only those
accommodations that comport with secular values. Separationists and
defenders of judicial authority should spend their energy encouraging
prudent, rights-regarding adjudication of RFRA's applications to fed
eral law, rather than urging the Court to overstep its authority and
strike those applications down.

